UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

DP 39

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFUGEE FLOWS FROM SOUTH-WEST SUDAN, 1986-1988

by David Keen

November 1992

The **United Nations Research Institute for Social Development** is an autonomous body which conducts research on key issues of contemporary social development. Current research themes include **Crisis, Adjustment and Social Change; Environment, Sustainable Development and Social Change; Ethnic Conflict and Development; Social and Development Indicators; Political Violence and Social Movements; Refugees, Returnees and Local Society; Socio-economic and Political Consequences of the International Trade in Illicit Drugs** and **Participation and Changes in Property Relations in Communist and Post-communist societies.**

A list of the Institute's free and priced publications can be obtained from the Reference Centre.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

(41.22) 798.84.00/798.58.50
Fax (41.22) 740.07.91
Telex 41.29.62 UNO CH

ISSN 1012-6511

PREFACE

This paper forms part of the Institute's research project on refugees, displaced persons and humanitarian assistance, co-ordinated by Hubert Morsink. Over the past four years, this research has focused on two themes: the interaction between refugees and the host society and the integration of returning refugees in their country of origin. The former issue was explored in case studies of Angolan and Guatemalan refugees in Zambia and Mexico respectively. The latter topic has been covered in studies in Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

The present paper contains an analysis of refugee flows from south-west Sudan over the period 1986-1988. The author focuses on an area that was subject to severe and intensifying famine and that generated a major flow of refugees to Ethiopia as well as very large numbers of "internal migrants" who moved to northern Sudan. He argues that all too often there is a tendency to take a purely "humanitarian" attitude to the problems of famines and to regard refugees as an unfortunate product of civil wars and social conflicts. A deeper examination of the events leading to famines and refugees reveals a disturbing picture of active intervention by powerful agencies and groups to create such situations to serve their political and material interests.

After a brief survey of the history of southern Sudan, the author examines the pull and push factors which drove the Dinka people to abandon their homes. The pull factors include their ethnic ties with people across the border, trading possibilities in the refugee camps, the prospects for better education for their children in the camps and security in the SPLA-controlled areas. The journey to the camps was, however, extremely hazardous and nearly a quarter of the people perished en route. Thus it was the push factors which were predominant in the Dinka people's decision to brave the onerous journey. These included murderous raids by the enemy, the loss of cattle and grain, impoverishment, hunger and starvation.

The author argues that these conditions were deliberately created by successive governments and powerful interest groups to serve their own ends. Military authorities encouraged Baggara tribesmen to launch raids in the Dinka areas to steal cattle and grain and to drive them from their areas. The "captured" Dinka were used as cheap labour in slave-like conditions. The merchants profited from grain scarcity and forced sales of cattle and often collaborated with the raiders and military authorities. Soldiers and officials in successive administrations also shared in the profits from transport, trading and expropriation of cattle and other assets. The government was interested in gaining complete control of areas potentially rich in oil and other resources. The vast land resources of the region appeared to provide a solution to the land-hunger generated by horizontally expanding mechanised agriculture. This constellation of interest groups went so far as to obstruct relief supplies to the beleaguered people. The author alleges that the donor community and international agencies made little attempt to go beyond government definitions of when and where relief would be acceptable.

November 1992

Dharam Ghai
Director

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the British Economic and Social Research Council for contributing towards the cost of this research; also to UNRISD for subsidising the writing of this paper. Amrita Rangasami, Alexander de Waal and Megan Vaughan have all helped me a great deal with my research. I am grateful also to Douglas Johnson for his general comments.

Map 1. SUDAN


EGYPT
LIBYA
Red Sea
RED SEA
Port Sudan
NORTHERN
NILE
CHAD
KHARTOUM
Khartoum
KASSALA
Kassala
EL GEZIRA
Wad Medani
DARFUR
KORDOFAN
WHITE NILE
El Obeid
NILE
Nyala
BLUE NILE
ETHIOPIA
Babanusa
Meiram
Abyei
Bentiu
UPPER NILE
BAHR EL GHAZAL
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Wau
JONGLEI
EL BUHEYRAT
EQUATORIA
Area under study
ZAIRE
UGANDA
KENYA

Map 2. Where north meets south: Ethnic groups in the famine's epicentre, south-west Sudan



Introduction

This study focuses on an area of south-west Sudan (delineated in map 1) that was subject to severe and intensifying famine in the period 1985-1988 and that yielded a major flow of refugees to Ethiopia as well as very large numbers of "internal migrants" who moved to northern Sudan.

The purpose of this research is to analyse the root causes of refugee movements from this area, movements which originated primarily among the Dinka in northern Bahr el Ghazal and elements of the Nuer in western Upper Nile. The analysis will attempt to go beyond the common assertion that war creates famine and refugees, and to throw light on the precise connections between "war" and these phenomena. It seeks to avoid the assumption that war, famine and refugee flows are simply **dysfunctions** and to explore the possibility that they may be **functional** for certain groups.

The role of international donors and the United Nations in addressing this emergency, and their interaction with powerful groups within Sudan, will be examined. It is hoped that by examining the historical, political and economic processes that created a major human catastrophe in this area of southern Sudan, it will be possible to suggest ways in which international interventions could be improved.

This research is informed by field trips to Khartoum and famine-affected areas of southern Kordofan and southern Darfur in 1988. The study draws on a variety of sources and disciplines. The sources include: archives of aid agencies and donor organizations; Sudan government records relating to the distribution of relief; historical material on the area affected by the famine; and interviews with Sudanese government officials, aid officials and people from Bahr el Ghazal who were suffering from famine. By tapping a great variety of sources, it is hoped that the research can highlight the different meanings of famine and upheaval for different groups of people: in this sense, the research is informed by sociological thinking, as well as by political economy. There is a further sociological dimension to the approach adopted here: following Foucault (1978, 1981), the paper seeks to examine not simply the practices of officials (in this case, international donors) in relation to a social problem, but also the relationship between this practice and the way that policy and social problems were discussed.

I. Some perspectives on famine and migration

Contemporary academic discourse on famine and relief has been greatly influenced by the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen. According to Sen (1981), famine was very closely linked with poverty, and specifically with a fall in individual "entitlements" to food. He showed that famine might occur where food supplies were abundant but where, for example, grain prices had risen sharply or wages had fallen. In 1989, Sen and Drèze turned their attention to relief, and simultaneously added a more political element to Sen's previous analysis, which had fallen largely within an economic framework. Sen and Drèze (1989) noted that governments (particularly if they were not democratic) might fail to take action to relieve famine, with such inaction resulting from "negligence or smugness or callousness on the part of the non-responding authorities".

The possibility that states and politically-powerful groups might **actively promote famine** (and actively obstruct relief) for rational purposes of their own was not addressed. Indeed, the Drèze/Sen conception of the state was essentially a liberal one, in which the failure to act in the "public interest" was conceived as a failure of "public policy". Famine was depicted as an "economic disaster"; the possibility that it might actually serve a number of important **functions** was not explored.

An important alternative perspective on famine has been offered by the Indian sociologist Amrita Rangasami. Significantly, she portrays famine not as a discrete event but as a **process,** often a very extended one.

Rangasami has suggested that "...the famine process cannot be defined with reference to the victims of starvation alone. It is a process in which benefits accrue to one section of the community while losses flow to the other" (Rangasami, 1985). It is, she elaborates, "a process during which pressure or force (economic, military, political, social, psychological) is exerted upon the victim community", progressively depriving it of assets (including the ability to labour).

Drawing on **local** understandings of famine in India in particular, Rangasami specifically challenges Sen's notion that famine involves mortality. For her, famine may **culminate** in mortality if there is no effective intervention early in the famine process; but it should not be identified with mortality. She stresses that famine is likely to be an extended process, not a sudden event. The "aimless wandering" of people, although deemed a "premonitory sign" of famine by officials in late-nineteenth century India, actually came only at the final stages of famine (Rangasami, 1985).

My analysis of the causes of refugee flows from south-west Sudan is informed by Rangasami's "alternative perspective" on famine. It seeks to understand the **processes** that created famine and outmigration, to analyse the ways in which these processes were shaped by the use of force, and to explore the possible **benefits** accruing to particular groups from these processes. Following the emphasis of Rangasami and Alexander de Waal – who both stress that local definitions of famine (in India and Sudan) equate it with social and economic disruption rather than simply with starvation – I take outmigration to be an integral part of the famine process, a process which may **culminate** in starvation if left unchecked.

II. The pattern of refugee flows

Refugees flows from Sudan into western Ethiopia embraced groups from all over southern Sudan. These refugees fled hunger, fighting, disease, or some combination of these (WFP/FAO/UNICEF, 1991; UNICEF, 1991).

Those who fled the case-study area constituted only a portion of the refugees who ended up in Ethiopia. Nor was Ethiopia the only destination for southern Sudanese refugees. For example, many thousands of Azande went to join their fellow Azande in Zaire and Central African Republic (WFP/FAO/UNICEF, 1991).

Much of the early fighting in Sudan's second civil war, which broke out in 1983, took place in Upper Nile province. Many thousands fled from there to Ethiopia from 1983 onwards, with many thousands more fleeing north to the capital Khartoum (WFP/FAO/UNICEF, 1991).

Migrations from northern Bahr el Ghazal – a trek of 600 kilometres or more – were observed after heavy raiding from the north in the dry season of 1986-1987. Young men headed overwhelmingly for Ethiopia (Ryle, 1989; Interdonor memo., 1988), while women, children and older men were more likely to head into northern Sudan (Interagency Situation Report, 1988). The 1987-1988 dry season saw increased outmigration from Bahr el Ghazal. In the last quarter of 1987, there was a surge in migration to Ethiopia, with migrants arriving in Ethiopian camps at a rate of 10,000 per month (**Sudan Times**, June 19th 1988). This movement continued in 1988, with northern Sudan and the southern government-held garrison towns of Aweil and Wau also experiencing major influxes of very malnourished Dinka migrants. In the three months from February to April 1988, about 40,000 people arrived in Ethiopia from Bahr el Ghazal (**Sudan Times**, May 3rd 1988), with much fewer numbers from Upper Nile (Interdonor memo., 1988).

By mid-March 1988, there were reported to be some 255,000 southern Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia (ACP-EEC, 1988). By the end of 1988, UNHCR estimated total numbers of Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia at some 350,000. About 11,500 of these had arrived in the last three months of 1988, after the summer rainy season (USCR, 1989).

Among the camps in western Ethiopia, Itang was the largest. At the end of March 1988, it was reported to have a population of 176,840, with refugees arriving at a rate of some 7,000-8,000 a month (ACP-EEC, 1988; UNHCR, 1988). The camp had perhaps 220,000 people by the end of 1988 (USCR, 1989).

Ethnic breakdowns of those in the camp in March 1988 revealed that 47-48 per cent were Dinka and 32-37 per cent were Nuer (estimates from UNHCR, 1988 and ACP-EEC, 1988). There were also Shilluk, Anwak and Nuba. Adult males (deemed, for survey purposes, to be those aged 15 and over) made up some 66 per cent of those in the camp, adult females some 11 per cent, boys 15 per cent and girls some 8 per cent. About 41 per cent of the camp population were from Upper Nile province, 20 per cent from Equatoria region, 15 per cent from Bahr el Ghazal province and 11 per cent from the Lakes Provinces.

The health of those arriving in Ethiopia was usually very poor. The US Committee for Refugees commented, "The physical condition of Sudanese refugees arriving in Ethiopia has been among the worst ever seen" (USCR, 1989).

Levels of malnutrition were very high, and many of those there had eaten only leaves and roots on their long walk east. Some had walked for up to three months. Many were boys and young men whose families had fled elsewhere in Sudan, or whose families had simply been killed.

Itang camp, moreover, was extremely overcrowded. It was reported in March that no sub-units had been made within the camp, something that contributed to poor sanitation conditions. There was safe water for only 20 per cent of the camp population, with the rest having to resort to taking water directly from the local river.

Fugnido camp (south-east of Itang) opened at the end of November 1987, in response to overcrowding at Itang. By the end of March 1988, it already had more than 23,500 inhabitants, mostly Dinka and Nuer (ACP-EEC, 1988; UNHCR, 1988). The camp held some 44,000 people by the end of 1988 (USCR, 1989). Amazingly, over half the camp population in the spring of 1988 consisted of boys under the age of 15.

Preparations at Fugnido camp were inadequate, with newly-arriving people facing poor infrastructure, inadequate storage centres, insanitary conditions and insufficient medical staff and equipment (ACP-EEC, 1988; UNHCR, 1988). Malnutrition rates were high, as were mortality rates - over 2 per 10,000 people per day between the camp's opening in November 1987 and the end of March 1988 (UNHCR, 1988)

In a general comment on the camps in western Ethiopia, the US Committee for Refugees said in its 1988 annual report: "The Ethiopian government, UNHCR, and international aid agencies were strongly criticized by many groups, including USCR, for their response during the early stages of this refugee crisis. Despite the availability of in-country resources and the fact that the emergency was taking place in areas well-removed from insurgencies in northern Ethiopia, the arriving refugees' most basic needs - food, sanitation, and particularly medical care - were not met in an adequate and timely fashion" (USCR, 1989).

To the south of Fugnido, there were more refugees at Dimma camp, which by the end of January 1988 held some 34,900 people, of which some 52 per cent were Dinka (UNHCR, 1988).

In all, an estimated 30 per cent of the south's population had uprooted to northern Sudan or Ethiopia by mid-1989 (USAID, 1988a). It is impossible to state precisely how many people moved north, but in just one small town - Meiram, southern Kordofan - there were some 26,000

southern Sudanese receiving small quantities of relief in August 1988. Perhaps 1 million southern Sudanese reached Khartoum in the four years before mid-1988 (USAID, 1988a).

1. "Pull" factors

In assessing the reasons for refugee flows to Ethiopia, one should not ignore a number of "pull" factors.

It is significant, first of all, that the Nuer in Sudan had important linguistic and cultural links with Nuer who lived over the Ethiopian side of the border. Inevitably, this made settlement in this area easier than it might have been.

