CHAPTER 4

Toward a New Eco-Social Contract: Actors, Alliances and Strategies

The twentieth-century social contract—an implicit bargain between economic imperatives of growth and productivity, and social imperatives of redistribution and social protection—has broken down and cannot sustain the transformative vision of the 2030 Agenda. The breakdown of the social contract manifests itself in multiple global crises, rising inequalities and the deep divisions in our societies. Multiple actors call for a new social contract, but visions differ on what an ideal social contract should look like. Indeed, it is important to recognize the variety of normative and real-world social contracts as well as the power asymmetries and structural inequalities shaping them. Recent history shows that social contracts are not set in stone but renegotiated when contexts change, or when contracts lose legitimacy and support. Countries have created new social contracts at critical junctures, in response to regime changes and citizens' demands, embarking on a variety of institutional and policy reforms. To overcome present challenges and lay the foundations for just and sustainable societies and economies, this report suggests uniting all stakeholders in deliberations on a new eco-social contract based on principles of inclusivity, human rights, social justice, respect for planetary boundaries and our global commons, solidarity and multilateralism.

1. The Time Is Now: A New Eco-Social Contract for a Just and Green World

The twentieth-century social contract—an implicit bargain between economic imperatives of growth and productivity, and social imperatives of redistribution and social protection—has broken down and cannot sustain the transformative vision of the 2030 Agenda. Unraveling under the pressure of neoliberal globalization and failing to be fully inclusive and environmentally sustainable, the breakdown of the social contract now manifests itself in multiple global crises and the deep divisions in our societies. Inequalities in many dimensions have grown, particularly in the last 40 years, and many people feel left out and left behind. The failure of our economic model to account for the natural boundaries of our planet has led to environmental destruction and a climate crisis with human precarity increasing because of extreme weather events and health pandemics such as Covid-19, presenting serious challenges for current and future generations. And despite considerable progress in human development for more than half a century, this progress has been uneven and volatile, while recent gains have been partially reversed as a result of the Covid-19 crisis.[1] At the current juncture, too many people are living in or have been pushed back into poverty, struggling with multiple deprivations, vulnerabilities and insecurities, while often lacking the power and means to make their voices heard. Many others have lost their trust in governments and their hopes that their children and grandchildren will be better off (see chapter 2).[2]

Demographic change such as ageing and increased labour market participation of women has impacts on the generational contract (chapter 3). It has increased the amount of paid and unpaid work placed on women, who continue to be considered "natural caregivers." This has led to growing demands for collective care arrangements beyond unpaid care provided by families and communities to which governments are increasingly responding, although much remains to be done. In addition, rapid technological change and globalization have profoundly altered labour markets, especially in the global North where labour markets had achieved a high level of formalization and protection, a result of the welfare state social contract that was established in the post-war era. Following deregulation, labour market flexibilization and new technologies, workers are increasingly struggling with outsourcing practices and high wage inequalities, increasing informalization and precarity, for example, through unregulated platform work, bringing the role of the state in providing income security and social protection back to the fore (chapters 1 and 2). As previous chapters have shown, the Covid-19 pandemic has also put social contracts under immense strain, affecting both vertical relations between citizens and the state as well as horizontal relations between citizens. Normal life was severely disrupted, and lives and livelihoods were threatened, while governments assumed new roles during the emergency, imposing limits on individual freedoms that led to protests and contestations.[3] Finally, the international security order has been seriously challenged since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, producing a new humanitarian crisis and negative impacts on the world economy, manifesting in a cost-of-living crisis and supply chain disruptions (chapter 1).

People around the world need to be involved in the design of and commit to implement a new eco-social contract which allows economies and societies to thrive, is fully inclusive, promotes human rights, respects planetary boundaries and our global commons, and supports new forms of solidarity and a strengthened multilateral system.

Intergenerational distributive conflict also pertains to generations yet to be born. The irreversible depletion of natural resources and ecosystem services, such as the capacity of the environment to assimilate greenhouse gases, will affect the economies of the future.

– James Heintz
Professor,
University of Massachusetts Amherst

In this challenging context, residual reforms of the social contract that fail to address root causes of problems will not be enough to achieve the necessary long-term transformations. The social contract needs a fundamental overhaul if we aim to achieve sustainable development for all; it must become an eco-social contract, incorporating the ecological dimension and creating a new contract for the planet and future generations. This new eco-social contract needs to be grounded in a broad consensus between different stakeholders, embarking on a democratic, inclusive and participatory decision-making process at multiple levels, and feeding evidence-based policy proposals into decision-making forums. The basic idea of creating a new eco-social contract is to foster a range of deliberative processes at local, national, regional and global levels, in different sectors and with different sets of stakeholders, to arrive at a shared vision, concrete objectives and commitments and accountability mechanisms. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has invited all countries to conduct inclusive and meaningful national listening consultations so that all citizens have a say in envisioning their countries' futures.[4]

Grassroots participation and the inclusion of previously excluded voices are especially necessary when it comes to the process of determining how to get to a new eco-social contract. Reinventing instead of repairing the broken social contract could be the result of more inclusive processes.[5] For a new eco-social contract to be sustainable and democratically grounded, there has to be a broad societal and global consensus regarding the questions of what the common public goods are (for example, keeping global warming under 1.5°C, providing decent work for all or maintaining global peace and security in line with the UN Charter), how to arrive there and how to finance them. Achieving such a consensus might not be a smooth process, nor a quick fix, but it should be a democratic, inclusive and transparent process. Consensus also implies that not everyone will see his or her original preferences succeed. Compromise is warranted, without getting stuck in the status quo or the lowest common denominator. Contestation and bargaining, protests and collective action, and building of strategic alliances will be necessary to challenge and overcome the status quo. Southern voices and Indigenous peoples' traditional knowledge as well as communitarian visions have hitherto been neglected in this debate, yet much can be learned from them, in particular regarding the sustainable management of natural resources and how everyone is part of a network of social relations defining rights and responsibilities. In addition, the people have more power resources than they tend to be aware of to shape the social and ecological transition and to hold governments and business to account (see Spotlight by Kumi Naidoo).[6]

Bargaining for a new eco-social contract also requires being explicit about normative foundations and values (see box 1.2). In this report we argue that now is the time for a fundamental rethink of the principles and values that currently guide our societies and economies and, building on this new consensus, the creation of policies and institutions needed to overcome urgent development challenges. People around the world need to be involved in the design of and commit to implement a new eco-social contract which allows economies and societies to thrive, is fully inclusive, promotes human rights, respects planetary boundaries and our global commons, and supports new forms of solidarity and a strengthened multilateral system.

In this chapter we propose principles which could guide deliberations, starting with the inclusion of groups that have often been excluded or were included on less favourable terms in previous social contracts, for example, women; informal workers; ethnic, racial and religious minorities; migrants; and LGBTIQ+ persons. Furthermore, societies need a fiscal contract that raises sufficient resources in an equitable way, a new economic model that is fair and sustainable, and a new relationship with nature that protects biodiversity and climate stability. Finally, creating new eco-social contracts requires redressing historical injustices through decolonizing policy and knowledge; fostering social, climate and gender justice; and promoting new solidarities at local, national and global levels.

This chapter provides further insights into the concept of the social contract; maps and discusses various examples of social contracts—which are much more expansive and diverse than the model associated with Western welfare states—and how they have evolved over time (section 2); and presents recent examples where social contracts have been or are being renegotiated or made more inclusive or sustainable, for example, through new constitutions, land reforms and expansion of social rights (section 3). It then explores the renaissance of the concept in current debates and how different actors conceive of the approach to articulate their demands and visions regarding needed changes in state–citizen relations and reform priorities (section 4). It concludes by laying out seven principles that would steer new eco-social contracts in a transformative direction to advance social and climate justice.

Chapter key messages

ONE

The twentieth-century social contract, while delivering social progress and greater well-being for many, left many behind and ignored planetary boundaries. A new eco-social contract for the twenty-first century needs to be fully inclusive and grapple with historical injustices such as colonialism and slavery as well as contemporary challenges, while shifting and restructuring economies and societies to halt climate change and environmental destruction.

●○○○

TWO

There is not one social contract, but many. As we move toward a new eco-social contract there is much to learn from the diversity of communitarian visions and country experiences in all parts of the world. Decolonizing knowledge is crucial for shifting power asymmetries.

○●○○

THREE

Existing social contracts have often been renegotiated in times of crisis and at critical junctures, opening a window of opportunity to build better futures. There is, however, a risk of backsliding through elite-driven and populist bargains and a backlash against equity and human rights.

○○●○

FOUR

A new eco-social contract should be created through deliberative processes at local, national, regional and global levels, in different sectors and with different sets of stakeholders. To arrive at a shared, equitable vision and transform it into tangible results, we need normative, regulatory and policy changes and concrete objectives, commitments and accountability mechanisms tailored to local contexts.

○○○●

2. Understanding the Social Contract: What It Is and What It Ought to Be

2.1 What is a social contract?

In a world of multiple crises where many previous certainties have been shattered, large numbers of people are beginning to question the principles, values and public institutions our societies are founded upon, what philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau have called the social contract.[7] A social contract can be defined as the explicit and implicit agreements between state and citizens defining rights and obligations to ensure legitimacy, security, rule of law and social justice (see box 1.1). Social contracts reduce transaction costs and increase trust and predictability in human interactions, both vertically between state actors and citizens and horizontally among citizens. In present times, social contracts are understood to reflect basic societal decisions regarding the division of labour between states, markets, communities, families and individuals, and on what is provided collectively and by whom in view of building a just society where equal opportunities exist for people to flourish and progress.[8] Social contracts are based on philosophical or normative frameworks and imaginaries and are implemented through concrete policies and institutions.[9] Both the normative framework of a social contract and how it is arrived at, as well as concrete policies and their implementation, can be analysed, criticized and scrutinized to guide reform proposals and advocacy work.