Second, movement to western Ethiopia offered some refugees a chance to engage in a wide-ranging trade that was to help sustain the ailing economy of much of southern Sudan. Itang camp in particular became the focal point for a trading system that came to embrace almost all Upper Nile province and parts of Jonglei province. Grain distributed at Itang was taken into Sudan and exchanged for Nuer cattle, helping many to survive poor grain harvests within Sudan (WFP/FAO/UNICEF, 1991). Many went to Itang only for certain parts of the year, and were able to trade in relief items, including food and shelter materials (UNICEF, 1991). Given these economic ties, supplying relief that was not directly consumed by refugees was by no means a waste of money. Indeed, there might well be case for supplying relief in excess of refugee numbers in such cases, particularly given the difficulties of getting relief directly into southern Sudan.

Of course, Itang was only an attractive option for supplying such a wide area because of extreme scarcity within southern Sudan. So it is difficult to separate this "pull" factor from the "push" factor of scarcity.

A third "pull" factor was the fact that the camps in Ethiopia offered the prospect of some education, and an alternative to the crumbling educational system in large parts of southern Sudan.

Finally, the movement to Ethiopia was encouraged by the fact that the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had important bases there. The principal SPLA training centre, Bilpam, was situated close to Itang. And there were some SPLA-organized movements from Bahr el Ghazal, beginning in 1984-1985, along with a much greater number of unorganized movements. Some affinity with the SPLA was noted at Itang camp. However, most refugees arriving in Ethiopia were in no fit state for combat, and sympathy for the SPLA often did not translate into active involvement (ACP-EEC, 1988; Ryle, 1989).

Insofar as the SPLA presence did serve as a "pull" factor, this was largely because the organization offered to provide some measure of protection against government-backed militias. Again, this "pull" factor cannot be separated from a major "push" factor: in this case, the subjection to raiding.

Conditions in the Ethiopian camps were often poor (Ryle, 1989; UNHCR, 1988; ACP-EEC, 1988). Furthermore, the journey by foot to Ethiopia was extremely hazardous: it is impossible to know for certain, but perhaps a quarter of those who set off died before they reached the border.[1] On treks that could be 600 kilometres or more, migrants were at risk of attack from the anti-SPLA Anyanya 2 militias, which killed large numbers of Dinka on their way to Ethiopia from Bahr el Ghazal (Africa Watch, 1990). The migrants also had to run the gauntlet of the eastern plains of Upper Nile, which are largely waterless in the dry season (Mawson, 1991). People would not undertake such a journey towards such uncertain camp conditions unless

---

[1] A Swedish missionary, E. G. Eriksson, back in Sweden from camps in Ethiopia, put the proportion who died *en route* at one third (**Sudan Times**, May 11th 1988). Another estimate said 20 per cent (**New York Times**, May 1st 1988).

effectively forced to do so. The immediate reasons why they were forced to do so are examined in the next section.

2. "Push" factors

Famine played a key role in propelling people northward from the case-study area to northern Sudan and eastward to Ethiopia. The following account gives the broad outlines of the developing crisis in western Upper Nile, but concentrates on northern Bahr el Ghazal, for which much better information is available.

While figures for rural areas are not available, mortality statistics for the government garrison town of Aweil in Bahr el Ghazal give a good indication of the severity of this famine. Here, there were 7,146 registered deaths between July and September 1988. Depending on which estimate of numbers of displaced is adopted, this represents between 5.6 and 7.7 per cent of the total population in the town (UNDP, 1988).

Famine in northern Bahr el Ghazal was created, it is argued here, by a combination of four "sub-processes". The first was raiding, something that the Sudanese government sought to portray - misleadingly, as we shall see - as an extension of traditional "tribal" hostilities. The second was changing prices, which damaged people's ability to secure food through the market. The third was the restriction of people's ability to pursue survival strategies (like collection of wild foods) outside of market channels. And the final process was the failure of relief.

Raiding

Sudan's second civil war, like the first, was fought mainly against the civilian population. In late 1989, one account estimated that there had been some 4,000 people killed on the government side and perhaps an equivalent number on the SPLA side. While these figures are higher than in the first civil war, they nevertheless pale beside the civilian death toll: a figure of 250,000 deaths from famine in 1988 has been widely quoted. This cannot by verified. But certainly, recorded death rates in Meiram and Abyei (both in southern Kordofan) and Aweil (Bahr el Ghazal) were extremely high. Although southern Kordofan suffered a degree of drought in 1987 which affected northern Sudanese (including those around Meiram and Abyei) as well as Ngok Dinka normally resident in southern Kordofan, famine mortality in the area was largely confined to the Dinka who had been uprooted from southern Sudan.

Raiding on the civilian population in the case-study area was largely the work of the militias of the Baggara (cattle-herding) peoples of northern Sudan (which cut a swathe of destruction across northern Bahr el Ghazal and western Upper Nile) and of the Anyanya 2 militia in western Upper Nile. The SPLA also raided extensively in Upper Nile.

The loss of assets (notably cattle) as a result of raiding was extremely severe. Comparison of an International Committee of the Red Cross vaccination report of 1989 with estimates of cattle populations in 1977 suggests that the total cattle population in the flood region of Bahr el Ghazal (that is, the north east, where the great bulk of cattle were) had fallen from close to one million to perhaps half this number (UN/SRRA, 1990). The extent of cattle loss implied may even be an underestimate. By the summer of 1988, the Executive Officer in Muglad District Council was estimating that at least one million stolen Dinka cattle had passed through Muglad District during the previous 18-24 months (Interagency Situation Report, 1988). This raiding was the work of Baggara militias from the north. Raiding in Upper Nile also caused widespread loss of cattle and other property.

Although there was some patchy evidence of drought in the south, this was not the decisive factor driving famine and outmigration. Pockets of drought were most significant in Equatoria, where famine was generally least severe (Sudan Council of Churches, 1986). Grain production falls were common in the south, but rarely led to the kind of outmigration seen in 1986-1988 (see, for example, Ministry of Agriculture, 1974). Although drought played some role

in the evolving famine, it was raiding that deprived people of the resources (grain stores and, especially, cattle) with which they had traditionally resisted natural adversity (de Waal, 1990a; Ryle, 1989). A Malwal Dinka chief, Deng Dang Wol, later explained this relationship: "Before, in a drought like this (he was referring to drought in 1989), we depended on our cattle for milk and meat. But today cattle and goats have been taken by *murhaleen* (militiamen). Then came the drought. That is the source of hunger" (UN/SRRA, 1990).

Widespread loss of cattle also meant that people in Bahr el Ghazal experienced severe difficulty in securing assistance through social ties, partly because of a shortage of cattle available for lending, and partly because people frequently proved reluctant to help out those whose lack of cattle indicated little likelihood of returned assistance in the future (Interview with Melvyn Almond, Oxfam, Khartoum, November 10th 1988). Moreover, granaries were burnt and many lost the seed needed for planting (Ryle, 1989).

Outmigration meant a loss of labour and hit future grain production, as the area sown in some areas fell by 50 per cent (Aweil Rice Development Project, 1987). A UN/SRRA mission in 1990 found that in areas of northern Bahr el Ghazal that had suffered militia raiding, the size of agricultural plots tended to be smaller than elsewhere, and suggested this may have reflected the preponderance of elderly people in these areas and the very small proportion of young men (UN/SRRA, 1990).

Outmigration in the case-study area was strongly correlated with militia raids, both geographically and chronologically. The apparent exception (reduced raids in the 1987-1988 dry season but substantial subsequent outmigration to the north, to government garrison towns in the south, and to Ethiopia) does not, as we shall see, contradict this analysis.

The earliest manifestations of famine in rural areas of the south, and accompanying outmigration, were seen in Upper Nile province. Here, the militias of the Messiriya (one of the Baggara groups, from southern Kordofan province) and Anyanya 2 (a mostly-Nuer paramilitary force that split from the SPLA in October 1984) turned rural areas into a wasteland, co-ordinating their raids with the government armed forces (Africa Watch, 1990). By 1986, many displaced people had gathered in the southern garrison town of Malakal. Others retreated to the bush, to more southerly areas or to northern Sudan; still others headed for Ethiopia (de Waal, 1990a; Sudan Council of Churches, 1986). The SPLA also displaced people with raids on parts of central Upper Nile that supported Anyanya 2. Few victims of SPLA raiding went immediately to Ethiopia, however, though there were some who went there after the reconciliation between Anyanya 2 and the SPLA in 1987.

In late-1985, large-scale raiding spread to Bahr el Ghazal, bringing famine in its wake (de Waal, 1990a). There was heavy raiding on the Ngok Dinka, the Malwal Dinka, the Abiem Dinka and the Twic Dinka, causing major displacement of all these groups (Amnesty, 1989; letter from representatives of the Twic community, 1986; **New York Times**, May 4th 1986; Duffield, 1990).

In early 1986, the Sudan Council of Churches estimated that 187,000 people in the Aweil and Gogrial districts were affected by hunger. War and armed raiding from the north were cited as the principal causes (Sudan Council of Churches, 1986). Many headed for northern Sudan, or moved to rural areas to the south of their home villages or to government garrison towns in the south (Amnesty, 1989; Duffield, 1990).

Resistance to the raiding was difficult or impossible. The northern Sudanese raiders had automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. The villages they attacked were often inhabited largely by women and children, with men having already left the area. Where men were still resident, they were generally armed only with spears and a few old-fashioned rifles - at least before the SPLA advance in Bahr el Ghazal in the course of 1987 (Africa Watch, 1990).

Renewed raiding in northern Bahr el Ghazal in the dry season of 1986-1987 led to renewed outmigration from rural areas - to the north, to government garrison towns, and to

Ethiopia (Amnesty, 1989; Africa Watch, 1990). Many men headed for rural areas to the south (especially Apuk district in eastern Gogrial) in an attempt to protect themselves and their cattle from the raiders (Ryle, 1989).

The surge in movements to Ethiopia, to the north and to government garrison towns in the south in late 1987 and early 1988 has been mentioned. Although raiding had peaked by this time as the SPLA began to deter the northern militiamen from coming deep into Bahr el Ghazal (Amnesty, 1989), raiding was still ultimately responsible for the outmigration. Many thousands of people had been holding on in rural areas of Bahr el Ghazal until the last possible moment, often feeding on leaves and the roots of wild plants (UNDP, 1988). The very poor condition of people arriving at southern garrison towns and in the north at this time indicated that the famine process was far-advanced among them (UNDP, 1988; Interagency Situation Report, 1988). Two things helped break people's resistance to leaving rural areas of Bahr el Ghazal. First, while the arrival of a significant SPLA presence in Bahr el Ghazal in 1987 came too late to prevent devastation by militia raiding, it did create large numbers of extra mouths to feed, adding to the strain on local resources (UNDP, 1988; de Waal, 1990a; interviews with Dinka migrants in Khartoum, December 1988). Second, there was moderate drought in 1987 (Father Deng Rudolf, 1988).

Migration to Ethiopia was often a two-stage process. John Ryle, a writer and anthropologist who has lived among the Dinka and who visited adjacent areas of the north in 1988, observed: "The large number of new refugees in Ethiopia is disturbing: it suggests that the men who stayed behind in rural areas of the south with the family herds and took them to safer areas while other family members went to the north or to southern towns may have nothing left to defend" (Ryle, 1989).

The eclipse of Anyanya 2 in Upper Nile in 1987 had removed the principal obstacle to movement to Ethiopia from Bahr el Ghazal. The fact that many of the raiders came from Darfur and Kordofan regions in northern Sudan clearly discouraged men and boys in particular from heading north into the heartlands of the militias, where they faced possible execution (Amnesty, 1989; Africa Watch, 1990; Keen, 1991). These fears were of fundamental importance in prompting the large-scale movements, despite the risks involved, to Ethiopia.

Markets

Rising grain prices undoubtedly contributed to the catastrophe in the case-study area, and the intensity of famine appears to correlate strongly with high grain prices, both chronologically and geographically. It is difficult fully to disentangle cause and effect: in some ways famine **contributed** to high grain prices by sending large numbers of people to particular urban areas where supplies were limited; nevertheless, it is clear that high grain prices helped to create famine by putting food beyond the reach of many people.

Grain prices in the south far exceeded those in the north. They were also relatively high in those parts of the north (notably southern Kordofan province) where famine was most severe (Interagency Situation Report, 1988; TCC meeting minutes, September 5th 1988). Moreover, grain prices fell in line with falling mortality in Meiram camp, southern Kordofan, in the autumn of 1988 (Information from Meiram relief committee, personal communication, November 1988; MSF-France, 1988a).

Access to marketed grain was particularly important for those unable to obtain grain through exchange with nature. This group included most of those confined to government garrison towns. The acting Governor of Bahr el Ghazal complained in early-1989: "The war is killing us with bullets and the merchants are killing us with their prices" (Toronto Star, March 25th 1989).

As southern towns were cut off from northern supply lines and in most cases from the surrounding rural areas, this disrupted both urban and rural economies (Ryle, 1989; UN/SRRA field notes). Southern towns became unable to support their normal populations, irrespective of the displaced (Ryle, 1989). Escalating grain prices accompanied growing famine mortality in

southern garrison towns, with high grain prices appearing to reflect a combination of reduced supply and increased demand. There were serious food shortages in Aweil and Wau in 1986 (Aweil Rice Development Project, 1987). The food shortage in these towns grew more severe through 1987 and 1988.

One way of acquiring the cash to buy grain was through selling livestock, a strategy commonly pursued even in "normal" times, especially during the "hungry season" before the harvest. But just when grain prices were rising, livestock prices were declining. In July–August 1987 in Abyei, southern Kordofan, cattle were being exchanged for no more than a single sack of grain – the terms of trade for those selling cattle and buying grain were a remarkable 27 times worse than the corresponding terms of trade in El Obeid, the major livestock and grain market of Kordofan (Interagency Situation Report, 1988; Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1987).

Meanwhile, rates of pay for labour in southern Kordofan fell in 1987 and 1988, partly because of the large numbers of famine migrants in the area (de Waal, 1990a).

High transport prices were also important in deepening the famine, notably because they restricted opportunities for moving far into northern Sudan away from the famine areas. Rail fares were supposed to be fixed by the state, yet these rose to unusually high levels, affecting those trying to get out of Aweil and Meiram. Truck fares also rose beyond the reach of many people (Africa Watch, 1990; Interagency Situation Report, 1988).