For an analysis of social contracts, it is useful to identify their scope (involved parties, application), their temporal dimension and their substantive content.[10] It is also common to distinguish between the procedural (enforcement of rights), the distributive (access to resources and rights), the participatory (participation in decision making) and the recognition function (promotion of dignity and respect) of social contracts.[11] For conflict-affected countries, a definition of a resilient social contract has been proposed that includes i) political settlements (a tacit agreement among powerful groups about the rules of the political and economic game),[12] that are increasingly inclusive and responsive to "core conflict issues"; ii) institutions (formal, customary, and informal) that are increasingly effective and inclusive and have broadly shared outcomes that meet societal expectations and enhance state legitimacy; and iii) a process of broadening and deepening social cohesion, with formal and informal ties and interactions binding society horizontally (among citizens, between groups) and vertically (between citizens/groups and the state).[13]

More recently, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, basic questions around individual freedom and self-responsibility versus collective responsibilities and state interventions—for example, for achieving public health objectives—have resurfaced and fueled contention, dominating public debates in many countries.[14] The pandemic has also triggered debates in the global South about building more inclusive and rights-based social systems as foundations for a new social contract.[15] Public debates are emerging in the global North about the role of the state, what is essential work in modern societies (see Spotlight by Naila Kabeer) and what are the bonds that tie people together, including across borders. What has become clear in previous chapters is that during the age of neoliberal globalization, increasing inequalities and multiple crises have undermined social contracts in different contexts, producing a political crisis of trust and legitimacy (see chapter 2) and a crisis of social reproduction, while humanity has not yet found an effective mechanism to secure the protection of nature or the rights of future generations.

Historically, theoretical or normative approaches and real-world examples of social contracts have differed according to how much weight they have given to social order (for example, protection

A social contract can be defined as the explicit and implicit agreements between state and citizens defining rights and obligations.

of private property rights) versus social justice issues (for example, income redistribution) and regarding the balance between individual rights and responsibilities versus state regulations and provisioning (see box 1.2).[16] More recent debates unfolding since the 1980s have taken an even wider view and an explicit critical stance, aiming to uncover how empirical social contracts deviate from the normative notion of mutual benefits based on cooperation among independent and roughly equal persons.[17] This report agrees with this critical perspective, promoted, for example, by feminists and critical scholars, that real-world social contracts tend to be far removed from the notion of free and equal persons creating a society based upon rules to which all agree.[18] Rather, social contracts reflect existing power structures and inequalities at multiple levels and in varied forms, often creating de facto contracts of domination.[19] They often do not grant broad-based political participation to non-elite groups, focusing in the best case on other legitimizing factors such as security or welfare provision.[20] More often than not, they are the result of elite bargains and market power.[21] According to Sen and Durano (2014:5), a social contract "may be imposed from above, fought over from below, and always holding the potential for change." The question then arises of how social contracts can be improved, strengthened and renegotiated in a fairer and more inclusive way, allowing groups facing social exclusion and obstacles to participate in shaping present contracts while also respecting the interests of future generations.

The question then arises of how social contracts can be improved, strengthened and renegotiated in a fairer and more inclusive way, allowing groups facing social exclusion and obstacles to participate in shaping present contracts while also respecting the interests of future generations.

Critical scholars and activists have highlighted the racialist and patriarchal nature of existing social contracts (see Spotlight by Marta Lamas),[22] our missing contract for nature,[23] and problems of elite capture, corruption and lack of accountability undermining political institutions (see chapters 2 and 3). They also point to governments failing to protect their populations in times of crisis or shocks or to guarantee basic democratic and human rights,[24] migrants falling between the cracks,[25] and informal workers being denied fundamental labour rights, social protection and just wages.[26] We therefore distinguish between theory and practice, that is, the ideal understandings of a social contract (the norms and values underpinning its vision and objectives, which vary according to different world views and ideologies) versus real-world experiences (the actual institutions and policies that are implemented and their effects). We furthermore analyse political processes of negotiating or renegotiating social contracts, whether these are elite-driven, top-down processes or decision-making processes that are democratic and bottom up, involving a broader range of citizens and stakeholders. Finally, important questions arise regarding transnational issues and how to overcome the limitations associated with national social contracts when it comes to building eco-social contracts that aim to promote global social and climate justice, peace and human rights, concerns that are at the centre of the UN Charter and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[27]

The outcomes of an inclusive and fair bargaining process and the observation of various principles (see section 5) that could guide negotiations and inform the substance of new eco-social contracts, including alternative civil society proposals as well as lived experiences and claims-making from sub-

altern groups, have the potential to lead to better and stronger social contracts than those that existed in the past. In line with the benchmark criteria for transformative change developed in our 2016 flagship report (box 1.4), the extent to which structural drivers of inequality, poverty, social exclusion and unsustainable practices can be addressed in the context of new eco-social contracts needs to be the key indicator upon which to evaluate their performance.[28]

2.2 Social contracts: Not one but many

Social contracts can be found in all societies. There is a large diversity among them, each emerging from different contexts: social contracts are shaped by historical and contextual factors and change over time, in response to changing political constellations or socioeconomic conditions.

The so-called sexual division of labour is not about sex but about gender, in that it is a social arrangement that limits equal access for women and men to work in both the public and private spheres.

– Marta Lamas
Researcher and Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico

2.2.1 Welfare state and developmental social contracts

The social bargain of twentieth-century welfare states is probably the social contract that has received the most attention and analysis, not least because it was a highly institutionalized process of consultation and cooperation on economic policy issues involving organized interest groups, the state and civil society actors. Their key objectives were more equalized capital–labour relations and shared growth in a democratic context with accountable institutions. Managing uncertainties and providing economic predictability as well as stable livelihoods in times of rapid structural change were key lessons learned from the Great Depression and the war period, which fed into the post-war social contracts in the global North.[29] Several late-industrializing countries in the global South pursued a similar model.[30] The promise of this bargain was delivered through an increase of the social wage of workers and a substantial expansion of social policies to compensate workers for wage moderation that was necessary to keep inflation rates low and the economy competitive. Western countries differed in their welfare regime approach from those that placed more responsibilities on individuals and markets to those that provided a higher amount of public social provision.[31] During this period, all parties involved in processes of tripartite negotiations or social dialogue achieved benefits: organized workers and their families benefitted from the increased social wage and high employment rates, a thriving business sector from growth and stability, and an expanding public sector from growth-driven fiscal receipts based on progressive taxation. For several reasons elaborated in this report, this welfare state social contract was undermined during neoliberal globalization and through multiple crises, and is now in need of a fundamental overhaul if it is to deliver on the objectives of social justice and economic development and safeguard the environment.

2.2.2 Communitarian approaches

Beyond the social contract associated with Western welfare capitalism and late-industrializing countries in the global South, different types of social contracts and associated narratives or normative frameworks can be identified across the world. These value frameworks or imaginaries rarely use the terminology of the social contract and can even be critical of the notion of consensus that is associated with contractual theory as well as of separation between individuals and communities/societies engrained in Western liberal philosophy. They tend to make less reference to vertical state–citizen relations and are more concerned with horizontal social relations or human–nature relations. In some cases, they have been mobilized as instruments of moral persuasion and reflect governments' efforts to promote social

The welfare state social contract was undermined during neoliberal globalization and through multiple crises, and is now in need of a fundamental overhaul if it is to deliver on the objectives of social justice and economic development and safeguard the environment.

responsibility in a context of weak regulatory state capacity vis-à-vis elites and companies.[32]

In the case of the African communitarian philosophy of *Ubuntu*, they have shaped social contracts between states and communities and relationships within communities,[33] as well as certain aspects of resource governance, for example regarding land rights.[34] *Ubuntu*—"I am because we are," also translated as "humanness" or "human dignity"—implies that individuals define themselves through their relationship with the community.[35] Humans are embedded in social relationships and interdependencies, with common interests, goals and values. Association and participation become key features of social life,[36] and the individual and the community share common goals of togetherness and love for each other.[37]

This approach is also reflected in the concept of *Sumak Kawsay* ("living in harmony" or "life in plenty"), conceived as part of Indigenous communities' struggle for autonomy and power in Latin America. The concept has traveled to become *Buen Vivir*, the Living Well paradigm, which is the normative foundation for national development strategies in the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador. Buen Vivir is a holistic vision, inspired by Indigenous knowledge and values, which promotes harmonious relationships between humans and nature, and a balance between material needs and immaterial needs such as recognition and affection.[38]

Another communitarian approach is *Ecoswaraj*–"ecological self-rule / self-reliance."[39] As conceptualized by Kothari et al. (2014), it combines the concept of *Swaraj*, used by Mahatma Gandhi in India's independence struggle, with ecology. It upholds the primacy of nature and views humans as part of rather than separate from nature. The human self is a relational self which is multidimensional, social, cultural, intellectual and spiritual. Along with the community, it is at the centre of local governance and economy. Hence, Kothari also defines it as radical ecological democracy similar to Shiva's concept of "Earth Democracy," "a new pact with the earth, as members of the earth family, a pact to create a new non-violent economy" (2016:208).

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, contractarian thought can be found in the Koran itself, which establishes a contract between God and the believers, defining rights and duties for Muslims and their leader, the Imam, which explicitly include the responsibility of the wealthy to care for the poor.[40]

Communitarian or religious imaginaries are at times instrumentalized to support development models which are clearly at odds with the fundamental values communitarian approaches represent. Sometimes policy makers who draw on them ignore the fact that communitarian approaches are subject to change as a result of changing economic and social structures and practices.[41] In South Africa, the *Ubuntu* rhetoric has been used by the Inkatha movement in its anti-apartheid struggle, but also by the state and market actors in the post-apartheid period to legitimize neoliberal economic policies.[42] In Bolivia and Ecuador, despite the importance

Western colonial actions over a long period have decimated the Earth's ecological integrity and biodiversity and, in the process, have created one of the most unequal realities imaginable. Indigenous wisdom and knowledge, including how to live in a mutually beneficial relationship with nature and sacred teachings about eschewing materialism, should be what we lift up right now, as they are a critical part of the solution to our climate disaster.

– Kumi Naidoo

Advisor, Community Arts Network (CAN) and Green Economy Coalition (GEC)

granted to the Indigenous values of *Sumak Kawsay* or *Buen Vivir* and harmonious and respectful human–nature relations, the development model has not moved away from environmentally harmful extractive industries, while Indigenous communities mobilizing against mining or oil companies are frequently criminalized or repressed.[43]

Communitarian or religious approaches are therefore not insulated from economic and political interests. They require constant engagement by grassroots movements and others who defend their intrinsic meanings, while it might equally be necessary to challenge them in cases where they conflict with contemporary values such as women's rights or the principles of modern bureaucracies and democratic governance.[44]

Social contracts have often been shaped by dominant economic and political power structures: in the case of Western post-war social contracts negotiated between governments, trade unions and employers' associations, they reflected centralized corporatist structures associated with industrial relationships. Non-organized workers, informal workers, less powerful unions and persons working on an unpaid basis, mostly women, were not included in these bargains, although women married to formal-sector workers were considered dependent beneficiaries with some access to social security, for example health care or survivor pensions. Lopsided bargains for less powerful groups were justified by dominant narratives, for example, evoking a natural division of labour between men and women or stigmatizing informal workers and enterprises as non-compliant, illegal or non-productive.[45]

2.2.3 Agrarian social pacts

Another example for social contracts associated with a dominant economic sector is that of agrarian social contracts or pacts. These are often marked by unequal land distribution as a legacy of feudalism as well as colonial and neocolonial practices, and in some cases have involved substantial land redistribution that has contributed to more egalitarian and developmental social contracts (see section 3.4). In some countries, new agrarian social pacts (sometimes considered a subsegment of more encompassing social contracts) have been forged, linking producer organizations, politicians and bureaucrats for policy formulation and coordination, or incorporating farmers into rural-based political parties.[46] These pacts have sometimes been associated with a specific design of social policy, universal and tax-financed benefits, which are better adapted to the realities of rural workers and producers, who tend not to be covered by contributory social insurance that is typical for urban wage workers in manufacturing or services. They have also included a range of other measures such as producer subsidies, price controls or rural development policies.[47] Examples of these agrarian social pacts can be found in the Nordic countries, but also in India, Poland and Senegal.[48] As is the case with other types of social contracts,

agrarian pacts have not necessarily led to egalitarian outcomes: large commercial farmers would usually dominate negotiations. As a result, support policies have often benefited larger farmers and capital-intensive producers to the detriment of smallholders and subsistence farmers.[49]

This is reflected in the experience of India, where a major part of the agricultural support system, especially electricity subsidies, has been acquired by large farmers in the western part of the country, whereas farmers in remote areas, including the eastern part, are unable to access the same services.[50] This has been an important factor contributing to increases in regional inequality in agriculture.

Although in several countries agrarian pacts have been forged around sustainable food practices, they have not always been successful in terms of egalitarian impact.[51] Some encouraging examples are available from Latin American countries such as Bolivia,[52] but agrarian pacts can be undermined by unfavourable institutional frameworks.[53] Women-led associations in particular struggle to gain a voice and influence due to the prevalence of gendered stereotypes and biases.[54] Government departments in most developing countries do not consider grassroots-level organizations as central actors of agriculture or food systems.[55] Where grassroots associations become effective, they continue to be dominated by certain privileged groups. This has become a channel for reproducing inequalities in countries that have highly stratified societies. As a result, truly egalitarian agrarian pacts remain isolated examples across the world. Yet, their potential role in reducing inequalities cannot be underestimated.

A particular type of rural social contract or pact can be found in the MENA region.[56] In Morocco and Algeria, for example, regimes traditionally granted rural elites access to water and land in exchange for loyalty. However, the neoliberal turn in the 1980s that propelled the liberalization of agricultural policies and regulatory reforms changed the rural social contract, empowering a new elite of agricultural entrepreneurs and leaving traditional allies aside. This new rural social contract, however, is considered highly unstable in a context of rising inequalities, difficulties to access natural resources and climate change. Social peace is mainly enforced through subsidies and repression, while environmental costs are high as producers circumvent protective regulations.[57]

Finally, agrarian pacts are increasingly influenced by powerful multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Monsanto, shaping both international trade agreements such as TRIPS (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and farmers' rights to seed sovereignty through their patent policies in genetically modified (GM) crop-producing countries.[58] This has highly adverse consequences for plant varieties crucial for nutrition and climate resilience, placing intellectual property restrictions on agricultural traditions on which many farmers rely for their livelihoods and promoting the unchecked use and development of GM crops and hazardous agricultural practices.[59] Research evidence shows how legal activism in Brazil and India has challenged the legality of the patents and royalty collection systems of Monsanto, cases where activists and some judges have highlighted the precedence of the larger social interest over purely private interest.

Buen Vivir is a holistic vision, inspired by Indigenous knowledge and values, which promotes harmonious relationships between humans and nature.

However, states have often sided with the private biotech intellectual property regimes' interests and conspired against small farmers.[60]

2.2.4 Social contracts in mineral-rich countries

Social contracts in mineral-rich countries have often been undermined by elite capture and distributional conflicts, as the case of Zimbabwe shows,[61] leading some scholars to argue that resource-rich countries are afflicted by a resource curse.[62] However, there are also examples of governments which have included marginalized groups in social contracts in mineral-rich contexts by widely distributing the benefits of resource extraction, while also strengthening their developmentalist social contracts through taking greater control within the sector and setting up institutions to better manage the challenges associated with mineral-led development.[63] This is the case in Botswana, the second largest diamond producer in the world. The mineral-dependent country is largely considered a success story, as it has used revenues from mining to invest in infrastructure and fund universal social policies such as education and social pensions. It has also set up effective institutions and policies to regulate the mining sector and insulate its economy from the negative impacts of volatile mining revenues.[64]

Bolivia is another example showing how a historically elite-dominated and exclusionary social contract can be renegotiated, as occurred during the government of Indigenous President Evo Morales in the early 2000s.[65] However, while progress was made in terms of domestic resource mobilization, social inclusion and poverty reduction, the environmental question remains a challenge. Chile, which used state revenues from its state-owned copper enterprise CODELCO to fund public policies and established CODELCO as a key player in the sector, allowing the government to gain important insider knowledge for regulating the mining sector, has faced similar issues. While it succeeded in channeling mineral rents into social development, the government is increasingly facing environmental and social challenges associated with mining, as well as conflicts with civil society and Indigenous groups who are contesting the extractivist model and seeking to reclaim ancestral land rights and access to natural resources (see box 4.3).[66]

2.3 Social contracts and a changing global context

While social contracts are often deemed successful if they coincide with or contribute to periods of stability, for example, during the so-called "golden age" of coordinated capitalism between 1945 and 1973,[67] pressures to renegotiate social contracts can arise in times of crisis, in particular if the crisis is identified as a systemic one that would make the return to the status quo an undesirable and unstable option (see box 2.1). Periods of instability and transformation are associated with the breakdown of accustomed norms and beliefs, when people's lived realities conflict more and more with familiar practices and they become convinced that the contract is no longer working.[68] Crises and national emergencies can provide incentives for concertation and cooperation to overcome multiple challenges across different policy areas, sometimes leading to substantial paradigm shifts. Several examples were presented in chapter 2: the post-war international order and the development of welfare states; the neoliberal turn of the 1980s that radically redefined the social contract in many countries as a response to the economic crises of the 1970s and early 1980s in the context of an ideological revolution; the social turn which aimed to reinfuse social objectives into market-centred development strategies in the 1990s; and finally the stalled efforts to reform economic governance after the financial crisis of 2008. These critical junctures, in combination with an accelerating climate and care crisis, demonstrate the importance of crisis for changing existing social contracts, although, as mentioned, new bargains might not lead automatically to political and economic stability and greater social justice, either because they are skewed toward particular interests or because they lack teeth and enforcement capacity.

In times of big transformations and upheavals, it is useful to place social contracts under public scrutiny and to make their underlying norms, policies and institutions visible, assessing whether they deliver and generate trust. Social contracts lose their effectiveness when rules and obligations are increasingly circumvented because they are not perceived to be binding anymore or because states lack sticks and carrots to steer the behaviour of key actors into desired directions. In addition, social contracts need to respond to long-term structural changes such as those analysed in chapter 1: globalization, technological progress and demographic change.

In addition to the reshuffling of social contracts that occurred during neoliberal globalization, technological change has great impacts on social contracts. Digitalization, automation and artificial intelligence hold huge economic potential but have also created new divides that exclude a large proportion of unskilled and informal workers, many of whom are women, from social progress and threaten to push countries in the global South and their populations further behind. While these processes bear both opportunities and risks, what is important here is how digitalization and its impact on the world of work has led to calls for a new social contract that is "fit for purpose."[69] With a focus on individualized, digitalized and portable social protection systems and calls for the state to assume greater responsibility for basic income protection, more equal capital–labour relations and the promise of dignified jobs are less and less a part of the social contract in these proposals.[70]

Demographic change, such as ageing and migration, creates challenges for employment-based social contracts, the financing of social insurance programmes and social inclusion.[71] A renegotiation of the generational contract was attempted in the 1990s through decoupling the fate of younger workers from the rising costs associated with ageing by privatizing pension programmes and creating individual pension accounts, starting with the Chilean reform in 1981 and spreading to several countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe.[72] This experiment is now largely considered unsuccessful, as it has resulted in further exclusions and rising old-age poverty (see Spotlight by James Heintz).[73] And while the generational contract could not be fixed through privatization, requiring further adjustments of contribution rates and pension ages, young workers are also increasingly affected by tight labour markets, precarious employment and increasing demands regarding experience and skill levels (see chapter 3).[74] Demographic change is also closely related to the care contract, which has distributed care responsibilities in highly unequal terms toward women and girls. Ageing has implications for care needs associated with different age groups, shifting them from younger to older cohorts and increasing the need for long-term care services for older people.[75] Migration of care and domestic workers can ease the care burden on national caregivers, paid and unpaid, but tends to create new levels of stratification among social groups and along global care chains. Indeed, migrants and refugees are still struggling to find their way into social contracts that were negotiated between national constituencies without paying sufficient attention to the transnational dynamics and mobility which are key features of our globalized system.[76]

Urbanization, another demographic trend that has profound implications for our way of living, is often seen as a positive force for the extension of social services and greater employment opportunities for people. Economies of scale lead to greater economic prosperity that, with justice and equality-oriented urban policies and institutions, can lead to positive human development outcomes, social mobility, sustainable resource use and many more positive outcomes.[77] However, low-income and minority groups are often left out of the benefits of urbanization. In many cases, informal settlements, lack of infrastructure and safe public spaces, as well as segregation have exposed inequalities and social fractures and testified to the failure of social contracts to be inclusive and empowering for all.[78] In addition to the material benefits of urbanization, cities are unique spaces where the marginalized can come face to face with the powerful, form alliances across groups, and exert cultural, social, political and economic influence simply by taking up space in visible ways.[79] Yet such potential is undermined by the kind of segregation mentioned above that is

The climate crisis has put a spotlight on the absence of a contract for nature. A common characteristic of most twentieth-century social contracts was the absence of rules to respect planetary boundaries, preserve biodiversity and promote the sustainable use of natural resources.

happening in cities across the world today, as it has profound consequences for citizenship, solidarity and buy-in to the social contract.[80] On the one hand, as urban institutions have been hollowed out by neoliberal processes of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, those with means have chosen to opt out of processes for the public good, motivated by various incentives including security and access to better life opportunities. This has taken the form of further divestment, enclavization and the private ownership of public spaces, compromising their value as sites of citizenship. Meanwhile, those without means have been left to make do with poor-quality or non-existent public services and abandoned public spaces, leading to a collapse of trust in the state. Further, daily confrontation with these realities erodes goodwill and encourages an every-man-for-himself mentality not out of step with the philosophy of global neoliberal capitalism. These realities place great strain on the social contract.