Constricted non–market strategies

The negative impact of cattle–raiding on non–market strategies like borrowing cattle and consuming milk and meat has been mentioned. In addition, the tense security situation impeded activities like fishing and gathering wild foods. For example, military permission for collecting wild foods around Abyei was withheld, and wild foods had to be bought in the market (Interagency Situation Report, 1988). To give another example, fish in a seasonal lake three miles from Aweil could not be caught because of security restrictions on movement outside the town (UNDP, 1988). People trying to leave the southern garrison towns of Aweil or Wau for surrounding rural areas risked being killed (Africa Watch, 1990). In general, the activities of the militias greatly impeded freedom of movement, constraining people's ability to reach areas where food, cash and/or relatives were more plentiful (Interagency Situation Report, 1988).

Lack of relief

Bahr el Ghazal received no substantial relief deliveries at the height of the crisis in 1987 and 1988. According to the minutes of the donor/NGO/government Technical Co–ordination Committee for November 9th 1987, relief deliveries to Bahr el Ghazal totalled 3,000 metric tons in 1987 (excluding some grain that was stolen from the government–held town of Raga). Meanwhile, the NGO consortium CART (Combined Agencies Relief Team), Sudan Council of Churches, Sudanaid and UN Office for Emergency Operations in Sudan (UNOEOS) together estimated that 38,250 metric tons would be required for Bahr el Ghazal to cover just the first six months of 1987 (**Early Warning System Bulletin**, RRC, March 15th 1987). Shortfalls in relief were even more severe in 1988: despite a deepening crisis, only 1,298 metric tons had been delivered to Bahr el Ghazal by mid–September.

To understand the causes of refugee flows from the case–study area, it is necessary to understand not only why people were forced out of their home areas, but also why they chose not to undertake the much shorter journey to the north to seek protection from their own government. The trek to Ethiopia, as noted, was a very hazardous one. Fears of journeying into the heartlands of the Baggara militias have been mentioned. Also of major importance was the inadequacy of relief in areas of northern Sudan adjoining Bahr el Ghazal.

Relief deliveries to these areas fell well below levels of need, and the results were catastrophic (Keen, 1991). To give just one example, at the end of August 1988, in the context of

wholly inadequate general rations and death rates that were among the highest ever recorded anywhere, the aid agency Medecins sans Frontieres described its own medical and supplementary feeding work in Meiram as an "ugly charade" (MSF–France, 1988b).

III. Catastrophe: An unfortunate side–effect of war?

It might be tempting to conclude from the above analysis that famine and accompanying outmigration stemmed essentially from the disruption, lawlessness and chaos accompanying civil war – a humanitarian crisis that was an unfortunate side–effect of Sudan's brutal civil war. Of course, chaos and the inevitable disruptions of wartime did play a part. For example, there were important security difficulties in getting relief grain to garrison towns in Bahr el Ghazal, as trains came repeatedly under threat of attack by the SPLA. However, such an interpretation of events – largely the one presented by international donors, as we shall see – is dangerously misleading. In particular, it is important to understand that each of the subprocesses contributing to famine was actively shaped by groups who stood to benefit from it, and more especially that the Sudanese government itself played a key role in creating the famine through its influence on each of these processes. Before this analysis is undertaken in more detail, it is necessary to provide some historical background to the crisis. This will be invaluable in understanding the "functions" served by this human catastrophe for a number of groups, notably the Sudanese government in Khartoum.

IV. Historical background

There has been a long history of violent competition for resources in the case–study area. The Dinka (living mostly in southern Sudan but also, in the case of the Ngok Dinka, in southern Kordofan) have been repeatedly subject to violence and exploitation, as have southern Sudanese more generally. This violence and exploitation has sometimes been tempered during periods in which these groups enjoyed significant representation beyond their heartlands.

In the nineteenth century, raiding for slaves and cattle created widespread devastation and famine in the south (Gray, 1961; Schweinfurth, 1873). The Dinka were able to put up more resistance than some of the weaker groups, but still suffered great losses of cattle as well as enslavement and starvation (Schweinfurth, 1873; Titherington, 1927; Gray, 1961). The southern Sudan became a major source of tribute for the Turko–Egyptian state, and slaves from the south came to underpin the social and commercial life of much of northern Sudan (Gray, 1961). A strong strand of Islamic thought divided the world into *Dar al–Islam* (the domain of Islam) and *Dar al–Harb* (the domain of war): beyond the boundaries of *Dar al–Islam*, the taking of slaves in war was permitted (Gray, 1961). Although there were moves at the apex of the Turko–Egyptian administration to abolish slavery, these humanitarian initiatives – not unlike later international humanitarian initiatives aimed at relieving famine – tended to be undermined at local level, where wealthy slave merchants were able to bribe poorly–paid government administrators to turn a blind eye to continued slaving (Gray, 1961; Schweinfurth, 1873).

The exploitation of the south also conferred important benefits on the cattle–herding peoples of western Sudan, known as the Baggara. They made raids on the south, and slave–owning became widespread among the Baggara by the 1870s (Saeed, 1982).

As the British consolidated their rule over Sudan at the turn of the century, southern Sudanese continued to be subject to exploitation and man–made famine. The British responded aggressively to resistance by the Dinka in particular, sometimes resorting to the creation of famine as a means of quelling rebellion. For example, after elements of the Agar Dinka rebelled in 1902, their land was devastated by government troops. These troops burned villages, shot village leaders, destroyed grain and confiscated such numbers of cattle that the land was left virtually devoid of stock. Entire families died of hunger (Collins, 1971). C. Willis, who became

director of intelligence in 1920, described his own government's policy for the south as "administration by raids" (Warburg, 1971).

British officials were profoundly conscious of the continuing political threat posed by the Baggara, who had played a key role in supporting the Mahdist revolt against Turko-Egyptian rule in the 1880s. Since slaving and cattle-raiding on the south had come to serve important economic functions for the Baggara (and attempts to abolish slavery had underpinned their support for the Mahdist revolt), the British were now very wary of prohibiting raiding and slaving. In practice, Baggara raiding on the Dinka was tolerated. Presaging events in the 1980s, such raids appear to have helped the Baggara to rebuild their herds after the severe famine of the late 1880s and 1890s (Wilson, 1977; de Waal, 1989). Meanwhile, Kordofan region, the centre of early Mahdist resistance, was exempted from the registration of slaves (Holt and Daly, 1988; Hargey, 1981; Warburg, 1971).

The subjection of southern Sudanese to violence and exploitation was not an historical inevitability, however. Given the political will in Khartoum, it could be checked. Beginning in the 1920s, British administrators adopted a policy that was explicitly designed to protect southern groups like the Dinka from exploitation and raiding by their northern neighbours (and also by the Nuer in the south). What appears to have prompted this change of policy was news of a major Dinka rebellion in 1922, which left British administrators not only severely shaken but also convinced that, in the long term, the south could not be ruled by force, but only through actively seeking out collaborators among the "traditional leaders" of its peoples (Collins, 1983; Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981). Beginning in the 1920s, strong government security forces were recruited from both Baggara and Dinka, helping to reduce warfare in the area of the Bahr el Arab river, which flowed between Bahr el Ghazal and Darfur/Kordofan (Collins, 1971). Under the Closed Districts policy of 1930, restrictions were placed on the movements of northern Sudanese traders into the south (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981).

From the 1940s to the early 1960s, the movements of Baggara into Bahr el Ghazal were carefully controlled through annual intertribal conferences under what was called the "Native Administration" system (Saeed, 1982; Karam, 1980). Under this system, the tribal chiefs derived their judicial and executive powers (and hence their principal opportunities for accumulating capital) from their positions within the Native Administration (Saeed, 1982). They were valued by the British (who appointed salaried guards to protect them) for their ability to control their own followers and to promote peaceful intertribal relations. Hence, they had a strong incentive to seek to promote a peaceful resolution of disputes, if only to maintain their own positions of privilege and power. Meanwhile, their followers could hope to avoid some measure of taxation and legal punishment by respecting the chiefs' authority (Deng, 1986).

However, by the mid-1960s, the peaceful co-existence of southern and northern groups had begun to break down under a number of pressures.

Although there was some missionary education, British rule largely neglected education in the south, and British officials saw the solution to "the southern problem" in terms of continued British tutelage rather than the emergence of political self-help in the south (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981). In large part as a result, the Dinka were generally poorly placed to fill posts that became available under "Sudanization" in the early 1950s and then after independence in 1956 (Mawson, 1989).

When the Sudanization of the administration began in 1955, the southern government positions previously occupied by the British were overwhelmingly filled by northern Sudanese (Deng, 1986). The aggressive Arabization and Islamization of the south was stepped up under General Abboud's government of 1958-1964 (Holt and Daly, 1988; Alier, 1990).

The new generation of Dinka increasingly favoured resistance to the north, which they saw as restricting educational and career opportunities for non-Muslims, particularly in the context of the aggressive Arabization and Islamization pursued by Abboud (Holt and Daly, 1988).

The government's failure to relieve famine among the Dinka in Bahr el Ghazal in 1959 and inaction in the face of three years of devastating floods in the early 1960s appear to have played a key role in propelling large sections of the Dinka towards identification with "southern" grievances and resistance, in contrast to their standing aloof when Sudan's first civil war had broken out in 1955 (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981).

In the context of a spreading rebellion by southern Sudanese in the first civil war, Baggara raids on the Dinka began again. Sometimes, they were funded by northern merchants (Saeed, 1982; **The Vigilant** (Sudan), 1965). They were also tolerated by northern police and by the army, which itself became involved in raiding (Saeed, 1982; Deng, 1972). The Dinka, once more, suffered widespread starvation, outmigration and severe loss of cattle (Deng, 1972; Saeed, 1982). Foreshadowing events in 1987–1988, those who migrated to northern Sudan were generally less well treated than those who fled to neighbouring countries like Central African Republic and Ethiopia (Deng, 1972; Saeed, 1982).

Southern Sudanese distrust of authority was fuelled by the first civil war. Nevertheless, the 1972 peace agreement at Addis Ababa gave them renewed, if short–lived, protection. President Nimeiri, who was given considerable credit for having brought peace to the south at Addis Ababa, sought to cultivate and harness southern support as a counterweight to the power of the Islamic traditional political parties in the north, which he had outlawed as part of his attempt to create a "modern", "socialist" Sudan.

Critically, the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 included a provision for the incorporation of elements of the rebel southern Sudanese Anyanya movement into the national army, and a provision that half the army's Southern Command be filled with southern Sudanese. These measures offered important protection for southern Sudanese, and by 1976 the Southern Command was under the full command of ex–Anyanya officers (Alier, 1990).

Under the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement, government revenues arising from commercial, agricultural and industrial activities in the south now accrued to the regional treasury, based in Juba, Equatoria (Alier, 1990). Meanwhile, in the Bahr el Arab region, the strong ex–Anyanya component in the southern army helped tilt the balance of power in favour of southern interests and against the Baggara.

The new peace was a precarious one however, particularly since some of the local safeguards against violence that had sprung from the Native Administration were now removed. Under the new system of local government established in 1971, Native Administration was abolished in northern Sudan. As a result, the carefully–bolstered "traditional leaders" were deprived of their official roles, their stake in resolving local conflicts and, to a large extent, their ability to influence their kinsmen.

Although inter–tribal conferences continued to be held (Mohamed Salih, 1990), many Dinka elders were to complain that when disputes emerged, there were now no recognized heads of the Baggara with whom they could negotiate.

There were growing problems at the centre, moreover. Increasingly, under a number of pressures, President Nimeiri began to turn away from his alliance with the south.

The first major pressure on Nimeiri was a growing threat of rebellion from the Baggara, who had been largely excluded from state office and development spending. The renewed threat to Khartoum from the Baggara owed much to their acquisition of arms – not only from the first civil war but also from Libya and markets created by wars in Uganda and Chad (de Waal, 1990b). Largely excluded from the organs of the Sudanese state, the heavily–armed Ansar (a military/religious organization that had made up the original followers of the Mahdi and that drew critical support from the Baggara of Darfur and Kordofan) made repeated attempts to overthrow Nimeiri's secular government. In 1976, the Ansar came close to toppling Nimeiri in a Libyan–supported coup attempt. It was clear that – despite, indeed in part because of, Nimeiri's attempts to "modernize" Sudan – the religious affiliations of the Baggara, centred on the Ansar

organization, remained a potent political threat. The narrowness of Nimeiri's escape appears to have prompted him to seek a reconciliation with Sadiq el Mahdi, leader of the Ansar, and Hassan el Turabi, leader of the increasingly influential fundamentalist Muslim Brothers organization (later the National Islamic Front), which drew strength and funding from revivalist movements elsewhere in the Middle East (Woodward, 1990). In July, the Ansar and the Muslim Brothers were brought into the Sudanese government, with both groups advocating an Islamic constitution, and both opposing southern autonomy (Allen, 1986). Nimeiri's *volte face* severely eroded southern Sudanese representation at Khartoum. In fact, between 1978 and 1983, the cabinet did not include a single southern Sudanese (Malwal, 1985).

Another factor contributing to Nimeiri's turning away from the south was southern resistance to the government's attempts to exploit resources in the south, notably oil. The discovery of large oil deposits in the south in 1978 provided an incentive to minimize the south's say in government and in the control of Sudan's resources, as did renewed plans to increase the supply of Nile waters to northern Sudan and Egypt through the Jonglei Canal, widely seen in the south as conferring few benefits on the region and perhaps actively harmful (Allen, 1986; Holt and Daly, 1988).

Oil in particular offered some hope of reducing Sudan's mounting balance of payments crisis. Yet, significantly, under the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement all taxes and government profits arising from the exploitation of oil resources would accrue to the regional government in Juba (Alier, 1990). In these circumstances, Nimeiri appeared increasingly determined to make fundamental political changes and to ensure that central government benefited from the oil. The government – ominously from a southern point of view – planned a refinery in Kosti in the north, rather than in the south (Holt and Daly, 1988). And a government bill presented in 1980 threatened to redraw the map of Sudan so that mineral-rich and fertile parts in northerly areas of the south (including the major oil fields and significant uranium deposits) were included in the north (Malwal, 1985; Alier, 1990). There was also widespread talk in government circles of creating a "Unity Region" which would cover the area of major oil finds (Alier, 1990). In general, the shrinking resource-base and gathering economic crisis in the north appear to have encouraged northern interests to seek to tap the abundant resources of the south – through increasingly violent means (Duffield, 1990).