Finally, the climate crisis has put a spotlight on the absence of a contract for nature. A common characteristic of most twentieth-century social contracts was the absence of rules to respect planetary boundaries, preserve biodiversity and promote the sustainable use of natural resources, ushering in a global environmental crisis.[81] The consumption and production patterns associated with these contracts were not sustainable and resulted in the depletion of natural resources, pollution and environmental deterioration. A binding obligation for economic actors, including the state, to protect the environment was missing, while the right to extract resources and deposit waste and emissions, to use natural resources for profit making or to privatize global commons was taken for granted. The lack of respect for nature and the commercialization of natural resources had widespread negative effects on the environment, health and economic opportunities of all people, but in particular for less powerful groups, for example, those groups whose livelihoods are embedded in the natural environment. Traditional farmers, fishers and Indigenous communities with livelihoods based on sustainable use of forests, land and water resources were often deprived of land and resource rights by big corporations or predatory rulers, for example, through privatization, commercialization or land grabs, often with negative impacts on women.[82] They also saw their livelihoods based on natural resources destroyed as a result of pollution and commercialized resource exploitation.

3. Renegotiating Social Contracts: Evidence from the Global South

Reforming or renegotiating social contracts can take different forms and entail complex transformations of institutions and structures that shape horizontal and vertical relations between citizens and state. Social contracting can lead to policy, legal or institutional reforms, including more fundamental ones such as constitutional reforms, which often occur at critical junctures such as post-conflict situations, decolonization or democratization, as well as during authoritarian backlash. Civil wars and violent conflicts and insurgencies frequently usher in new social contracts necessary to establish peace, as the examples of Colombia,[83] Nepal,[84] Rwanda[85] and Sierra Leone[86] show, each with their own challenges. In post-conflict scenarios, addressing root causes of conflict (often related to real or perceived inequalities and exclusion), strengthening social relations, attending to grievances and injustices, and rebuilding a peaceful and cohesive society based on shared values, trust and solidarity are of paramount importance if relapse into violent conflict is to be avoided.[87]

Social policy has an important role to play in the peace-building process, as lack of access to resources, participation and protection are frequent conflict drivers.[88] However, there is also an important path dependency in social contracts. Limited state capacity and low levels of social cohesion and citizen trust in the state and/or other social groups, if enduring, can threaten the success of efforts to create better social contracts. If new agreements are forged at the national level, they might not have sufficient downward reach to regional and local levels. In Africa, social contracts such as those at the community level and between communities (often represented by traditional authorities such as chiefs) and states continue to dominate post-conflict situations, while the military and external actors such as donors often constitute parallel contracts/bargains with governments.[89] Another challenge is that peace agreements might be forged in the middle of an unfinished process of social contracting, with open conflict lines and the already mentioned low degrees of social cohesion and state capacity.[90]

This is the case in Colombia, where after more than 50 years of armed conflict the government and the former guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement in 2016. The agreement came as a crucial milestone after the adoption of a new constitution in 1991, which, despite its progressive and inclusive nature, had failed to prevent further escalation of the conflict. The peace agreement set out to address core conflict issues such as land distribution as well as the trade of illicit crops and drugs. In recent years, it has created a new institutional governance structure and budgetary allocations to implement the agreement and to advance transitional justice. While the process has offered a range of opportunities, the key conflict issues—land and illicit crops—would require higher state capacity in terms of funding, administrative capacity and political support, as well as reforms at the international level in order to be addressed effectively. Further impediments to creating a more resilient social contract are the perceptions that aspirations of the agreement exceed state capacity and political will, while levels of social cohesion remain low.[91]

In the case of Rwanda, where an authoritarian social contract has been established by the Rwandan Patriotic Front under President Kagame in the aftermath of civil war and genocide (which came to an end in 1994), social order, security, rule of law and progress in social development has been advanced, while the social contract has fallen short of delivering democratic state–citizen relations and participation.[92]

Social contracts have also been renegotiated in response to peaceful regime changes, or because of collective mobilization and claims making. This has often involved inclusion of previously excluded groups, for example through providing cash transfers to low-income groups, improving access to social services for religious minorities, and extending social protection and labour rights to informal workers.[93] In response to the green wave movement and feminist lobbying in Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico, women have acquired more reproductive rights, while collective mobilization and participation in political decision-making is associated with expanding rights for sexual and gender minorities such as LGBTIQ+ groups.[94] These incremental changes are often accelerated in times of crisis (see chapter 2): for example, during the Covid-19 crisis, most countries strengthened social protection systems, albeit in a top-down and often selective manner as part of efforts to shield vulnerable populations from the adverse impacts of the pandemic and the associated lockdown measures.[95] However, economic crises often prompt governments with limited fiscal space and dependence on foreign investors to implement austerity policies and cut social spending.[96]

Whether changes are so fundamental that we would speak of a new social contract, or whether incremental reforms are still part of the original societal–political consensus, depends on a variety of factors and arguably opens space for different interpretations.

Whether changes are so fundamental that we would speak of a new social contract, or whether incremental reforms are still part of the original societal–political consensus, depends on a variety of factors and arguably opens space for different interpretations. Key factors indicating a change in the social contract are the scope, temporality and substance of reforms; who participates as contractual parties; and the ideational and value frameworks contracts are built on. The following sections will present some regional trends in reforming social contracts in the global South.

3.1 Regional trends

Latin America followed the model of Western welfare state contracts in the second half of the twentieth century but struggled to maintain social spending in times of economic crisis.[97] Initially based on the partial incorporation or co-optation of organized labour, formal sector workers and state employees gained access to social insurance and were protected through comprehensive labour legislation, which effectively created dualist systems, as those working in the informal economy remained outside of contracts. Some of these contracts were made more inclusive as a result of democratic transitions in the 1980s (see box 4.2), though economic crises and Washington consensus reforms undermined these efforts, until a more progressive social turn was pursued in the 2000s in a more favourable economic and political context (chapter 2). Supported by booming world market prices for key Latin American export products which increased fiscal receipts, progressive governments implemented economic and social policies with positive distributional outcomes, reducing both vertical and horizontal inequalities.[98] While differences exist within the region, showing a strong relationship between income level and development of the welfare state, improvements have been made across country groups, with the greatest progress achieved between 2002 and 2012 in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic and Peru.[99]

Key reforms were the renationalization of the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia, the renationalization of the pension system in Argentina in the context of the financial crisis in 2008, the implementation of progressive tax reforms in Argentina and Uruguay, the creation of a national care system in Uruguay and the implementation of universal child benefits in Argentina, including previously excluded groups such as migrants, domestic workers and informal workers in the child allowances system.[100] Social pensions were greatly expanded in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, while Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador also achieved an increase in formal employment with social insurance coverage. Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay increased their public spending by more than 10 percent of GDP. Simplified tax and social insurance programmes for independent workers (the *monotributo* programmes) were implemented in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay; coverage of social protection was extended to domestic workers in Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay; and health coverage was extended in Brazil and Mexico. Finally, innovations in the administration of services and benefits such as unified social registries and digital technologies led to greater efficiency and costs savings while also raising new questions about digital access, data protection and potential inclusion/exclusion errors related to registries.[101]

Brazil, a country that is often portrayed as the international role model for conditional cash transfers with reference to its celebrated Bolsa Família programme, is less recognized for other reforms implemented by the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores / Worker's Party) governments, including coverage extension and wage indexation of various other cash transfer programmes such as social pensions; universalization of access to education and health services; labour market policies such as minimum wage policy; and participatory governance models and effective social registries (see chapter 3).[102]

The expansion of social rights and improvements in vertical and horizontal inequalities strengthened the social contract in many countries in the region; however, some structural challenges persisted, for example, a high level of economic instability and volatility due to dependence on external creditors

The expansion of social rights and improvements in vertical and horizontal inequalities strengthened the social contract in many countries in the region.

in the context of rising debt levels. Another problematic factor was the so-called re-primarization of the economy through the commodity price-led growth of the primary sector accompanied by premature deindustrialization, with parallel growth of a low-productivity, informal service sector. These tendencies counteracted efforts to strengthen social contracts through the integration of more workers into the formal economy with better protections and wages. This is even more problematic as a lack of sustainable financing sources for social policy impeded further coverage expansion of non-contributory programmes and public services. Labour markets were highly segmented and informality persistent; despite improvements, entrenched vertical and horizontal inequalities were difficult to overcome. Social service provision was often fragmented and public services of low quality, whereas administrative capacity suffered from inefficiencies.

In *Africa*, social contracts are characterized by the presence of communitarian values and challenges associated with colonial legacies, the importance of non-state authorities and their mediating role between states and citizens, as well as context-specific political, demographic and economic structures.[103] Social contracts were rewritten by independent post-colonial governments concerned with nation building, state legitimacy and social cohesion.[104] These social contracts took different shapes, with the more developmental ones deriving their legitimacy through state-led economic development and public provision of basic services such as health and education.[105] Governments in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, Senegal under Léopold Senghor and Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah committed to varying visions of pan-Africanism and a nation-building project aimed at creating transethnic and transracial identities for their countries.[106] The constitution of both a sovereign development project in these countries, grounded in African values of equity and mutuality, as well as a decolonized epistemology, were at the heart of Nkrumah's and Nyerere's projects (see box 4.1).[107] Post-colonial social contracts also included negotiations over tax payments, with the type of tax-welfare regime influenced by colonial heritage.[108] Overall, post-colonial contracts eroded as a result of the crisis of the development model, growing horizontal and vertical inequalities and, in some contexts, increasingly authoritarian and predatory rulers. The creation of social pacts was made difficult in the face of highly fragmented groups representing labour and capital, sometimes along ethnic and racial lines, and the weakness of domestic capital with foreign capital dominating. Positive examples of democratic developmental pacts in Africa are found in Mauritius and Botswana. In Mauritius, the existence of a hegemonic national bourgeoisie, strong unions and a social-democratic government facilitated the development of a more universal welfare state, aided by centralized business associations working across ethnic and sectoral lines and the creation of multiple formal and informal arenas for consultation.[109]

Post-colonial social contracts in the *MENA region* (encompassing both republics and monarchies) have evolved from populist-authoritarian types, grounding their legitimacy on security and service provision rather than political participation and funded by massive rent incomes, toward post-populist social contracts from the mid-1980s onward.[110] In the era of the neoliberal turn, governments reacted to declining incomes from abroad by reducing social spending, in particular for the poor, whereas influential groups and the middle classes were initially kept within the contract, only to experience cuts in urban service provision and subsidies later on. As MENA regimes did not improve political rights and participation of their citizens in compensation for less protection and provisioning, discontent among the urban middle classes increased, as they felt the state was increasingly failing to fulfil its obligations. This rising discontent fueled a wave of mass protests in 2010–2011 that came to be known as the Arab spring. Since the protests, countries in the region have taken different paths, with Tunisia making considerable progress toward a more inclusive and participatory social contract (although more recently seeing authoritarian backlash), whereas some countries were afflicted by civil wars (Libya, Syria and Yemen), while others moved toward more repressive social contracts under military rule (Egypt) or tried to maintain the status quo (for example, Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf monarchies).

In *East Asia and Eastern Europe*, the post-war social contract was strongly influenced by cold war rivalries and great power influence (chapter 1).[111] In both regions, unions were repressed and labour subordinated to larger political and development goals. Socialist social contracts in the Eastern bloc guaranteed full employment and access to social

protection and social services, while social contracts in East Asian developmental states also rested on the promise of stable employment relationships and equality through redistribution, for example, of land (see section 3.4). This social contract was renegotiated after regimes in both regions democratized and became more integrated into world markets, resulting in expansion of social policies in East Asia and a transition to market-oriented approaches in Eastern Europe, a process that led to severe economic crises and deteriorating social indicators in the transition countries.[112]

In *South Asia*, recent decades have seen the rise of a language of rights, citizenship and democracy that has been instrumental in moving toward more inclusive societies.[113] While the independence of some countries in the region (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) during a time when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into force may explain an explicit commitment to human rights in their constitutions, this commitment has been revisited and revitalized in the 2000s, while in the case of Sri Lanka it has been undermined by neoliberal policies and internal conflict.[114]

Box 4.1 Decoloniality: Making room for knowledge toward a new eco-social contract

The notion of modernity holds that rationality, objectivity and science can and ought to drive human progress, peace and prosperity. However, anti-colonial, postcolonial and decolonial theorists contend that the globally dominant formulation of modernity is, in reality, a European-American account of modernity, which created the unequal contemporary world order where material, epistemic and other means to realize human potential are controlled by a few powerful elites often, but not exclusively, from the global North.[a] Western domination was attained through imperialism, colonialism, and related intellectual, moral and other justifications for Europe's global conquests from the fifteenth century onwards.[b] To justify taking land, resources and people as labour by force, Europe's conquering powers relied on epistemologies that, building on pre-existing hierarchies, categorized, ordered and ranked human beings and human societies, placing European men and European civilization atop the hierarchy and all other living beings and societies below. Reliance on these colonial epistemologies was, in turn, dependent on dismissing, devaluing, displacing, destroying or co-opting the knowledge systems and knowledge of peoples and societies to be conquered.[c]

Decolonial theorists contend that the dominance of Euro-American modernity is ongoing and sustains and perpetuates the inequitable material, epistemic and other realities and relations that resulted from imperialism, colonialism and their justifications.[d] The concept of coloniality captures this outcome. Coloniality describes "long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations."[e] Coloniality highlights that the constructions of the modern state, such as institutions, policies, laws, and international frameworks and conventions, through which it recognizes, controls and directs individuals and groups are historically defined, and that from imperialism and colonialism emerged distorted realities, patterns, categories and taxonomies (of race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, legal status and more) that still facilitate the exercise of power.[f] As such, the concept shares affinities with the Black feminist legal theory concept of intersectionality as both offer a critical lens on the linkages between power and interlocking systems of oppression (see chapter 3).[g]

Decolonial theorists furthermore associate the current multiple crises facing humanity with prioritizing the well-being of people and societies at the top of Euro-American modernity's hierarchies at the expense of other living beings, societies and the planet.[h] They offer decoloniality and a decolonial perspective as means of systematically and methodically visibilizing and interrogating distortions caused by the colonial matrix—which are otherwise presumed to be naturally occurring phenomena.[i] In so doing, decoloniality aims to give rise to a pluriverse of knowledge, one in which there is room for the emergence of more cogent, holistic ideas of development, well-being and prosperity, and how they are attained, calling on knowledge systems and knowledge beyond the Euro-American modernist framing.[j]

[a] Cusicanqui 2012; Getachew 2019; Mignolo and Walsh 2018; Quijano 2007; [b] Mignolo and Walsh 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Quijano 2007; Wynter 2003; [c] Santos 2014; Mbembe 2021; Mignolo and Walsh 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Quijano 2007; Wynter 2003; [d] Mignolo and Walsh 2018; [e] Maldonado-Torres 2007:243; [f] Castro-Gómez 2019; [g] Tamale 2020; [h] Wynter 2003; [i] Dastile and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Mignolo and Walsh 2018; [j] Dastile and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Mbembe 2021; Mignolo and Walsh 2018.

Countries such as Nepal and the Maldives have seen more recent democratization processes that resulted in more inclusive constitutions (Nepal in 2015 and the Maldives in 2008), though the two countries differ greatly in terms of income level and institutionalization of social policies. While Nepal has post-conflict aspirations to promote inclusion and social policies, social exclusion is entrenched and state capacity constrained. The Maldives feature the highest per capita income and human development outcomes in the region, while lagging behind in creating inclusive democratic structures and stable political settlements to underpin a new social contract.

One important feature of most South Asian social contracts is the lack of an effective fiscal contract that would allow governments to deliver the planned allocations and comply with universalist aspirations, redistribution goals and international development objectives—tax-to-GDP ratios continue to be very low.[115] While limited domestic resource mobilization is a challenge, electoral incentives and civil society activism have been a positive force. The fact that governments aim to attract votes through more inclusive policies, in combination with an increasing role of civil society organizations in the implementation of social policies, advocacy for social rights and monitoring of state commitments, indicates a new phase of state–society relationships in the region.[116]

In South Asia, recent decades have seen the rise of a language of rights, citizenship and democracy that has been instrumental in moving toward more inclusive societies.

3.2 Social contracts and the neoliberal turn

Many twentieth-century social contracts forged in the post-war/post-colonial era that aimed at economic development, social inclusion and a stronger public sector began unraveling during the period of economic crises, neoliberal policies and accelerated globalization starting in the 1980s, as analysed in chapter 2. In this period, power was shifted toward capital, while state capacity to enforce contracts weakened, in particular in the global South, affected by state retrenchment and adjustment policies. Welfare and developmental social contracts were increasingly replaced by new types of contracts that emphasized individual responsibilities to the detriment of solidarity, redistribution and public provision. These changes also affected more traditional social contracts based on communitarian values, as these communities were increasingly integrated into world market dynamics, while traditional informal institutions of mutual support, instead of evolving into employment-based social security, were replaced by residual social assistance schemes (for example, cash transfer programmes for the poor), affecting social relations.[117]

Citizens were rarely consulted to agree on these radical reforms beyond their electoral vote or cosmetic participation in donor-led consultation mechanisms, such as the elaboration of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).[118] It was assumed that the crisis of state-led development in the late 1960s and 1970s (stagflation) and the breakdown of the socialist model in the former Soviet Union, East Germany and Eastern Europe provided sufficient legitimacy to change gears. Social contracts in the global South, in the case of post-colonial African states called the nationalist project,[119] were undermined by debt crises and austerity policies, leading to adjustment pacts that would often be implemented in highly coercive and repressive ways.[120] State–citizen relations and political legitimacy worsened as a result of shrinking fiscal resources, deteriorating public services and the social costs of structural adjustment. As Adesina (2021:2) observes: "If we understand the relations between state and citizens as a web of rights and obligations, the retreat of the state from socialized and universal social provisioning undermines the legitimacy of the state, reinforces its more coercive face in its engagements with citizens and undermines social cohesion." Donor bargains bypassed citizens

and shifted governments' accountability to deliver on their social contract from national electorates to external actors, while policy space shrank through loan conditionality (chapter 2).[121]

Despite a challenging global context for social contracts that were based on a greater role for the state in development and welfare provision after the ascendance of neoliberalism, spaces opened up at the national level to renegotiate and reform social contracts to make them more inclusive and sustainable. The following sections will present three types of formalized institutional arrangements that have changed social contracts in substantive ways: constitutional reform, land reform and social rights.

3.3 Constitutional reform

Some countries have created new social contracts through a process of constitutional reform (see box 4.2). The constitutions of Kenya and Nepal were created in a highly participatory manner and have

Box 4.2 Constitutional reform in Brazil and South Africa

In Brazil, the Citizen Constitution of 1988 led to the expansion of social rights and profoundly transformed the country.[a] Articles 194 and 195 of the constitution implemented a social security system, comprising health care, pensions and other labour-related benefits, social assistance schemes and unemployment insurance (Article 201). Health care is defined as universal and free of charge. Non-contributory old-age pensions for rural workers are funded by the social security system while social assistance schemes are means tested and funded through the general budget. The constitution further stipulates the right to housing and emphasizes the social function of the city and urban property, the social function of agricultural property and the promotion of agrarian reform. It further guarantees food security, the right to free education at all levels (daycare and preschool; primary, middle and high school; college; and youth and adult education) and the right to security. The constitution has also expanded labour and union rights. A key pillar of the new Brazilian social contract is the state guarantee to a minimum level of protection. It was implemented through the Organic Social Assistance Law (LOAS, Law n. 8.742) in 1993, which guarantees a minimum wage to poor senior citizens (aged 65 or older) and persons with disabilities living in families with per capita household income below one-fourth of the current minimum wage. The number of recipients of the BPC (Non-Contributory Regular Pension) amounts to 4.9 million. The monthly benefit corresponds to a minimum wage, equivalent to Brazilian real (BRL) 998 in 2019 (equivalent to approximately USD 190). Another important pillar of the social protection system is the Bolsa Família programme, a conditional cash transfer, which covered 46.9 million people by December 2018.[b]

In South Africa, the first non-racial elections were held in 1994, in which the ANC led by Mandela secured a substantial majority. The new government embarked on sweeping reforms, redefining the social question and rewriting the social contract.[c] For the first time in South African history, all South Africans became full citizens enjoying social, economic and political rights. Given the enduring racialized pattern of disadvantage, the social question focused on the experiences of Black South Africans. African workers, organized into powerful trade unions, demanded higher wages and improved conditions of employment. The African middle classes, from which much of the political elite came, demanded improved opportunities in professional and managerial occupations. The rapidly forming African elite, including much of the political leadership, demanded opportunities to seize a share of the country's wealth through "Black Economic Empowerment." The urban and rural poor wanted jobs and improved public services. Given the success of the Black elite, middle class and organized working class in accessing improved opportunities and standards of living, the fundamental post-apartheid social question revolved around poverty and crucially around elite perceptions of poverty and the poor (see chapter 2). A new constitution was approved in 1996 and took effect in 1997, guaranteeing a range of social rights including housing, education, health and social protection, a legal basis on which a massive expansion of social grants for older persons living in poverty, children and disabled persons was enacted. Social assistance has had significant effects in curbing vertical, horizontal and spatial inequalities (see chapter 3). Social grants have reduced overall income inequalities and redressed the social and spatial inequalities derived from previous discriminatory policies. However, their ability to reverse patterns of disadvantage in the labour markets and economy of care has been limited, revealing entrenched drivers of inequality rooted in the macroeconomic sphere and social norms.[d]

[a] Lavinas 2021:328; [b] World Bank 2020b; [c] Seekings 2021:264; [d] Plagerson 2021.