Closely linked with the growing power of Islamic interests in central government and with a growing interest in southern resources was Nimeiri's reversal of the Addis Ababa agreement, in particular the removal of the powers of autonomous rule he himself had established for the south. In 1983, Nimeiri pushed through the redivision of the south in an attempt to exploit divisions between a number of disgruntled Equatorian groups and other southerners, notably the Dinka, who were often seen as taking an unfair proportion of regional government employment (Allen, 1986; Prunier, 1986; Alier, 1990). The three regions of the south to whom power was ostensibly "devolved" in 1983 actually possessed very limited powers, and limited sources of revenue. Critically, oil revenues were now to go to central government (Alier, 1990).

In that same year, the second civil war broke out: one of the main priorities of the rebel SPLA forces was to prevent access to the newly-discovered oil, and the SPLA stopped extraction by force. (The SPLA also put a stop to the building of the Jonglei canal.)

Paradoxically, the end of military rule and the arrival of "democracy" in 1986 appears if anything to have accentuated the decline of southern representation. The war in the south impeded the 1986 elections in the region, and the south was left with only 29 members of parliament out of a total of 262 (Chiriyankandath, 1987).

Local political power was also falling into northern hands. When the second civil war broke out in 1983, the South Kordofan and national authorities moved quickly to get full control of Abyei district, which bordered Bahr el Ghazal to the north. Local control fell into the hands of the Messiriya Baggara.

Meanwhile, the balance of power within the army was shifting significantly, as southern Sudanese troops were transferred to the north and northern troops were transferred to the south, notably to the oil-rich Bentiu area (Alier, 1990). The safeguards against the abuse of military power agreed at Addis Ababa were being rapidly removed.

V. Creating famine

1. The role of the government of Sudan, and what it stood to gain

In these circumstances, the Sudanese government - first under President Nimeiri, then under the year-long administration of the Transitional Military Council from May 1985, and finally under Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi - actively fostered the various subprocesses that created famine in the case-study area. The processes of famine offered solutions to important problems for Khartoum.

Nimeiri's government began to encourage a number of militias (notably the Baggara militias and the Anyanya 2) to make raids on "enemy" populations, notably the Dinka, the Shilluk and some sections of the Nuer, apparently seeing this strategy as the cheapest and most politically-convenient way of achieving its military and economic objectives. Under Nimeiri and succeeding regimes, government support of the militias took the form of provision of arms, ammunition and intelligence, as well as the effective provision of immunity from prosecution for theft, killings and other violations of the law (Amnesty, 1989; Africa Watch, 1990; Oxfam, 1986a; Alier, 1990; **Sudan Times**, October 25th 1988).

Central government's interest in raiding was reflected in the increasingly close involvement of the national army. The army co-operated closely with the Messiriya militias in 1985, when the focus of militia raiding was switched to Bahr el Ghazal. Significantly, the occurrence of joint attacks by the Messiriya and the Darfur-based Baggara group, the Rizeigat, on areas south of Bahr el Arab in the dry season of 1985-1986 indicated an unusual degree of co-operation among groups who usually acted independently and sometimes in opposition to one another (Mahmud and Baldo, 1987). Dinka elders alleged that army officers had participated in militia raids, wearing civilian clothing (Letter from representatives of the Twic community, 1986). In Upper Nile too, army officers co-operated in planning raids, and, moreover, increasingly directed their own attacks against civilians (de Waal, 1990a).

For central government, the militia strategy held out the promise not only of saving money but also of securing access to critical resources in the south. In particular, the strategy offered the prospect of harnessing southern oil and other resources through the depopulation of areas from which the SPLA drew critical support, and most notably through the decimation of the Dinka, seen as the main source of support for the SPLA (Johnson, 1988; Hutchinson, 1988; Mahmud and Baldo, 1987). (An official with the Ministry of Energy and Mining told me in late 1988 that the government was ready once more to move supplies to major oil fields to begin extraction. I said there would be resistance. He replied: "Yes, but there is the resettlement to Ethiopia.")

When the idea of a "Unity Region" was proposed in government circles, it was planned that the region would embrace the major oil-rich areas of Bentiu and Gogrial area councils in the south and Abyei area council (where additional oil deposits had been discovered) and some other parts of southern Kordofan (Alier, 1990). It is striking that precisely these areas (together with the garrison towns of Aweil and Wau which served as a refuge for those displaced by militia attacks) were the most severely affected by famine in 1986-1988 (Keen, 1991). This was more than a coincidence. The Bentiu area, with the richest oil reserves, was where the initial raiding had been concentrated and where both government and SPLA troops continued to be stationed in the greatest numbers. Nimeiri's use of Messiriya militias in 1983-1984 was designed to protect the Bentiu oilfields from SPLA attack, and the simplest way to do this appeared to be to depopulate the surrounding areas (Hutchinson, 1988; de Waal, 1990a). In late-1984, Nimeiri recruited Anyanya 2 forces to co-operate with the army and the Messiriya militias in protecting

these oilfields and attacking populations seen as hostile, notably the Dinka and Shilluk and also some groups among the Nuer (Alier, 1990; Africa Watch, 1990; de Waal, 1990a).

In Abyei district, attacks on the local Ngok Dinka were interpreted by the Ngok as an attempt to drive them away from this potentially oil-rich area, and to keep it from falling under southern control (Mawson, 1984). Leading southern Sudanese politicians have alleged that Chevron itself - which came under pressure to push ahead with extraction as Nimeiri signed an oil exploration deal with the rival National Oil Company of Sudan in December 1984 (Africa Economic Digest, December 14th 1984) - contributed to the arming of the militias to protect its oil interests (Alier, 1990; Bona Malwal, personal communication).

Another economic motive for depopulation in northern Upper Nile and northern Bahr el Ghazal was the land-hunger generated by Sudan's pattern of horizontally-expanding mechanized agriculture. The clay plain across which mechanized agriculture has spread in the north, damaging the soil and then of necessity moving on, extends into northern Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, where the beginnings of mechanized farming have already taken place. While the relationship between central government, merchant interests and the depopulation of this area remains unclear, nevertheless the further expansion of mechanized farming into this fertile belt was likely to be facilitated by famine and depopulation (Duffield, 1990).

The militia strategy appears to have offered the prospect of appeasing the growing political threat from the Baggara with booty from the south, while at the same time defusing the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism with an aggressively "Islamic" agenda in relation to the south. A number of Umma Party politicians had close connections with the Messiriya militias and with the army. For its part, the National Islamic Front (NIF) set up and ran a "Committee for the Defence of Islam and the Nation", which was essentially a political lobbying group on behalf of the Baggara militias (Africa Watch, 1990; Mawson, 1991; Ryle, 1989). A 1986 confidential working paper from the other main political party, the Democratic Unionist Party, obtained in Khartoum, stated that the party favoured creation of militias in the south and the continued division of the south into three fragile economic regions, expressing the hope that the population would "remain dependent" on the central government Islamic relief agencies and the belief that Nimeiri's policy of "divide and rule" was a "good step towards the creation of an Arab and Islamic state" (Ad Hoc Committee, 1986).

Sudan's heavily-indebted government was ill-equipped for suppressing rebellion. The Sudanese Armed Forces numbered only some 60,000 men - not nearly sufficient to contain the insurgency. Nimeiri proposed conscription in September 1984, but the idea was quickly dropped because of its unpopularity in the north (de Waal, 1990a). Meanwhile, the government could ill afford to fund a protracted war (see, for example, Brown, 1988). In these circumstances, the arming and encouragement of Baggara militias (as well as the Anyanya 2 fighters in Upper Nile) offered central government a cheap means of quelling southern opposition. It also kept the army, to a large extent, out of the firing line (Alier, 1990; Africa Watch 1990). Additionally, the use of militias to displace civilians associated with the SPLA also appeared to offer the prospect of significantly less diplomatic "fall-out" than if the Sudanese armed forces had been the main instrument for such attacks. The attacks on civilians which were an integral part of the government's counter-insurgency strategy were something the national army could not be seen to be carrying out (Oxfam, 1986b). Some observers held that the government's strategy was to induce starvation so as to persuade the SPLA to give up the fight on account of the suffering of its own people (Bona Malwal, personal communication).

Quite apart from the militia strategy, the central government also contributed greatly to the evolving famine through actively blocking famine relief. This is considered in a separate section below.

2. The role of local interests, and what they stood to gain

Baggara

Among the Baggara groups of Darfur and Kordofan regions, a number of pressures had combined to create a significant economic crisis by the early-1980s.

Grazing-land had for some time been under pressure as improved veterinary services from the 1950s boosted the numbers of cattle (Karam, 1980), while mechanized farming and smallholder cultivation for export took increasing amounts of land, notably in Kordofan (Karam, 1980; Saeed, 1982).

There were significant shortages of labour in some rural areas, as young people drifted to the towns and to central-eastern Sudan. This was partially offset by a significant influx of Dinka from the south during the first civil war, and this pattern of migration continued after the war (Deng, 1972). Significantly, migrant Dinka became what one police report called "an indispensable factor" for farmers and townspeople in southern Kordofan (Saeed, 1982). Dinka labour helped the expansion of groundnut and sesame production among Baggara farmers, particularly in the Muglad area (El Sammani, 1985).

Rapid inflation (particularly escalating grain prices) added to the economic pressures on the Baggara. And by the beginning of the 1980s, the majority of wage workers in Babanousa, South Kordofan's biggest town, were people who had abandoned a nomadic way of life at some point in the previous three decades (Saeed, 1982).

The price-squeeze and land-squeeze on Baggara groups were part of a wider process of increasing social and economic differentiation between large mechanized farmers on the one hand, and nomads and peasant farmers on the other, with perhaps 90 per cent of Sudan's marketable food surplus controlled by less than one per cent of the farmers by the end of the 1980s (Duffield, 1990). The sedentarization of nomadic groups also extended well beyond the Baggara (see, for example, Hales, 1978).

A source of pressure on grazing that affected the Baggara in particular was the resurgence of southern political representation after the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. The Baggara found that their access to grazing in their dry season pastures to the south, the subject of long-standing historical disputes, was coming under threat from newly-confident southern politicians, from southern army units in which ex-Anyanya guerrillas were strongly represented, and from southern police units now staffed largely with southern Sudanese (Karam, 1980; Saeed, 1982).

The 1980s brought extra pressures on the Baggara. The second civil war led to significant labour shortages in the north, as supplies of migrant labour began to dry up (Africa Watch, 1990). And the 1983-1985 drought led to major loss of cattle among the Baggara and the threat of long-term destitution (de Waal, 1989). Significantly, drought also drove many Baggara south into Dinka areas. Newly familiar with the territory, many were to return as raiders (Interview with Ushari Mahmud, December 20th 1988, Khartoum).

For those who joined the Baggara militias, raiding offered the prospect of relief from economic pressures. For one thing, it allowed the direct acquisition of cattle, which, although unsuited to the ecology of northern Sudan, could be sold for cash. Young Baggara men were particularly severely hit by economic marginalization and drought, and they made up the bulk of the recruits to the northern arab militias (Johnson, 1988; Mahmud and Baldo, 1987). The raiding – as in the first civil war – was often opposed by tribal elders (Mahmud and Baldo, 1987). But in the absence of a Native Administration or equivalent system which bolstered their prestige and influence, such opposition proved ineffective.

The raiding and closely connected famine offered a possible solution to the Baggara's growing problems in gaining access to adequate grazing and water. Certainly, the "scorched earth" tactics (burning of villages, crops and trees) employed in the raids suggested an intention to depopulate much of northern Bahr el Ghazal and northern Upper Nile, something for which the Baggara – as well as the central government – had important economic motives. A Minority Rights Group report stated that:

"Well-placed sources speak of a government policy to depopulate northern Bahr al-Ghazal through Arab militia activity, just as earlier raids tried to drive the Dinka out of Abyei. The outcome of such a plan, if successful, would be to place the crucial pastures of the Bahr al-Arab completely under Baggara control..." (Johnson, 1988).

Raiding brought the benefit of access to the free labour of captured Dinka civilians (Keen, 1991; Amnesty, 1989; Alier, 1990; Africa Watch, 1990). These captives were held in conditions resembling classical slavery. Twic elders said some of their people, including children, had had their hands pierced and had been chained together before being led away to the north (Letter from representatives of the Twic community, 1986). The current writer collected sixteen first-hand accounts of Dinka who were subjected to some form of slavery (Keen, 1991). The captured Dinka were used for a variety of herding and domestic work. Often, they were physically and sexually abused.

The chronology and geographical focus of the raids suggest that economic motives were extremely important for the raiders. For one thing, the raids on Bahr el Ghazal were concentrated on one of the most cattle-rich parts of the south. Further, the fact that the late-1985 raids south of the Bahr el Arab came some two years before a major SPLA presence in the area suggests that the strictly economic motive for the raiding was more important, at least initially, than any counter-insurgency motive, although it is not always easy to separate the two (Mahmud and Baldo, 1987; de Waal, 1990a; Oxfam, 1986b).

It is clear, moreover, that the raids themselves prompted thousands of people to join the SPLA, including Dinka groups who had previously remained aloof (Mahmud and Baldo, 1987; Wilson, 1989; Oxfam, 1986a; interview with Melvyn Almond, Oxfam, Khartoum, November 10th 1988). In this sense, the raids (for which economic motives appear to have been predominant, at least among the Baggara) actually provided their own military justification, by stimulating the growth of the enemy.

A subsequent geographical shift in raiding **away from** Bahr el Ghazal is also suggestive of the importance of these economic motives. In mid-1988, with raiding opportunities drying up in Bahr el Ghazal, Baggara groups from south Darfur began to join a growing wave of raiding on the Fur people of Darfur, depopulating areas of Fur territory and taking large numbers of cattle. This was despite the fact that the Fur were Muslims, and that they had not rebelled against the government (**News from Africa Watch**, April 6th 1990).

Merchants and army officers

Although the interest of northern merchants in southern Sudan had been tempered by Dinka suspicion of the market and by British colonial policy, which restricted merchant movements (Sikainga, 1986; Abdel-Rahim, 1968), nevertheless independence brought an increase in trading between southern and northern Sudan.

Cattle exports from the south became significant. And Cunnison, who worked in southwest Kordofan in the early 1950s, reported that Abyei had a significant weekly cattle market at that time (Cunnison, 1966). Although this market had become of marginal importance by the early 1970s after years of severe cattle-loss in the south, it resumed its growth in the 1970s until by 1980 it had become a major link between the economies of north and south, with as many as 25 traders looking to buy cattle in Abyei in the period before the rains (Niamir, Huntington and Cole, 1983).