Welfare and developmental social contracts were increasingly replaced by new types of contracts that emphasized individual responsibilities to the detriment of solidarity, redistribution and public provision.

progressive articles on the inclusion of Indigenous peoples and pastoralists, as well as a quota for women in Parliament.[122] Burundi was the first African country to have a quota for Indigenous peoples (the Batwa) in the Parliament and Senate as an outcome of the Arusha peace agreements.[123] National constitutions were rewritten in Brazil in 1988, formalizing a process of democratic transition after 21 years of military rule (1964–1985), and in South Africa in 1994, when the African National Congress (ANC) party under President Nelson Mandela took power, upending the racist apartheid regime that had been institutionalized by the National Party in 1948. In Chile, a new constitution to replace the one dating back to General Augusto Pinochet's military rule and considered a root cause of many inequalities in the country is currently in the making, although the process got stalled after the rejection of the draft constitutional text at the polls in September 2022 (see box 2.4 and box 4.3).

As presented in section 2, new constitutions that were negotiated by left-wing governments in Bolivia and Ecuador in the early 2000s have incorporated Indigenous visions such as *Buen Vivir* to create a new eco-social contract that represents the culture, knowledge and development vision of the Indigenous majority population that was previously excluded from elite bargains. These reforms were exceptional in bringing into social contracts an ecological dimension alongside the social dimension.

Constitutional reform as an instrument to rewrite the social contract is not always a progressive and democratic move, however, as recent examples from China, Hungary, Libya, Russia and Turkey show.[124] Here, constitutional reform has been used to consolidate authoritarian regimes (strengthening, for example, presidential rule or possibilities for re-election or lifetime rule and weakening checks and balances) or entrench elite interests. These regressive outcomes occurred in some cases despite citizen participation, national consultations and referendums, as these were instrumentalized to legitimize the process rather than to shape it (see chapter 2).[125] In addition, constitutional reforms often lag behind in terms of implementation, though they open the way for litigation processes that have sometimes proven successful, as the case of South Africa demonstrates.[126] Finally, high-level reforms such as constitutional reform need to be accompanied by change processes from below, for example, regarding social norms: the example of gender backlash after introducing the quota system in Kenya's Parliament shows the "need for women's rights activists to prioritize a parallel bottom-up process of transforming gendered power relations alongside top-down institutional efforts."[127]

3.4 Land reform

Unequal land distribution and the continued power of agrarian elites is an enduring feature of many countries in the global South, which is considered to have detrimental development implications in terms of political bias, income inequality and poverty emerging from unequal asset distribution and the capture of agricultural rents by elites who might not invest them productively (see box 3.1).[128] It is a legacy from colonial times and a type of inequality that is regularly exacerbated in periods of commodity booms that increase land rents and benefit landowners.[129] Land reform has been an important instrument for renegotiating unequal agrarian pacts, holding the potential to promote more equitable and inclusive growth paths while also boosting productivity and poverty reduction.[130] Approaches to land reform have changed over time: whereas

land reform in the post-war era was understood as distribution of land property rights for the benefit of landless workers, small farmers and tenants, the neoliberal approach that became dominant in the 1980s focuses on specific policies (sharecropping, tenancy) and the removal of institutions that are deemed dysfunctional in terms of market efficiency. Any transfers of ownership should be market-based (willing seller, willing buyer), ruling out expropriation or compulsory purchase.

Comprehensive land reforms were implemented in East Asia, for example, in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Province of China in the post-war period, where the landlord class was virtually displaced after successful collective action by farmer-tenants had already shifted land policies in their favour by the 1930s.[131] These reforms were important for more equal development outcomes and greater agricultural productivity, while countries that were less successful in distributing unequal land property such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand also fared less well in catching up with the global North.[132] Some progressive land reforms were overturned in cases of regime change: for example, the Chilean land reform of 1962–1973 that redistributed land ownership from large estates to small farmers, rural labourers and cooperatives was abolished when General Pinochet took power, returning expropriated land to former owners and dividing former cooperative land into individual plots. By 1997, land ownership was more concentrated than in 1955.[133]

Commercialization of land associated with the second reform type and the market revolution of the 1980s had a bearing on social contracts.[134] Notably, failure of land reforms, persistence of landlessness and skewed land relations considerably enhance the likelihood that gains from global value chains will not be distributed evenly and will rather be cornered by big players, with small farmers being pushed further to the margins.[135] Commercialization increases the gender division of labour and generates inequalities in income and in access to land, labour and employment. Food insecurity is also unequally distributed according to gender, class and ethnicity.

Land reforms are also important with regard to women's rights. There have been some important advances in women's property rights related to land, for example, in India and China, where it has been pushed forward by women's movements.[136] This has had positive impacts on women's social status, bargaining power over household assets, gender-based violence and political decision making. Social movements of landless workers and peasants claiming access to land have brought new political forces into power in countries such as Bolivia and Brazil. However, land confiscation and redistribution require strong political power, which many Latin American governments that promised land reform in electoral campaigns lacked (for example, in Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay). State approaches to land tenure reform can conflict with customary land rights. There is also debate on whether state approaches or customary systems are more favourable for women's access to land.[137] Maximizing their claims under any system is still a challenge for women, as examples from Africa show, because women's bargaining power and political voice is still weak, in particular in contexts where gender rights are not fully supported by either the state or communities.[138]

State land reform initiatives must deal with the protection and management of common property resources through a new eco-social contract involving alternative institutional arrangements.

Box 4.3 A new eco-social contract to address historical injustices faced by Indigenous peoples

Indigenous peoples (IPs) account for approximately 476.6 million people or an estimated 6.2 percent of the global population. They have faced historical injustices through processes such as colonization, nationalization and privatization,[a] resulting in high levels of inequality and poverty. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples points to a strong interconnection between inequality and the ownership and control of land and natural resources by IPs. The lack of implementation of Indigenous rights to land and territories is strongly associated with land grabbing under colonial rule, but also with nationalization of land and natural resources after independence, and privatization under agrarian reforms.[b] Seen from this perspective, landlessness is strongly related to violations of the rights of IPs, who have been and are still excluded from their collective property rights that allow them to decide about their livelihoods.[c] Land inequality has been found to be a multidimensional problem that affects employment, political participation, biodiversity and social inclusion, among other aspects.[d] It is exacerbated by the promotion of large-scale commercial agriculture and the expansion of monoculture, which result in deforestation, depletion of water resources and biodiversity loss, and the eviction of IPs from their traditional territories.[e]

IPs in various countries are mobilizing to regain access to their lands and realize their right to self-determination, renegotiating social contracts that have disadvantaged and excluded them. In Chile, IPs have a central place in the current constitutional reform process. Following significant social turmoil that advocated for a new social contract and greater equality, a Constitutional Convention has been established and was presided by Elisa Loncón, a Mapuche activist and academic, calling for the refoundation of Chile as a plurinational country.[f] Moreover, the environmental proposals of the members of the convention showed a favourable position toward a change in the current development model, the recognition of the rights of nature and the adoption of the *Buen Vivir* concept.[g]

In December 2020, the South African president signed the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill into law. The act grants already recognized traditional leaders the power to make decisions on communal land. In the north of Australia, meanwhile, the Eastern Kuku Yalanji people recovered 160,000 hectares in the Daintree tropical rainforest following an agreement with Queensland state government.[h] In the United States, an innovative form of land trust was created by the Wiyot Tribal Council. The Council established the Dishgamu Humboldt community-led land trust, a first-of-its-kind initiative that aims for perpetual tenancy over the land, allocating the ownership back to the Wiyot Tribe.[i]

IPs are challenging and rewriting the foundations of the broader societies they belong to while preserving nature thanks to their traditional knowledge. The recognition and fulfilment of IPs' rights, including their collective rights to their lands and territories, is therefore a vital step not only for promoting human rights, but also for reframing our relationship with nature.

[a] Kempf 2003; [b] Anseeuw and Baldinelli 2020; ILO 2020b; [c] Anseeuw and Baldinelli 2020; [d] Anseeuw and Baldinelli 2020:13; [e] Anseeuw and Baldinelli 2020; UN DESA 2020; [f] Ontiveros 2021; [g] Rubio 2021; [h] Smee 2021; [i] Greenson 2021.

Furthermore, there may be tension between land reform initiatives and common property rights. Certain land tracts are often part of common property resources on which the poor and women rely for their day-to-day livelihoods. This is especially the case in local economies where extensive livestock activity is a key pillar of livelihood systems. Within such systems, there are particular economic and ecological advantages to common property institutions.[139] Similarly, peasant households often depend upon firewood and fodder fetched from forest lands. State land regulation initiatives may not align well with these traditional practices unless they are taken care of a priori through suitable policy frameworks and support mechanisms. In India, for example, implementation of the Forest Rights Act, rather than protecting, has often led to the exclusion of many Indigenous and tribal communities from their traditional rights to the forest, which has translated into their marginalization.[140] State land reform initiatives must deal with the protection and management of common property resources through a new eco-social contract involving alternative institutional arrangements. Common resources are also crucial for ecological health and environmental protection. There is a natural synergy between livelihoods and the environment here that must be accommodated within any negotiation

aiming at a new eco-social contract. Access to and rights over land is also a key demand by Indigenous peoples around the world who have been deprived of ancestral lands through processes of colonization, nationalization and privatization, who are now seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and promoting livelihoods in harmony with nature (see box 4.3).[141]

3.5 Expanding social rights

Social protection reform has been a key instrument to make social contracts more inclusive and to expand social protection in times of crisis, in particular to mitigate negative impacts on vulnerable groups in the context of the recent Covid-19 pandemic (see Spotlight by Naila Kabeer). In their response to the health and concomitant economic crisis, countries in the global South have built on the more recently introduced cash transfer programmes, which opens questions regarding a potential longer-term revision of social contracts.[142] An analysis of social policy responses to the pandemic suggests that these have been shaped by existing systems and national solutions rather than international support, while also highlighting that the pandemic shed light on gaps in social contracts. Groups most affected by the crisis were workers in informal or precarious employment conditions without social insurance coverage, as well as undocumented migrants and care workers.[143] These groups, often facing intersecting inequalities, continue to be vulnerable and have yet to be formally included into existing social protection schemes.