There was also a significant increase in grain trading after independence. Indeed, the majority of southern towns outside western Equatoria became dependent on grain imports from the north. And the inhabitants of many rural areas throughout the south came to depend on the availability of such grain in the May-July pre-harvest period (Ryle, 1989).

North-south trading was dominated by northern traders, whose privileged access to trading networks and local monopolies or near-monopolies allowed them to buy cheaply and sell dearly, causing widespread resentment among southern Sudanese. Such resentment was evidenced by attacks on merchants (Saeed, 1982), which themselves sometimes provoked retaliation by Baggara militias (Ryle, 1989).

The monetization of the economy in both north and south led to new patterns of labour migration. Bahr el Ghazal became, in the 1960s and 1970s, an important source of labourers for southern Darfur and southern Kordofan (Shepherd, 1984). And both Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile became important sources of migrant labour for the big agricultural schemes in Renk and the central zone of Sudan (Ryle, 1989; Duffield, 1990).

At the beginning of the 1980s, larger traders buying southern cattle at Abyei in Kordofan province could make profits of 50-100,000 Sudanese pounds a year. Perhaps 10,000 cattle would be bought in a season, with profits described as a "bonanza". Traders had a powerful interest in maintaining, and even increasing, this trade. But by 1980 they faced escalating attacks from the local Ngok Dinka, who saw the trade as exploitative, with profits reserved almost exclusively for northern traders. This led to an increasing resort to force, with army personnel bribed into providing special protection for northern merchants. As a result, the army itself acquired an increasing interest in the livestock trade (Niamir et al., 1983). When the beginnings of the second civil war led to a drying up of cattle flows from the south, the interests of army officers as well as of northern merchants were threatened.

In the famine of 1983-1985, traders withdrew to a large extent from selling grain and consumer goods and advancing loans to cultivators and concentrated on livestock trading, almost the only profitable activity for them in Darfur and western Kordofan in 1983-1985. But this market collapsed in 1986. Between mid-1985 and mid-1986, cattle prices in the major Darfur town of Nyala rose from 100-150 Sudanese pounds to 800-1100 Sudanese pounds, while numbers of cattle sold fell from more than 10,000 to 3,000 per month, the lowest level for five years, as farmers and herders tried to rebuild their herds. At the same time, there was a drying-up of commercial flows of cattle from Chad and Bahr el Ghazal, in both cases due to war, and there were new official restrictions on moving grain south from Darfur and Kordofan. Traders already operating in the south saw their rural markets disappear as a result of the war. In any case, Sudan's gathering economic crisis after 1978 made merchant capital investments less profitable and more risky (de Waal, 1990a; Duffield, 1990).

To trader discontent was added a threat to military involvement in trading. Nimeiri's rule had seen the creation of special trading enterprises controlled by the military, giving officers privileged access to import licenses. Members of the military government both dispensed and obtained concessions and leases for mechanized farms. But special trading enterprises were disbanded or had privileged status withdrawn (de Waal, 1990a).

VI. Creating advantageous "famine" prices

In part, the cutting off of southern garrison towns - and the persistence of very high grain prices within Bahr el Ghazal - was due to the SPLA, which attempted to place government-held garrison towns like Aweil and Wau under seige. The SPLA has in fact been widely accused of promoting famine in the south, and its leader, John Garang, has written that famine in government garrison towns was welcome and showed SPLA strategy was working (Garang, 1987).

However, there was another major problem. This was the manipulation of supply by politically-powerful northern Sudanese groups. The role of central government has been mentioned. In addition, a number of groups manipulated supplies in order to increase their own profits, something that was itself facilitated by the south's relatively recently acquired dependence on northern grain.

Many merchants and army officers found a solution to problems outlined above, and a windfall from war and famine, through highly manipulative trading in southern garrison towns and northern towns on the edge of famine areas, using their ability to restrict the flow of grain to these areas, as well as their ability to increase the flow of cattle and labour. It is true that raiding and depopulation threatened to erode certain long-term trading interests. But in the context of a collapse in peaceful trade and a general economic crisis that encouraged a search for short-term solutions, merchant and army sponsorship of raiding appears to have been economically rational. Nor is it the case that long-term trading relationships were completely undermined by the windfalls accompanying large-scale violence: some peaceful north-south trading has now resumed in Bahr el Ghazal/southern Kordofan.

During the famine, there were substantial opportunities for profit in grain and other foods (de Waal, 1990a). The army was involved in the grain trade in all garrison towns, including Abyei, Wau and Aweil (Africa Watch, 1990; **The Independent**, March 3rd 1989).

In Aweil, the army enjoyed a monopoly of the sale of foodstuffs, and it was reported to be interested in maintaining a shortage of food for this reason (Aweil Rice Development Project, 1987). It was significant that trains from Babanousa to Aweil, which carried merchants' goods as well as some relief supplies, did not move from Babanousa without the consent and active co-operation of the army. In addition to profits made by army officers in Aweil, both soldiers and policemen profited from escort duties on trains carrying commercial goods from Babanousa to Aweil (Wannop, 1989). In Wau, too, the army was able to manipulate food prices to its own advantage, controlling at least some of the shops (Toronto Star, March 25th 1989; Africa Watch, 1990), levying a tax on all grain coming into the town, and a further tax on grain sold in Dinka parts of the town (de Waal, 1990a), where famine conditions were worst (Africa Watch, 1990).

The army did little to facilitate commercial shipments into Wau, and when it did offer protection to commercial convoys, it charged a high price for the service (Toronto Star, March 25th 1989). The threat of SPLA attack and the consequent need for military escorts for deliveries of grain and other supplies gave the army a great deal of influence in shaping the pattern of food deliveries, as well as providing army officers with a justification for the lack of deliveries which underpinned their own profits (Africa Watch, 1990). Meanwhile, the army and northern militias placed restrictions on traders (some from the south, some from the north) who tried to move food from northern Sudan into rural areas of Bahr el Ghazal (UN/SRRA, 1990). These various kinds of political influence help to explain why price differences between the south and the north were so extreme and persistent, notwithstanding a degree of demand-failure in the south of which starvation was graphic evidence.

Significantly, army measures which restricted the availability of grain in garrison towns did not threaten the army's own consumption (**Sudan Times**, December 16th 1988). It is clear that the military were able to feed themselves in the main southern towns (de Waal, 1990a).

Merchants were involved in delivering commercial goods to Aweil by train, and were able to maintain high prices by restricting the quantities delivered. The composition of the trains from Babanousa (through Meiram) was decided by a combination of local merchants, the town councils in Babanousa and Muglad, and the army. The railway trade had considerable political and economic barriers to entry: perhaps five or six merchants in Babanousa had sufficient funds (reported to me as 20,000 Sudanese pounds) to be able to afford to pay the town councils for permission to take goods by train.

In towns that received famine migrants from Bahr el Ghazal, there is clear evidence that merchants were hoarding grain stocks and restricting influxes of grain, and profiting from very

high grain prices as a result. For example, it is clear that there were significant quantities of grain in private merchants' stores in Meiram during August 1988 (Minutes of a meeting held at offices of Concern, Khartoum, May 27th 1988), notwithstanding the extremely high mortality in the town. Merchants were able to exercise considerable control over the movement of grain by train to Meiram from Babanousa. This was the only route open during the rainy season. During more normal years, small quantities of grain would be moved into Meiram from mechanized farming areas and El Obeid in March–April. This allowed substantial profits for Babanousa merchants (with agents in Meiram) during the summer, when many small farmers (often combining cash crops like peanuts with grain production) would be running out of grain (Information from Meiram relief committee, personal communication, November 1988). Regular demand for grain would also come from Baggara livestock herders in the area. During the famine, this demand was greater than normal. This was partly because of the large influx of southern Sudanese: even famine victims sometimes had a few remaining assets or a little money to buy grain. Second, local farmers' harvests in 1987 had been affected by drought and insecurity. In these circumstances, sorghum prices in Meiram reached 600 Sudanese pounds per sack in August 1988 – more than seven times levels in December 1987. Profits from the sale of grain must have been considerable. In September, there was still extraordinarily high mortality in Meiram, but grain actually moved **away from** the town in response to commercial considerations. Private grain moved north out of Meiram towards Muglad in September by train, as strong, if belated, pressure from international donors led to the arrival of significant relief grain. The arrival of relief grain had prompted prices in Meiram to collapse from over 600 Sudanese pounds per sack in August to a figure on 18th September of 120 pounds per sack, a price lower than that in Muglad at this time (MSF–France, 1988c). A number of factors suggest oligopolistic behaviour: the suddenness of this price collapse; the fact that merchants were clearly taken by surprise at the arrival of grain and falling prices in Meiram; the evident ability of merchants to respond quickly to price differences by shipping grain between Meiram and Muglad; and the relatively small numbers of merchants involved in the rail grain trade.

There were substantial profits to be made from the livestock trade, too. We have seen how the terms of trade for those buying livestock and selling grain in Abyei were hugely favourable in comparison to those in El Obeid. In the early days of raiding, Abyei and Safaha in southern Darfur served primarily as centres for the resale of raided cattle; later, they were the focus of cattle sales by Dinka, with soldiers and merchants forcing such sales at below–market rates. One practice that was followed was that a soldier would force a Dinka migrant to write to a relative in Bahr el Ghazal, encouraging the relative to bring cattle to Abyei for sale. These cattle would then be bought cheaply under coercion, or simply confiscated (de Waal, 1990a).

Grain and livestock price patterns cannot be understood in isolation from various forms of political interference, notably raiding. By creating demand for market grain, by prompting influxes of desperate people into towns in Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan, and by restricting people's ability to leave these centres, raiding contributed greatly to the rise in grain prices. By creating a large supply of raided cattle in the north and by prompting forced sales of cattle by the Dinka, raiding also ultimately underpinned the low prices at which cattle could be bought in places like Abyei. Significantly, the merchants, the chief beneficiaries of these price changes for grain and livestock, had helped to fund the Baggara raids. For example, merchants in Ed Daien – one of the two biggest cattle markets in Darfur and an important market for stolen cattle (Oxfam, 1986c) – provided money for guns and ammunition for Rizeigat Baggara militias (Mahmud and Baldo, 1987).

Downward trends in labour prices (with wages often not paid at all) also had their beneficiaries, and cannot be understood in isolation from the use of force by these beneficiaries. The potential value of the famine migrants to resident farmers was underlined by Dinka reports that they had been told by northern Sudanese farmers not to try to return to Bahr el Ghazal (Ryle, 1989). Famine migrants were sometimes forcibly removed from camps in southern Kordofan, often to work for no money. One woman told me three of her children had been taken from Meiram camp in this way. On November 2nd 1988, when many of the inhabitants of the Meiram camp were beginning to regain their strength, soldiers of the Sudanese army came to the

camp and took away a number (reportedly several hundred) of relatively healthy Dinka to work on farms in the area (MSF-France, 1988d).

Trends in transport prices, though they exacerbated famine, were again beneficial for some groups. And again, it was not simply "market forces" which raised these prices beyond what many famine migrants could afford. The supply of such transportation was artificially restricted, as only certain lorries were "authorized" for the transport of famine migrants. Demand for such transportation had been initially boosted by raiding and consequent hardship. It was further artificially increased by the high grain prices in Abyei and by restrictions on the purchase of grain in Abyei other than for consumption within the town itself (Interagency Situation Report, 1988). This made it more difficult for people to make their own way from Abyei. The likelihood of experiencing further militia attacks was an additional disincentive to travel by foot, and hence a further incentive to travel by lorry. Those on unprotected lorries were very vulnerable to attack (Africa Watch, 1990).

Both merchants and army officers profited from the high price of travel on "authorized" lorries (de Waal, 1990a). Meanwhile, policemen and soldiers made substantial profits from famine migrants seeking a train ride north from Aweil to Babanousa (Wannop, 1989).

VII. Restricting non-market strategies

If non-market strategies were constricted, this was again not so much an unfortunate "side-effect" of war as something that arose directly from the actions of groups that stood to benefit from such constraints, notably officers in the Sudanese national army.

There were important military benefits in restricting these non-market strategies. The control of Dinka movements promised to serve important military functions, as did the deepening of the process of debilitation among the Dinka. Both goals may have contributed to the army's shooting of seven people, and the arrest of 50 others, as Dinka tried to take food out of Abyei in 1988 (Interagency Situation Report, 1988). Of particular importance were the perceived security gains in restricting the movement of people between government-controlled towns and surrounding rural areas where the rebels exerted greater control. Restrictions of this kind had also been imposed during the first civil war (Wai, 1973).

There were also political gains from the prevention of the movement of hungry people to places where they would be more visible to the foreign press and international donors.

In keeping famine migrants away from major towns, such restrictions also helped to minimize the perceived threat which migrants posed to the economic resources and the health of local residents. A refusal by the local executive officer in Babanousa to grant permission for people to move from Muglad to Babanousa should be seen in the context of widespread fears that the resources of Babanousa would be stretched to the breaking point if the famine migrants were allowed to come (Interview with Abdulla Arabi, Administrative Officer, Babanousa Town Council, Babanousa, November 30th 1988; Concern, 1988a; MSF-France, 1988e).

Finally, there were also significant economic benefits from constraining non-market strategies: the more that such strategies were constricted, the more necessary it became for famine migrants to enter into (exploitative) market transactions (whether in grain, livestock, labour or transport markets). Whether or not this was consciously intended, people's dependence on army-controlled food supplies and their willingness to sell livestock at very low prices was increased by the army's preventing people from moving outside the main garrison towns, and from collecting wild foods (Africa Watch, 1990).

VIII. Obstructing relief

"International" relief operations were actively shaped by powerful interests within Sudan. And relief "failures" served three important functions. First, the inadequacy of relief permitted the largely-untrammelled extraction of the military and economic benefits of famine. Notably, the "failure" to deliver relief grain to particular areas allowed significant gains in livestock, transport, grain and labour markets. This, in turn, appears to have been an important reason for this "failure". Second, in areas of northern Sudan, the inadequacy of relief helped discourage unwanted patterns of migration. Third, inadequate relief effectively "released" relief resources for use by groups for whom they had not been designated (Keen, 1991).

The low level of relief deliveries to Bahr el Ghazal has been mentioned. This cannot be blamed only on the SPLA. Even though the SPLA did not have a strong presence in Bahr el Ghazal for 1986 and much of 1987, only ten trains left for Aweil between March 1986 and March 1988, according to records I obtained from Babanousa railway station (the point of departure). There were no subsequent trains until January 1989.

Further, considering that the average train had 30 wagons, the 23 wagons of relief dispatched in all of 1987 represent something less than 10 per cent of the wagons dispatched. Despite government promises of substantial relief, the carriage of such small quantities of relief did not represent a deviation from central government policy by provincial officials. There is evidence that it was fully intended by senior officials in Khartoum. In particular, on June 17th 1987, as UN officials subsequently reminded Prime Minister el Mahdi, the Steering Committee of the state-controlled Sudan Railways Corporation had stated its intention that less than 7 per cent of wagons would carry relief supplies (Letter from Joachim von Braunmuhl, Resident Representative a. i., UNDP, to Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, June 24th 1987). Actual proportions did not deviate far from this stated intention.

This led to an accumulation of grain in Babanousa. In the summer of 1988, 23 wagons of grain consigned to Aweil were "discovered" in Babanousa railyard. Ten had been waiting there for a year, and eight for two or more years (Concern, 1988b).

There were reports that merchants were bribing rail workers in Babanousa **not to** load relief onto trains heading south (**Africa Report**, July-August 1988). In addition, the army possessed an effective veto on rail deliveries to Aweil and Meiram. Given the lack of any relief agreements with the SPLA, the trains to Aweil required military escorts. The army's extreme slowness in providing these was a key reason for the lack of relief deliveries (Aweil Rice Development Project, 1987). In relation to Meiram, delays of up to six weeks in dispatch were justified on the grounds that military escorts were not available - despite the absence of SPLA activity within 100 miles of Meiram. Meanwhile, military supplies ran unimpeded along the rails that dissect the town (Keen, 1991).

When trains were despatched to Aweil, army staff and merchants between them controlled the contents of these trains: the majority of wagons were reserved for army supplies and merchants' goods, leaving very little room for relief (Interviews with railway workers, December 1988).

Bryan Wannop, the UN's Resident Representative in Sudan and someone who helped push through relief on trains in 1989, commented on this experience: "We were introducing a pattern which was dangerous to the traditional groups involved because it eliminated profiteering." Apart from the various interests opposed to the relief train on strategic grounds, he reported, the relief trains were being opposed by merchants with an interest in selling grain in Aweil. The trains were also a threat to soldiers and policemen who profited from escort duties on trains carrying commercial goods (Wannop, 1989).

As for Kordofan, the areas of the region that experienced the most severe famine in 1988 (as a result of a predictable influx of people from Bahr el Ghazal) received the lowest allocations in donor/government distribution plans (Keen, 1991). Local distribution of relief in Kordofan was controlled by army officers and Baggara (Africa Watch, 1990); both groups were benefiting from "famine" prices. To give one example of diversion of relief among a great many, in both 1987 and 1988 government officials permitted use of food aid for the displaced as fodder for Baggara cattle (US Congress, 1989; see also Guiding Star, November 3rd 1988; Africa Watch, 1990; Keen, 1991). Meanwhile, western aid agencies, which would have pressed for fairer distribution, were kept out of Abyei by the Sudanese government (Africa Watch, 1990).

IX. The role of international donors

What was the role of international donor governments (notably the key players, the United States and the European Community) and of the United Nations in relation to the crisis in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile that created such massive upheaval, including the refugee flows to Ethiopia? And how might their response have been improved?

Three points emerge from my research. First, donors made relatively little attempt to move beyond government definitions of when and where relief distributions would be acceptable and possible. Second, they made little attempt to push grain through to famine victims once it had been allocated. Third, they made little attempt to tackle the underlying conflicts that were generating famine. The approach of donors to relief was "humanitarian" – dealing with specific humanitarian crises as and when these became severe and visible, assessing the "numbers in need" and dispatching an appropriate amount of relief. They did not engage with the processes generating famine, or with the political roots of these processes. These omissions proved extremely damaging to famine victims, in a context where famine (and a lack of relief) was being actively promoted by powerful groups within Sudan, and most notably by the Sudanese government itself.

There is little doubt that the opportunity to influence the actions of the Sudanese government existed, had donors desired to follow this route. Sudanese governments had relied heavily on western assistance since President Nimeiri's break with the Communists inside his government in 1971–1972. Before the last months of Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi's administration in early 1989, Sudan was the largest recipient of US foreign aid in sub–Saharan Africa (Africa Watch, 1990).

Since the early–1970s, Sudan had been an important ally for western governments, notably the US. It offered access to the Red Sea, a base for the US's rapid deployment force, and was the only "arab" government to support Egypt and the Camp David agreement (Minear, 1991). Like Nimeiri's regime, the succeeding Transitional Military Council government and that of Sadiq el Mahdi offered western leaders (led by the US) and the conservative arab states (led by Saudi Arabia) the prospect of keeping Egypt's strategic neighbour free from Communism (in the form of the Ethiopian regime to the east) and Islamic fundamentalism (Libya to the west) (see, for example, **The Times**, January 16th 1987).

The leverage possessed by international donors was not used, for the most part, to counter the many ways in which the government was contributing to the crisis in southern Sudan.

1. Deference to government definitions of the relief problem

In the course of the case study famine, donors seemed unwilling to move beyond government definitions of when and where relief distributions were acceptable and possible. The strategic reasons for this deference were important: in March 1989, after the height of the famine, the New York Times reported that "American diplomats acknowledge that the lack of public criticism of [Sadiq el Mahdi's]... failure last year to provide food to famine victims stemmed from a desire not to push him into the arms of next–door Libya" (**New York Times**, March 14th 1989).

Some examples of the largely-hostile attitude of the Sudanese administration to relief for southern Sudanese (notably the Dinka) have been noted. Among the other important manifestations of this hostility were the fact that the Sudanese government did not officially declare a famine emergency in the south (Africa Watch, 1990), and that it did not appeal for international assistance until the summer of 1988 (something that hampered the UN response in particular) (**Sudan Times**, June 30th 1988; interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, August 24th 1990).

In the summer of 1986, NGOs had been hopeful of support from UNOEOS for their advocacy of wide-ranging, neutral, accountable relief operations in the south. However, by end-August, these hopes were dwindling as the UN appeared to be directing its efforts towards relieving government-held areas, apparently with a view to leaving relief aimed at rebel-held areas to the International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC (Oxfam, 1986d).

The donors' stance was further modified at the end of 1986, following the expulsion of the UN Special Representative, Winston Prattley, by the government of Sudan. This virtually put an end to donor/NGO attempts to reach beyond the government garrison towns. Prattley's expulsion drew scant protest from the major donors like the United States and the EC (Bonner, 1989), nor was there any penalty imposed by the UN itself (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, August 24th 1990). The incident helped convince NGOs that channelling relief to rebel-held areas of the Sudan would not be tolerated by the Sudanese government or supported by donors (Bonner, 1989). There was to be no significant relief to rebel-held areas (on the lines of operations aimed at rebel-held areas in Communist Ethiopia) - at least not until after the worst of the famine in 1988. And as the government-held areas dwindled due to SPLA successes in the south, the focus of international relief efforts narrowed correspondingly.

In Sudan, at least until the Operation Lifeline relief effort in 1989, UN officials and bilateral donors typically regarded relief to rebel-held areas as off-limits. Indeed, Prattley's successor at UNDP, Bryan Wannop, told me: "When I replaced Prattley, I made it clear I wouldn't talk with the SPLA... ." SPLA-held areas remained a taboo subject in UN relief discussions throughout 1988 (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, August 24th 1990). Even as late as November 1988, there was no reference to the SPLA in 164 pages of the UN's famine appeal document, and no plan for sending food to rebel-held areas (UNOEA, 1988). When negotiations over Operation Lifeline began in early-1989, UN officials did not feel able even to mention SPLA-controlled areas (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, August 24th 1990).

The NGO-controlled operations of CART in 1986 had offered a possible springboard for relief operations that would reach areas outside direct government control, whether these were rebel areas, or "grey areas" under no firm control, as was the case with much of Bahr el Ghazal during the famine in question. Yet as SPLA control of southern Sudan increased, and in the absence of firm donor support for CART's operations, CART yielded to government pressures for military escorts, increasing government control, and the confining of relief to government-held areas. Noting the end of any semblance of neutrality from December 1986, one experienced CART worker commented: "We are now likely to be regarded by them (the SPLA) as under the control of the government and we must therefore expect to be treated accordingly" (memo. from Melvyn Almond, Oxfam, August 31st 1987).

In the absence of major donor or NGO relief efforts to non-government areas, responsibility for attempting to reach these areas was left to the ICRC.[2] The ICRC began negotiations in February 1988, but as a result of obstruction - by the government until August 1988, and then by the SPLA - the ICRC proved unable to deliver any relief until small quantities were airlifted in December 1988. Its activities in the field were confined to confidential surveys (**Sudan Times**, October 14th 1988). Donors stressed the strength of their behind-the-scenes

[2] It should be noted that Norwegian People's Aid and World Vision were involved in some relief efforts aimed at rebel-held areas (Minear, 1991). These were on a relatively small scale.

support: they said lobbying on ICRC's behalf had been a key element of the meetings between the donor food aid group and Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi which had taken place every six weeks in 1988 (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, September 6th 1990; EC, 1989; Minear, 1991). The exact nature of donors' pressure on ICRC's behalf is unclear. However, any such pressures were largely ineffective and donors put little **public** pressure on the government of Sudan on behalf of ICRC was very little.

Indeed, the Sudanese government was depicted as generally co-operative: the State Department in particular tended to project misplaced optimism that ICRC negotiations were about to bear fruit. In July, a State Department official informed Congress that: "We are... pleased to report that efforts to involve the International Committee of the Red Cross in feeding operations on both sides of the battle lines, at long last, appear to be coming to fruition" (US Congress, 1988). He said he expected ICRC operations to commence by the beginning of August. Yet at the same time, a US Embassy cable from Khartoum to Washington was noting that: "International Red Cross operations are at a standstill, reflecting an appalling lack of concern on the part of the Government of Sudan's military authorities toward the suffering of the people considering the ICRC reports of starvation in Wau" (US Congress, 1988).

Donors, relying largely on indicators of drought supplied by the NGO CARE, sanctioned the low allocation to Abyei district in late 1987 despite its proximity to an area where famine was known to be developing and despite the fact that southern Sudanese migrants had already begun to come to southern Kordofan. Indeed, donors actually wanted **lower** allocations to southern Kordofan than the regional government, with donors not taking the high population of South Kordofan into account. Arguments over this issue led to a two-month delay in relief operations to South Kordofan, with donors demanding a further survey of needs there (Interview with Peter Jobber, WFP, Khartoum, November 2nd 1988; RRC/EC, 1988). When donors **did** react to the increasing severity of famine (for example, by increasing the allocations to Abyei area council, and later by organizing airlifts), it was already too late to prevent very high mortality. The manifold political obstacles ensured that already-tardy efforts were subject to damaging delays.

One key UN official later acknowledged that NGO reports of famine were treated with some scepticism by donors for much of 1988 (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, September 6th 1990). Donors' tendency to equate famine with outright starvation tended to encourage and legitimate late interventions in the famine process. The US Agency for International Development had a fairly sophisticated system for providing warning of famines, using satellite-derived information among other sources. However, it failed to highlight the evolving famine in the south. Thus, the June 1988 Famine Early Warning System report noted: "Of great concern are the increasing numbers (from southern Sudan) seeking refuge in Ethiopia. This is a sign of stress previously identified as the one indicator that might **foretell** true famine in the south" (my emphasis) (USAID, 1988b).

Since this report was issued in June 1988, and the outmigrations in question peaked in late-1987, this "warning", in any case, could not reasonably be described as "early". Outmigrations, indeed, were significant even in 1985-1986, and these were regarded by indigenous NGOs more as a consequence of previous failure to relieve famine than as a sign that famine might be about to happen. Thus, the Sudan Council of Churches noted in early-1986: "[We view] with great and mounting concern the lack of assistance reaching the south from the international community and the consequent dislocation and migration of those affected from their homes and villages in search of food" (Sudan Council of Churches, 1986).

The EC appeared to judge the severity of famine by nutritional indicators rather than by asset-loss. And some NGOs felt donors regarded such asset-loss as in some respects a sign of **progress**. When Oxfam was lobbying the EC for a substantial relief response in the spring of 1987, Oxfam's Country Representative noted: "When tackled on the question of nutritional indicators not being helpful in relation to pastoralists, (the EC official) replied that to make good a claimed food deficit when people still have livestock could cause dependency... . In his view, pastoralism was, in any case, non-viable and in decline all over the region... . It is important to note that USAID, UNICEF and EEC have all recently expressed similar views concerning

pastoralism in the south, that it is on the way out and in twenty years would have disappeared anyway" (Oxfam, 1987).

Inadequate interventions were also encouraged by an official discourse which conflated "numbers in need" with "numbers in need and reachable". The data in the following table comes from the Early Warning System Bulletin (**Early Warning System Bulletin**, RRC, September 5th 1988).

Table 1

	Quantity of grain needed (metric tons)
Kordofan	71,000
Darfur	51,000
Upper Nile	9,600
Bahr el Ghazal	11,000
Equatoria	11,280
Eastern	46,000
Total	199,880

According to this table, the "needs" in the south were far outweighed by those in the north. In reality, the reverse was true. What appears to have happened is that the assessment of "needs" was conflated with assessments of who was "reachable" and who was not. Whilst donors sometimes acknowledged that these figures for "needs" were contaminated by assessments of accessibility (TCC meeting minutes, November 9th 1987), this qualification was frequently omitted.

In April 1988, a joint donors' report on the displaced said the number of southern displaced people "in need and reachable... is restricted to the displaced populations... of Juba and Yei" (Interdonor memo., 1988). The report mentioned the difficulty of getting food to Aweil, which was clearly classed among the "unreachable" areas. While it is true that the increasing control of Bahr el Ghazal by the SPLA was adding to the difficulties of delivery, the arrival of several trains in Aweil between March 1986 and March 1988 indicated that Aweil was generally reachable; the biggest problem lay in the infrequency of trains, and in their composition. In fact, the composition of the Aweil trains was doubly problematic, for the SPLA justified its threat to the trains on the grounds (to a large extent accurate) that they were being used to carry military supplies, rather than food for civilians (**Sudan Times**, November 29th 1988 and January 12th 1989).