In some African countries, such as Botswana and Ethiopia, cash transfers or social assistance programmes that were mobilized and upscaled during the pandemic had originally been designed to provide relief for displaced populations and refugees or to address food insecurity in times of drought. Over the last years, in response to citizen demands and donor recommendations, these have evolved into more permanent and predictable programmes with higher coverage rates (see box 4.4).[144]

The expansion of social protection coverage in Latin America during the period of the social turn, as described in chapters 2 and 3, not only resulted in more inclusive social and fiscal contracts,[145] but also meant that the region was much better prepared to face the Covid-19 pandemic than decades ago.

Social protection reform has been a key instrument to make social contracts more inclusive and to expand social protection in times of crisis.

Several countries that had reformed their social contracts and included a greater share of their population, in some cases also migrants, into social protection systems and social services proved to be more crisis resilient. Similar to the African cases, a common challenge was the temporary nature of support measures, as well as coverage gaps for informal workers and the self-employed, who were often covered neither by existing social insurance nor by social assistance programmes.[146]

It remains to be seen if the coverage expansion can be maintained beyond the emergency situation of the pandemic, extending social rights to migrants and informal workers. The creation of a new social contract that is fully inclusive and based on human rights will depend on future economic and fiscal prospects and political will to reform existing programmes in line with the lessons learned during the crisis, a scenario that could be again compromised as a result of the mounting economic challenges associated with the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.

Box 4.4 Expansion of social protection in Ethiopia and Botswana

The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia was launched in 2005 with its main component consisting of a public works programme that provides temporary employment on community infrastructure or agricultural projects for working adults and, to a lesser extent, direct benefits to households without work capacity (for example, older or disabled persons). This programme was extended to urban areas (UPSNP) in the mid-2010s, turning it into one of the biggest social assistance programmes in the region, covering eight million persons, of whom 600,000 are beneficiaries of the urban component UPSNP in 11 cities.[a] The vertical and horizontal expansion of the PSNP as a government response to the pandemic and lockdown measures happened through several policies: a waiver of the work requirements for the public works component of the PSNP, while payments continued; top-ups of cash transfers to existing UPSNP direct support beneficiaries; and inclusion of unregistered poor urban households into the UPSNP for three months, granting unconditional cash transfers in 27 cities. This scaling up was facilitated because a shock-responsive component of the PSNP already existed for drought relief and natural disasters, funded through a contingency budget, which could be used during the pandemic.[b]

In Botswana, Covid-19 social protection responses did include adaptation of existing programmes (mostly to respect sanitary and hygiene standards) and introduction of new programmes, in particular a programme to deliver food aid to two-thirds of all households nationally, partly to replace school feeding programmes during school closures. For public works programmes the work requirement was waived, while other social assistance programmes and the old age pension plan continued to operate.

While both countries testify to the usefulness of having social protection programmes in place that can be scaled up in crisis situations, they also display a number of shortcomings, in particular under-coverage of vulnerable urban populations in Ethiopia and fragmentation between the urban and the rural components of the PSNP, and high fragmentation and lack of institutionalized social rights in the case of Botswana. Here, the crisis was taken as an opportunity to envisage systemic reforms under a National Social Protection Recovery Plan, jointly designed by the United Nations and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. The reform proposal for social protection is to reorganize the 29 existing social protection programmes in Botswana into five that are structured around the life course.[c]

[a] Lavers 2020; [b] Devereux 2021; [c] Freeland et al. 2020.

3.6 Renegotiating social contracts in the global South: Lessons learned

Social contracts, though usually designed for the long term, are not static and are often reformed in times of crises or at critical junctures, for example in the context of peacebuilding, regime change or ideological revolutions such as the neoliberal turn in the 1980s. Regional trends in the evolution of social contracts reveal important historical and contextual factors that drive their reform, while also pointing toward the importance of political settlements, developmental visions, dominant economic sectors and associated interests, cultural factors and values, as well as historical legacies. Constitutional reform, land reform and the expansion of social rights are measures that can usher in substantive changes of existing social arrangements, but much depends on the scope, temporal dimension and actual design of policies and institutions, as well as on the inclusiveness of the contracting process, whether it counts on the support of important elite groups, whether state capacity exists to enforce it and whether it provides viable solutions to key development challenges and existing conflict issues.

The selective analysis of several types of social contracts in different regions and countries and how they were affected by changing global trends, power shifts and changing policy paradigms, from corporatist welfare state contracts to post-colonial contracts, to contracts based on communal visions, to neoliberal or adjustment contracts, to sectoral pacts, provides lessons on what makes social bargains more stable, developmental and inclusive.

Regarding scope, temporal dimensions and substance, social contracts have been more successful when they i) guarantee national reach and buy-in of key organized interest groups, ii) are coordinated by states with sufficient capacity to implement policies

and enforce compliance, iii) are led by state actors with a proactive and long-term development vision, and iv) create consensus on concrete substantive issues within elite factions and the broader citizenry. Contracts have been more inclusive and produced better social outcomes when they were based on values of participation, recognition, democracy, social justice and solidarity. A context of growth and stability is a further enabling factor, as well as policy space to design social contracts in line with the opportunities and constraints of each country context.[147]

Finally, empirical cases studied in this report, though far from constituting an exhaustive analysis, have demonstrated that few social contracts have established clear guidance on relationships with nature and on how to protect the interests of future generations.[148] Where this has happened—for example in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, as well as in Chile regarding the recent constitutional reform process—difficulties have arisen in translating these visions into practice in contexts of mineral-dependent economies, and in gaining the necessary political support, as in the case of Chile. On the other hand, as the next section shows, environmental issues have taken centre stage in contemporary policy debates and inspired new social movements, with various actors making proposals on how to reform our societies and economies to embark on more sustainable pathways supporting justice and fairness in all spheres.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a high-level global consensus on the key objectives that a new eco-social contract needs to fulfil.

4. Claiming a New Social Contract: The Current Landscape of Debate

4.1 Actors' views and interests

Greater inclusion and access to rights does not happen automatically; it is the result of political strategies and collective action putting pressure on public opinion and decision makers.[149] Analysing the positions of various actors and stakeholders can help to identify potential areas of consensus but also of diverging interests that are likely to shape the possibilities for and contours of future eco-social contracts.

Considering the linked economic, social, ecological and political crises being faced worldwide, organizations and movements are calling for the creation of a new social contract between people, between citizens and governments, and between people and nature. The United Nations has a strong voice in this process based on its charter and its comprehensive human rights framework; its different organizations working for peace, security, economic stability and sustainable development; and the climate governance regime emerging since the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a high-level global consensus on the key objectives that a new eco-social contract needs to fulfil. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda explicitly uses the terminology and commits to establishing a new social compact to deliver social protection and essential public services for all, in line with the International Labour Organization (ILO) recommendation to implement national social protection floors.[150] Many other UN organizations are using the concept of a social contract, and the UN Secretary-General has reinvigorated the call for a new social contract during the pandemic and in his *Our Common Agenda* report.[151]

More recently, voices from the Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future movements, the International Trade Union Congress as well as business actors are each in their own way championing different dimensions of a new ecological and social contract. These recent movements have to be seen in a broader context

of social movements that have been organizing for decades to promote equality, justice, human rights and environmental protection. For many decades, women's movements have been organizing globally and locally, advocating for greater gender equality in all spheres of life and for a social contract that promotes gender justice,[152] with the MeToo movement denouncing sexual violence and abuse and the Green Wave movement in Latin America advocating for reproductive rights as recent examples. People have stood up against dictatorships and repressive regimes, racial discrimination, workers' exploitation and the subordination of women and minorities. Informal workers, landless peasants, slum dwellers and Indigenous groups have organized and claimed their rights, with important achievements. Economic justice movements which mushroomed in the 2000s and range from the global debt, tax or trade movements to Occupy Wall Street, have propelled fair taxation, business and human rights issues, global economic governance failures and the disproportionate power of MNCs and rich individuals onto agendas.

Below we review more recent claims raised by some of these voices, asking where commonalities or trade-offs exist.[153]

On Mandela Day, 18 July 2020, the UN Secretary-General stated that "the response to the pandemic, and to the widespread discontent that preceded it, must be based on a New Social Contract and a New Global Deal that create equal opportunities for all and respect the rights and freedoms of all."[154] This call for a new social contract was taken up in the Secretary-General's Common Agenda Report.[155]

International organizations representing labour interests, such as the ILO, call for a new social contract in a changing world of work, where globalization, technological change, rising informality and weakening of labour market institutions erode social contracts, emphasizing the need for adaptation to change, reduction of inequalities and enhancement of voice and participation.[156] Trade unions such as the International Trade Union Congress (ITUC) and others are also calling for a new social contract, one that provides decent work, access to public services and tax justice.[157] The ITUC identifies five action points for building a new social contract: i) creation of climate-friendly jobs with a just transition to achieve net-zero carbon emissions; ii) rights for all workers, regardless of their employment arrangements; iii) universal social protection, with the establishment of a Social Protection Fund for the least wealthy countries;[158] iv) equality and ending all discrimination such as by race or gender; and v) inclusion, to combat the growing power of monopolies and oligarchs, to ensure that developing countries can actually develop their economies, and to build tax systems that provide the income governments need to meet the needs of people and the planet. The European Trade Union Institute and Confederation argue that climate and social goals need to be addressed together in line with Kate Raworth's (2017) safe and just space for humanity and call for the development of a social-ecological or "eco-social" framework.[159]

Representatives from the business sector have made suggestions regarding the role of private companies in a new social contract. The McKinsey Global Institute proposes a systemic role for the private sector in targeting vulnerable groups through the provision of affordable goods and services such as housing and childcare, describing it as "more cost-effective for the social contract than aiming to stabilize incomes."[160] This would also include providing digital identification, payment channels and collection of data for better targeting benefits to the neediest. Businesses have expressed a number of demands regarding their role in a twenty-first-century social contract, summarized in *The Business Role* as stakeholder capitalism, skills development and career pathways, economic security and mobility, a just transition to net-zero emissions and worker data protection.[161] Calls for a new social contract have also been articulated at the World Economic Forum annual meeting in 2022, emphasizing a world in crisis, eroding trust, and the necessity to collaborate and strengthen accountability. Interestingly, it is highlighted that business needs to have a seat at the table in negotiations for a new social contract: "Amid the uncertainty of Covid-19 and the fragmented political landscape, polls show businesses emerged as the most trusted institution globally, filling leadership voids with their voices, finances, and resources to bring help and change to communities in need."[162]

Social movements such as Fridays for Future, Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion demand urgent climate and environmental action, intergenerational justice, and gender and racial

equality as well as direct participation in decision making, for example, through citizen assemblies. They are calling for a new eco-social contract that is inclusive and participatory and brings in all actors under legally binding commitments in favour of social justice and the environment. The Treaty Alliance, a network of advocacy groups, wants to hold business accountable through laws on supply chains and calls for a binding treaty on business and human rights which would make social and environmental standards legally enforceable. Various national and international civil society organizations and NGOs, as well as individual academics and activists, are advocating for social and climate justice, a new feminist agenda, anti-racism, human rights and decolonial approaches as key ingredients for new social or eco-social contracts or a "feminist green new deal."[163] They often create broad-based coalitions, networks and alliances that actively engage with local, national, regional and global processes (see chapter 5).