"Inaccessibility" could also be overcome with relief flights – most readily in the case of towns on the edge of the war zone. For example, Abyei, although deemed inaccessible during the summer of 1988, had an airstrip which, in the autumn, was used to deliver relief supplies (Bonner, 1989).

2. Inadequate attention to problems in the distribution of relief

Donors, for the most part, left responsibility for the politically-sensitive tasks of monitoring relief distributions and overcoming official obstruction to NGOs and to the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). Again, this pattern was damaging to the victims of famine, since NGOs and the RRC generally lacked the political muscle to sway powerful obstructionist elements of the Sudanese government, whilst donors potentially wielded much more influence.

The Sudan representative of MSF-France went so far as to suggest that neither the EC nor the RRC was interested in what happened to their food, unless news of abuses leaked out

into the **public** domain (Interview with Christopher Carr, MSF-France, Khartoum, November 20th 1988). Certainly, publicity was to be of critical importance in radically altering donors' agendas and actions in relation to the case-study famine in late-1988.

In the context of hostility to relief on the part of many elements of the Sudanese government, the meagre resources allocated to the RRC during the phase of under-reaction inevitably reduced its ability to ensure receipt of relief by famine victims. In particular, the RRC was poorly equipped to stand up to the Ministry of Social Welfare, which also claimed responsibility for relief of the displaced. Meanwhile, divisions among the donors (with the UN tending to support the Ministry of Social Welfare and the EC tending to favour the RRC) cannot have helped in organizing a coherent lobby on behalf of the displaced.

The RRC was also poorly equipped to monitor or supervise distribution of relief at local level, a role that NGOs were often denied. RRC representation in the field was weak. For example, it was not until September 8th 1988 that an RRC representative began supervising grain distribution in Meiram. This belated supervision appears to have helped reduce abuses that had previously been the norm, including the leakage of grain from the camp to the town (MSF-France, 1988c).

Public mention of the government's role in blocking relief was very rare. The "obstacles" said to be impeding relief were well summarized by Bollinger, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, USAID, in statements to Congress in July 1988. First of all, there were important security obstacles (US Congress, 1988), a theme the Department of State was to reiterate in October 1988 when it emphasized the disruption of relief by SPLA attacks (Bonner, 1989). The government's apparent slowness in distributing relief had been further encouraged, Bollinger said, by "... the country's vast size; the lack of accurate data on conditions; the depressed state of the economy...; the very low level of development, particularly in logistics; the inexperienced and thinly staffed bureaucracy and the primitive and unreliable means of communication" (US Congress, 1988).

The government's repeated reneging on promises of substantial train deliveries to Aweil drew little public criticism from donors, although USAID was less reticent than the others in pointing to the RRC's relief failings (Oxfam, 1987).

The UNDP Resident Representative later acknowledged: "From when I arrived (April 1987), the donors were not focussing on Aweil... The primary focus in 1987 was on getting food to Darfur. There wasn't much attention to Aweil before the flood (of August 1988)" (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, September 6th 1990).

Yet donors knew that relief to Aweil was minimal and that only a minority of wagons were being used for relief. The donors' TCC meeting minutes, February 29th 1988, make this explicit in relation to the March 1988 trains to Aweil.

The role of the UN in obscuring government obstruction was a significant one. The UN appeal document of November 1988 claimed to address the problem of the displaced. Noting the importance of Babanousa as the fulcrum of relief efforts to Bahr el Ghazal and to southern Darfur and southern Kordofan, the UN recommended a major upgrading of technical facilities at the railway yard: more trains, trucks, workshops, radios, housing and staff, costing more than 6 million dollars. Yet there was no mention of the central **political** problem with deliveries, namely how these facilities might be used, and how facilities at Babanousa had been used in the past (UNOEA, 1988). These problems continued to beset relief operations: local reports said the January 1989 trains to Aweil carried 54 wagons of goods for the army, along with six relief wagons (**Sudan Times**, January 23rd 1989).

In the rare instances when donors did have their own representatives in the south, information reflecting badly on the government was sometimes simply ignored. This appears to have been what happened to a report by donor representative Paul Symonds, detailing the role of the army in theft of relief grain at the government-held town of Raga in 1987 (Symonds, 1987).

It is clear from the report that the stolen grain was dispersed thereafter, with some of it used as payment in the army compound and some sold to a number of merchants for subsequent sale in Wau. Clearly, this grain was lost to the relief operation. Yet John Davison, Director, Office of East African Affairs, Department of State, commented in July 1988: "There was food that was misplaced, but we understand that it has been found now by someone so that the deficit at Raga has been made up. The food has been accounted for" (US Congress, 1988).

3. Inadequate attention to the root causes of famine and refugee flows

Donors' public statements, while commonly referring to "insecurity" and "civil strife" (see, for example, UNOEA, 1988), gave little attention to the government's role in promoting these phenomena. Although the "Famine Early Warning System" reports put out by USAID described one of their aims as being to isolate the "proximate causes" of nutritional emergencies (USAID, 1987), they generally omitted any mention of the critical importance of the government-sponsored militias.

As late as November 1988, the key UN document which purported to address the issue of the displaced made one reference to militias in 164 pages (UNOEA, 1988). Further, the document's comment that "Thousands of families have fled the hinterlands to seek food and safety in the towns protected by the government" was very misleading, in view of the government's role in undermining safety and access to food both in areas that migrants had left and areas where they were arriving.

In a book on the war that was widely circulated in the west in late-1988, senior UNICEF staff made no mention of northern militias, but noted: "It is not only a war between army and SPLA but southern militia have also been armed to assist the army in **defending civilian populations**" (my emphasis) (Dodge and S. A. R. Ibrahim, 1988).

It is not plausible, however, that donors were ignorant of the importance of militia raiding, or the role of the government in sponsoring it. Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi had publicly admitted arming tribal militias. Ushari and Baldo published their report on slavery and the militias in July 1987, in which they detailed the government's role in supporting the Messiriya and Rizeigat militias. Donors received regular briefings from NGO staff and others (including priests) returning from the south (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, September 6th 1990).

The UNDP representative later told me: "I thought the major reason for arming the militias was as a defence force... It was a good idea that went wrong" (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, September 6th 1988).

To the extent that there **were** gaps in donors' information, these could have been filled to a large extent by talking to displaced people in the capital, Khartoum, where large numbers of southern Sudanese had fled from militia attacks (and many from the SPLA).

Moreover, in the context of continued economic assistance and donors' protests over the obstruction of relief in Ethiopia, donors' silence can itself be seen as a form of political action: inevitably, it lent a degree of legitimacy to the Sudanese government. So too did the simple existence of donor/government operations apparently aimed at remedying famine: in late October 1988, the State Minister, Ministry of Social Affairs and Zakat, Ahmed El Radi Gubara, stated publicly that the recent UN delegation to the Sudan (examining the problem of the displaced) provided proof that the government was not using food as a weapon in the war against the south (**Sudan Times**, October 28th 1988). The manipulation of donor-sponsored "relief" efforts for the transport of military supplies to government garrison towns has been mentioned.

The importance of widespread press coverage in prompting a major improvement in relief responses in 1989 was emphasized by the UNDP's resident representative. He told me: "The press blew the whistle. If it hadn't been for this international public exposure, nothing would have happened" (Interview with Bryan Wannop, UNDP, New York, August 24th 1990).

Gathering NGO pressures on donors also appear to have played a part in prompting a change (Oxfam, 1988; Oxfam, 1989). Also significant was shift in US attitudes with the arrival of the Bush administration and Sudan moving closer to Libya.

Together, the new international and domestic pressures forced Prime Minister el Mahdi to allow free passage of relief, at least in theory, under Operation Lifeline in April 1989 (Africa Watch, 1990). The operation was plagued by many of the problems affecting relief in previous years, but it did represent a notable step forward and was accompanied, for a while, by a ceasefire (Minear, 1991).

Conclusion

Notwithstanding Sen's emphasis on the connection between poverty and famine, it is significant that the Dinka, whilst they had suffered from neglect in government development plans, were blessed with considerable natural wealth. As the historian and politician Francis Deng wrote in 1971, "In the field of wealth, Dinkaland is among the richest in the country's natural resources, especially in livestock, forests, agricultural land, and water, including such riverain resources as fish" (Deng, 1971; see also Alier, 1990). To this, we must add the considerable oil reserves subsequently discovered in Dinkaland and adjoining areas of Upper Nile.

In this instance, it was precisely the resources controlled by the Dinka that – in the context of extreme political powerlessness and the proximity of relatively powerful northern groups – made them vulnerable to exploitative processes that threatened to destroy their way of life and remove their assets. In this sense, it was not the poverty of the Dinka, but their wealth, which exposed them to famine and outmigration. "We were rich people", one Dinka and former herdsman told me in Meiram in 1988. "We have come down so far."

This paper has highlighted some of the weaknesses – and, for those engaged in relief, the dangers – of analyses which, in taking a purely "humanitarian" approach to famine, skate over its political roots. And it has highlighted the ways in which famine and accompanying upheavals may be functional.

One of the standard recurring phrases in official and journalistic discussions of refugee flows (and one often used in Sudan during the period in question, as we have seen) is that refugees are "fleeing conflict". Meanwhile, publications with humanitarian objectives often describe how civilians are "caught in the crossfire" of warring parties, how they are victims of "senseless" violence – a position adopted, for example, in a Panos publication called "War Wounds" (Panos Institute, 1988), which described the impact of civil war on some of Sudan's civilian population. Yet such propositions may be dangerously vague, or outright misleading.

What tends to be missing from this kind of "humanitarian" analysis is any sense of the functions that violence may serve, or of how various powerful groups (perhaps including the national government) may have an interest in actively promoting violence and famine for purposes of their own. As with Sen and Drèze's analysis, the small element of "political" analysis in these discussions does not actually take us very far. In particular, by obscuring the detailed and often closely related processes of war and famine and by concentrating on the **end result** of these processes (often outright starvation), this kind of analysis runs three important risks. First, it may help to legitimize and encourage belated relief interventions, interventions that occur only once the famine process is far advanced. Second, it may encourage interventions that are in some sense politically naive, for example interventions that are poorly monitored and susceptible to manipulation by indigenous groups with an interest in promoting famine. Finally, this form of analysis may distract attention from the **root causes** of human suffering (and in particular from a national government's role), and hence reduce the chances that effective pressure can be brought to bear to remove or reduce these root causes.

Clearly, the willful creation of famine and of massive population upheavals is morally wrong. At the same time, it is important to recognize that many of the groups creating famine and upheaval in this instance were behaving perfectly rationally (if we mean by that acting in their own political and economic interests) in so doing. Correspondingly, relief was also blocked by a number of groups for perfectly rational reasons. This research suggests the dangers in assuming that government actors are seeking to promote the best interests of people in their charge, notwithstanding the claims which governments may make. What the United Nations and its member governments should do about this is no easy question, and cannot be properly addressed here. However, refugee movements, famines and relief operations are likely to be intensely "political", and so long as international players adopt the position that relief is purely "humanitarian" and somehow outside of political and economic processes, they risk merely tinkering at the fringes of these problems. At worst, they may serve to legitimate brutal and unrepresentative governments.

Postscript

Refugee flows to Ethiopia from southern Sudan did not stop in 1988, but continued in the years that followed. Relief has continued at low levels, and has been hampered by government's bombing of relief centres. The government also bombed refugees moving back into Sudan from Itang. Meanwhile, government support of militias in the south has continued. With government interest in the south now confined to garrison towns and with domestic public opinion easier to ignore in the absence of democratic government structures, the government may have fewer reasons to co-operate with relief efforts to southern Sudan than it ever did. UN officials report that the government has proved unwilling to agree ground-rules for relief at any joint meeting with rebel SPLA and donor representatives, and that UN representatives have had to undertake "shuttle diplomacy" between the government and the rebels, allowing the government to undermine this diplomacy by announcing "agreements" with donors in which the rebels played no part. The situation has been complicated by the "Nasir" group, which broke away from the SPLA. This paper shows how even the recent "democratic" Sudanese government of Sadiq el Mahdi, far from seeking to relieve famine and prevent upheaval in the south, actively promoted them. The current fundamentalist regime shows little sign of taking a more benevolent approach.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdel-Rahim, M. (1968)
The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899-1947, Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.

ACP-EEC (1988)
Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia, March 24 - April 4, 1988.

Ad Hoc Committee for the working paper on the southern problem (1986)
Working paper on the southern problem, General Secretariat, DUP, 1986.

Africa Watch (1990)
Denying the "Honor of Living": Sudan, A Human Rights Disaster, New York, Washington, London.

Alier, A. (1990)
Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, Exeter: Ithaca Press.

Allen, T. (1986)
Full Circle?: An Overview of Sudan's "Southern Problem" since Independence, Manchester Discussion Papers in Development Studies, 8604, University of Manchester.

Amnesty International (1989)
Sudan: Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, London: Amnesty International, December.

Aweil Rice Development Project (1987)
Report on the Food Situation in Aweil, April 25th 1987.

Bonner, R. (1989)
"A Reporter at Large: Famine", **New Yorker**, March 13th 1989.

Brown, R. (1988)
"A Background Note on the Final Round of Economic Austerity Measures Imposed by the Numeiry Regime: June 1984 - March 1985", in Barnett, T. and A. Abdelkarim, (eds.), **Sudan: State, Capital and Transformation**, London: Croom Helm.

Chiriyankandath, J. L. (1987)
"1986 Elections in the Sudan: Tradition, Ideology, Ethnicity - and Class?", **Review of African Political Economy**, No. 38.

Collins, R. O. (1971)
Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1889-1918, London: Yale University Press.

____ (1983)
Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956, London: Yale University Press.

Concern (1988a)
Report for July 1988.

Concern (1988b)
Situation Report on Relief Operations.

Cunnison, I. (1966)
Baggara Arabs: Power and Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

de Waal, A. (1989)
Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984–1985, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

_____ (1990a)
Starving out the South: Famine, War and Famine, 1983–9, mimeo.

_____ (1990b)
Armed Militias in Contemporary Sudan, mimeo.

Deng, F. M. (1972)
The Dinka of the Sudan, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston.

Deng, F. M. (1986)
The Man Called Deng Majok: A Biography of Power, Polygyny and Change, London: Yale University Press.

Dodge, C.P. and S.A.R. Ibrahim (1988)
"The Civilians Suffer Most", in Panos Institute, **War Wounds** (op. cit.).

Drèze, J. and A. Sen (1989)
Hunger and Public Action, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Duffield, M. (1990)
Sudan at the Crossroads: From Emergency Preparedness to Social Security, Institute of Development Studies, DP275.

EC (1989)
Evaluation of EC Emergency Rehabilitation and Food Aid to Sudan, 1985–88, Note to the Directorate General for Development, April 10th.

El Sammani, M. O. (ed.) (1985)
El Khuwei–Mazroub–Tinna Study Area, North Central Kordofan and Messeriya Study Area, Southern Kordofan, Institute of Environmental Studies, Khartoum University and USAID (project no. 698–0427).

Father Deng Rudolf (1988)
Memo from former Chairman, Aweil Relief Committee, to Sudanaid, Khartoum, Spring.

Foucault, M. (1978)
"Politics and the Study of Discourse", **Ideology and Consciousness**, No. 3, Spring.

_____ (1981)
"Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault", **Ideology and Consciousness**, No. 8, Spring.

Garang, J. (1987)
John Garang Speaks, London: KPI Ltd.

Gray, J. R. (1961)
A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839–1889, Oxford University Press.

Hales, J. M. (1978)
The Pastoral System of the Meidob, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University.

Hargey, T. (1981)
The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan, 1898–1939, Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University.

Holt, P. M. and M.W. Daly, (1988)
A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, London: Longman.

Hutchinson, S. (1988)
The Nuer in Crisis: Coping with Money, War and the State, Ph.D. thesis, Vols I and II, University of Chicago.

Interagency Situation Report (1988)
South Kordofan, June 1988.

Interdonor memo (1988)
Displaced Persons in Sudan: Food Needs and Related Issues, April 29th.

Johnson, D. H. (1988)
The Southern Sudan, Report no. 78, London: Minority Rights Group.

Karam, K. M. (1980)
Dispute Settlement among Pastoral Nomads in the Sudan, M. Soc. Sci. thesis, Birmingham University.

Keen, D. P. (1991)
Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in South-West Sudan, 1983–89, Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University.

Mahmud, U. A. and S. A. Baldo (1987)
Al Daien Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan, Khartoum: Human Rights Violations in the Sudan.

Malwal, B. (1985)
The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood, New York: Thornton Books.

Mawson, A. M. M. (1984)
"Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict", **The World Today**, December.

_____ (1989)
The Triumph of Life: Political Dispute and Religious Ceremonial among the Agar Dinka of the Southern Sudan, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University.

_____ (1991)
"Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka, 1985–1989", **Disasters**, Vol. 15, No. 2, June.

Minear, L. (1991)
Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan, Trenton: Red Sea Press and Washington: Bread for the World.

Ministry of Agriculture (1974)
Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, Khartoum: Government of Sudan, June.

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (1987)
Agricultural Situation and Outlook, August Report, Vol. 3, No. 5, Department of Agricultural Economics.

Mohamed Salih, M. A. (1990)
"Ecological Stress and Political Coercion in the Sudan", **Disasters**, Vol. 14, No. 2.

MSF–France (1988a)
Details des différentes pathologies rencontrées dans les consultations feeding du 7 au 20/8/88, Meiram, August 18th

_____ (1988b)
Situation Brief, Meiram, June 4th

_____ (1988c)
El Meiram, Situation Brief IV, September 22nd.

_____ (1988d)
Report for 14/10 to 15/11, Meiram, November 16th.

_____ (1988e)
Meiram Situation Brief, July 4th.

Niamir, M., R. Huntington, and D.C. Cole, (1983)
Ngok Dinka Cattle Migrations and Marketings: A Missing Piece of the Sudan Mosaic, Development Discussion Paper No. 155, Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge.

Oxfam (1986a)
Political Situation in Abyei, March 29th.

_____ (1986b)
The Economic War against the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal, June 4th.

_____ (1986c)
Ed Daien Tour Report, June 18th.

_____ (1986d)
Memo from Country Representative, Khartoum, to Oxfam House, Oxford, August 31st.

_____ (1987)
Policy Situation Report No. 6, March 1st.

_____ (1988)
Telexes from Country Representative Mark Duffield, Khartoum, to Oxfam, Oxford, November 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th 1988.

_____ (1989)
The Changing Political Scene: Implications for Relief Work, Khartoum, February 1st.

Panos Institute (1988)
War Wounds: Sudanese People Report on Their War, London.

Prunier, G. (1986)
From Peace to War: The Southern Sudan 1972–1984, Occasional Paper No. 3, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Hull University.

Rangasami, A. (1985)
"'Failure of Exchange Entitlements' Theory of Famine: A Response", **Economic and Political Weekly**, Vol. XX, No. 41, October 12th and No. 42, October 19th.

Representatives of the Twic Community (1986)
Subject: Destruction of Northern Gogrial (Twic Area) by the Messiriya (Baggara) tribesmen of southern Kordofan province, Letter from representatives of the Twic community to H. E. the Chairman, Transitional Military Council, Khartoum, January 25th 1986,.

RRC/EC (1988)
Report on Visit to Food Aid Administration, El Obeid, May 29th.

Ryle, J. (1989)
Displaced Southern Sudanese in Northern Sudan with Special Reference to Southern Darfur and Kordofan, Mimeo.

Saeed, A. (1982)
The State and Socioeconomic Transformation in the Sudan: The Case of Social Conflict in Southwest Kordofan, Ph.D. thesis, University of Connecticut.

Sanderson, L. P. and N. Sanderson, (1981)
Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899–1964, London: Ithaca Press.

Schweinfurth, G. (1873)
The Heart of Africa, Vol. II, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle.

Sen, A. K. (1981)
Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press (reprinted 1984).

Shepherd, A. W. (1984)
"Nomads, Farmers and Merchants: Old Strategies in a Changing Sudan", in E. Scott, (ed.), **Life Before the Drought**, Boston: Allen and Unwin.

Sikainga, A. A. M. (1986)
British Policy in Western Bahr el Ghazal (Sudan), 1904–1946, Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Sudan Council of Churches/Sudanaid (1986)
Emergency Assistance Needs: Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, September 28th.

Symonds, P. (1987)
A Report on the Situation in Raga, Western Bahr el Ghazal Province, June–August 1987, Khartoum, September.

TCC (Technical Coordination Committee) (1987)
Meeting minutes, November 9th.

_____ (1988)
Meeting minutes, September 5th and February 29th.

Titherington, Major G. W. (1927)
"The Raik of Bahr el Ghazal Province", **Sudan Notes and Records**, Vol. X.

UN/SRRA (1990)
Lifeline Sudan: An Investigation into Production Capability in the Rural Southern Sudan; A Report on Food Sources and Needs, also field notes for this report.

UNDP (1988)
Report of the Multi-Agency Survey Mission to Aweil, 30 November-1 December 1988, Khartoum.

UNHCR (1988)
Ethiopia: Health and Nutrition Assessment of Southern Sudanese Refugee Camps in Kefa, Illubabor and Wolega Awrajas, 8-22 March 1988, Geneva.

UNICEF (1991)
The Return to Southern Sudan of the Sudanese Refugees from Itang Camp, Gambela, Ethiopia.

UNOEA (1988)
The Emergency Situation in Sudan: Urgent Humanitarian Requirements, November.

US Congress (1988)
Ethiopia and Sudan: Warfare, Politics and Famine, Hearing before the Select Committee on Hunger, House of Representatives, Serial No. 100-30, Washington, July 14th.

_____ (1989)
Politics of Hunger in the Sudan, Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Hunger and the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Serial No. 101-1, Washington, March 2nd.

USAID (1987)
Country Report: Sudan, Famine Early Warning System, January.

_____ (1988a)
Sudan: A Good Start to the Rainy Season, Famine Early Warning System, July.

_____ (1988b)
Sudan: Vulnerability Assessment, Famine Early Warning System, June.

US Committee for Refugees (1989)
World Refugee Survey: 1988 in Review, Washington.

Wai, D. (1973)
The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration, London: Frank Cass.

Wannop, B. (1989)
Report on the First Muglad-Aweil Relief Train, May 20 to May 28, Khartoum: UNDP, June.

Warburg, G. (1971)
The Sudan Under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1916, London: Frank Cass.

WFP/FAO/UNICEF (1991)
Report of the WFP/FAO/UNICEF Crop, Food and Emergency Needs Assessment Mission, Southern Sudan, 14 October - 14 December.

Wilson, K. (1989)
"Towards Understanding the War", **Africa Events,** April.

Wilson, R. T. (1977)
"Temporal Changes in Livestock Numbers and Patterns of Transhumance in Southern Darfur, Sudan", **The Journal of Developing Areas**, July.

Woodward, P. (1990)
Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State, London: Lester Crook.

LIST OF AVAILABLE DISCUSSION PAPERS

. DP 1 **Economic Growth, Structural Change and Labour Absorption in Africa: 1960–85,**
Dharam Ghai, December 1987

. DP 2 **The Peasant Question and Development Policy in Nicaragua,**
Peter Utting, February 1988

. DP 3 **Promoting Youth Employment: Policies and Programmes,**
Dharam Ghai, May 1988

. DP 4 **Inside Megalopolis: Exploring Social and Spatial Diversity of Provisioning Structures in Mexico City,**
Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara and Gabriel Vera, June 1990

. DP 5 **Participatory Development: Some Perspectives from Grass–Roots Experiences,**
Dharam Ghai, June 1988

. DP 6 **Some Reflections on Human and Social Indicators for Development,**
Dharam Ghai, Michael Hopkins and Donald McGranahan, October 1988

. DP 7 **The Crisis of the 1980s in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Impact, Social Change and Political Implications,**
Dharam Ghai and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, July 1989, (revised version, January 1990)

. DP 8 **From "Orthodoxy" to "Reform": Experiences of Dependent Transitional Economies,**
Peter Utting, July 1989

. DP 9 **Self–Sufficiency and Exile in Mexico (Report on a field study among relocated Guatemalan refugees in South–East Mexico, August–November 1988),**
Finn Stepputat, August 1989

. DP 10 **The New System of Food Marketing in Pakistan,**
Sartaj Aziz, May 1990

. DP 11 **Seeking Food and Seeking Money: Changing Productive Relations in a Highland Mexican Community,**
George A. Collier, May 1990

. DP 12 **Barabaig Natural Resource Management: Sustainable Land Use under Threat of Destruction,**
Charles Lane, June 1990

. DP 13 **Constraints to Environmental Rehabilitation through People's Participation in the Northern Ethiopian Highlands,**
Michael Ståhl, July 1990

. DP 14 **Eléments pour l'approche des indicateurs sociaux en Côte d'Ivoire,**
José Trouvé, July 1990

. DP 15 **Qualitative Indicators of Development,**
Donald McGranahan, Wolf Scott and Claude Richard, November 1990

. DP 15F **Indicateurs qualitatifs du développement,**
Donald McGranahan, Wolf Scott and Claude Richard, April 1991

. DP 16 **The Social Dynamics of Deforestation in Developing Countries: Principal Issues and Research Priorities,**
Solon Barraclough and Krishna Ghimire, November 1990

. DP 17 **Refugee Self–settlement versus Settlement on Government Schemes: The Long–term Consequences for Security, Integration and Economic Development of Angolan Refugees (1966–1989) in Zambia,**
Art Hansen, November 1990

. DP 18 **Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse,**
Yusuf Bangura, March 1991

. DP 19 **Beneficiaries of the Illicit Drug Trade: Political Consequences and International Policy at the Intersection of Supply and Demand,**
LaMond Tullis, March 1991

. DP 20 **Organización social y lucha ecológica en una región del norte de México,**
Julio Moguel and Enrique Velázquez, April 1991

. DP 21 **Illicit Drug Taking and Prohibition Laws: Public Consequences and the Reform of Public Policy in the United States,**
LaMond Tullis, April 1991

. DP 22 **Greening at the Grassroots: People's Participation in Sustainable Development,**
Jessica M. Vivian, April 1991

. DP 23 **Ruining the Commons and Responses of the Commoners: Coastal Overfishing and Fishermen's Actions in Kerala State, India,**
John Kurien, May 1991

. DP 24 **The Social Origins and Impact of Deforestation in Central America,**
Peter Utting, May 1991

. DP 25 **Development Data Constraints and the Human Development Index,**
Christopher J.L. Murray, May 1991

. DP 26 **Structural Adjustment and Multiple Modes of Social Livelihood in Nigeria,**
Abdul Raufu Mustapha, June 1991

. DP 27 **Economic Reform and Citizen Entitlements in Eastern Europe: Some Social Implications of Structural Adjustment in Semi–Industrial Economies,**
E.V.K. FitzGerald, June 1991

. DP 28 **Limits to Labour Absorption: Conceptual and Historical Background to Adjustment in Nigeria's Urban Informal Sector:**
Kate Meagher with Mohammed–Bello Yunusa, December 1991

. DP 29 **Parks and People: Livelihood Issues in National Parks Management in Thailand and Madagascar,**
Krishna B. Ghimire, December 1991

. DP 30 **Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Guyana,**
Ralph R. Premdas, January 1992

. DP 31 **Economic Restructuring and Rural Subsistence in Mexico: Maize and the Crisis of the 1980s,**
Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, January 1992

. DP 32 **Fisheries Management in the Pacific: Tradition and the Challenges of Development in Marovo, Solomon Islands,**
Edvard Hviding and Graham B.K. Baines, March 1992

. DP 33 **Conservation, Livelihood and Democracy: Social Dynamics of Environmental Changes in Africa,**
Dharam Ghai, March 1992

. DP 34 **Land Tenure and Deforestation: Interactions and Environmental Implications,**
Peter Dorner and William C. Thiesenhusen, April 1992

. DP 35 **Sustaining the Forests: The Community–Based Approach in South and South–East Asia,** Marcus Colchester, May 1992

. DP 36 **The Social Dynamics of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: An Overview,**
Antonio C. Diegues, July 1992

. DP 37 **Structural Adjustment, Global Integration and Social Democracy,**
Dharam Ghai, October 1992

. DP 38 **Consequences of the Forced Mass Repatriation of Migrant Communities: Recent Cases from West Africa and the Middle East,**
Nicholas Van Hear, November 1992

. DP 39 **A Political Economy of Refugee Flows from South–West Sudan, 1986–1988,**
David Keen, November 1992