When comparing the demands of trade unions to those of business-near organizations,[164] non-discrimination and climate change are common concerns, but business puts emphasis on targeted social policies and safety nets, while trade unions argue in favour of universal social protection. Both workers and business are asking for just transitions to achieve net-zero emissions without compromising social justice, a demand that is also taken up by civil society organizations (CSOs) and social movements, some of which demand more radical and transformative changes (chapter 5). However, while business actors hold that just transitions will be achieved through creation of high-quality jobs in the green sector and new skills development, trade unions demand concrete policies for job creation, education and health in this transition. The United Nations and social movements are both asking for urgent climate action, promotion of equality and social justice, while also demanding an end to racial and other group-based discriminations. While the United Nations sees this happening through networked multilateralism and implementation of global standards and agendas such as the SDGs implemented through sovereign states at the national level, many movements question the capacity of nation-states and governments and want more direct citizen participation in decision making and enabling (policy) environments for alternative economic models.

What emerges from the different stakeholder views on a new eco-social contract is a broad consensus on the urgency to act, along with significant differences of perspective regarding the substance and scope of necessary reforms, as well as the distribution of costs and benefits associated with change processes.

What emerges from the different stakeholder views on a new eco-social contract is a broad consensus on the urgency to act, along with significant differences of perspective regarding the substance and scope of necessary reforms, as well as the distribution of costs and benefits associated with change processes. Now as in the past, social contracts are contested, and social contracting and bargaining are complex processes. A new social contract will reflect ideational struggles, and the outcomes of bargaining processes between actors with unequal power resources and influence means they may not result in progressive agreements.[165] And while the idea of a social contract is associated with the notion of consent, it may be necessary to opt for contestation to pressure for transformative change, a pathway chosen by several of the social movements discussed in this chapter.

5. Seven Principles for Building a New Eco-Social Contract

The basic values, policies and institutions shaping our societies and economies are neither short-lived nor set in stone. The social contract needs to pass the test of time and hold onto its promises. If an increasing part of the population is feeling left out or left behind and social fractures are increasing, or if instability and uncertainties erode trust in and legitimacy of governments, the time has come to renegotiate the social contract. If social and environmental reproduction is under threat, the systems that sustain our livelihoods, well-being and survival, it is also high time to react and embark on bold reforms. This chapter has introduced different models and historical experiences with social contracts, with a focus on the diversity of normative and real-world approaches as well as renegotiations of contracts at critical junctures and in times of major societal or political transformation. We have also reviewed the recent debates that emerged in the context of contemporary global challenges and crises, showing commonalities and differences in how problems are perceived and what solutions are proposed.

Based on the evidence and analyses presented in this report, we argue that the vision of a new eco-social contract needs to differ fundamentally from the twentieth-century social contract. A new eco-social contract should be instrumental in reconfiguring a range of relationships that have become sharply imbalanced—those between state and citizens, between capital and labour, between the global North and the global South, between humans and the natural environment. It will be based on rebalancing hegemonic gender roles and relations rooted in patriarchy, remedying historical injustices and strengthening solidarity and multilateralism. While this chapter presents a short overview of these principles, chapter 5 will go into more detail regarding the policies that can be implemented to put these principles into practice.

Human rights for all

A new eco-social contract must surpass the post-war welfare state settlements by ensuring human rights for all, including those excluded from previous social contracts or relegated to a secondary role such as women; informal workers; ethnic, racial and religious minorities; migrants; and LGBTIQ+ persons. This requires a human rights-based approach that goes beyond formal-employment-dependent social benefits.

Universal human rights and inclusion resonate with the SDGs in various ways. Consistent with its promise to address inequalities, the 2030 Agenda commits "to leave no one behind," to ensure "targets [are] met for all nations and peoples and for all segments of society" and "to reach the furthest behind first." The social turn which led to a revival of social policy in development approaches has resulted in expansion of social insurance and social assistance programmes in a range of countries, while some governments have also scaled up investments in public social services and strengthened workers' rights. Social protection has also been greatly expanded during the Covid-19 pandemic. The challenge is now to institutionalize universal social programmes and to close coverage gaps (for example, for informal workers, migrants or persons engaged in unpaid or community work) while providing adequate benefits across the lifecycle and in times of shock.



Progressive fiscal contracts

A new eco-social contract must go hand in hand with a new fiscal contract that raises sufficient resources for climate action and SDG implementation and fairly distributes the financing burden.

The provision of universal social policies requires a strong fiscal base. For many low-income countries, this will not be possible without strong support from the international donor community. However,

domestic financing schemes are the better option in the long term, as progressive distributional impacts support social integration by creating a social contract and strengthening relations within society, between economic sectors, between rich and poor as different social groups, and between society and governments.[166] A fiscal contract for the SDGs should favour financial instruments which are supportive of environmental goals and the sustainability transition.[167]

Transformed economies and societies

A new eco-social contract must be based on the common understanding that we need to transform economies and societies to halt climate change and environmental destruction and promote social inclusion and equality.

Transformative change (box 1.4) in our societies and economies demands deep-seated structural changes in order to overcome long-term stratification patterns that impact future generations, locking people into disadvantage and constraining their choices and agency. Such structural change can be catalysed through innovative social policies in areas such as social pensions, education, health care, employment and equal opportunity based on universal approaches that enhance the role of the state and community organizations, and with strong regulatory frameworks and monitoring by citizens.[168] It is also highly compatible with alternative economic approaches such as social and solidarity economy, new sustainability metrics used by enterprises, as well as just transition strategies which create synergies between social and climate justice.[169]

A contract for nature

A new eco-social contract must recognize that humans are part of a global ecosystem. It must protect essential ecological processes, life support systems and the diversity of life forms, and pursue harmony with nature.

A new eco-social contract should be instrumental in reconfiguring a range of relationships that have become sharply imbalanced—those between state and citizen, between capital and labour, between the global North and the global South, between humans and the natural environment. It will be based on rebalancing hegemonic gender roles and relations rooted in patriarchy, remedying historical injustices and strengthening solidarity and multilateralism.

Establishing a contract for nature requires changing dominant growth strategies and decoupling them as much as possible from natural resource use and adverse environmental impacts. This includes changing consumption and production patterns to ensure climate and intergenerational justice, which illustrates the link between resource use and equity.[170] Moreover, the Rights of Nature approach describes inherent rights of ecosystems and species, as living beings that need to be given a voice and protected by law. It is based on recognition that the development and survival of human beings depend on a healthy environment and biodiversity. Earth jurisprudence considers the governance and regulation of relations between all members of the earth community, not just between human beings, and is thus an important aspect of a new eco-social contract.[171]

Historical injustices addressed

A new eco-social contract must be decolonized and informed by Indigenous knowledge, social values and capacities from the global South. It must remedy historical injustices and combat the climate crisis fairly through just transitions.

Securing workers' rights and decent work while economies are shifting to sustainable production and lifestyles will be paramount, as is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities for global South countries in addressing climate change.[172] A new eco-social contract needs to replace the colonial tradition of resource exploitation with participatory and sustainable use of natural resources, compensation for loss and damage as well as benefit sharing. The historical injustice of colonialism created mistrust and discrimination and is still institutionalized. Self-determination and recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights will be a vital part of applying traditional knowledge in climate change adaptation.[173]

Gender justice

A new eco-social contract must recognize that previous social contracts have been built upon unequal gender arrangements. It must go hand in hand with a gender contract in which activities of production and reproduction are equally shared by women and men and different genders, and where sexual orientations and expressions of sexual identity are granted equal respect and rights.

Establishing an eco-social contract in which gender identity and sexual orientation are not a basis for discrimination requires dismantling gendered power hierarchies that subordinate women; establish gender as a static, definite and binary category; and devalorize social reproduction. Such a new contract must dismiss the gendered division of labour and centralize the work of care, a function that is essential for the maintenance of our social, economic, political and cultural institutions, and for our continued existence.

Love, in its various expressions, is a political issue: it should be granted the same importance as material themes and placed at the center of our agenda for social transformation.

– Jailson de Souza e Silva
Director, Instituto Maria e João Aleixo (IMJA)

Solidarity

A new eco-social contract requires new bottom-up approaches to transformative change for development, bringing together social movements and progressive alliances between science, policy makers and activists. It must overcome the mindset of "us against them," fostering instead a spirit of "all united against" global challenges such as climate change, inequalities and social fractures.

Forging a new eco-social contract requires a new process where everyone gets a seat at the table. CSOs and social movements as well as scientists, private sector actors and policy makers need to come together and discuss a fair distribution of costs and benefits of reforms. Informal workers, unpaid carers and community volunteers have to be invited to participate in social dialogue processes to shape public policies in line with their needs and interests. Public policies and institutions should strengthen the solidarity principle and support poor and marginalized groups and share benefits and risks in a fair way. The multilateral system needs to be strengthened to promote sustainable development, peace and security and to foster social and climate justice at the global level.

Endnotes

1 UN 2021; World Bank 2020a.

2 Shafik 2021.

3 Delanty 2021.

4 UN 2021.

5 Plagerson et al. 2022.

6 Phillips 2020.

7 Hobbes 1996 [1651]; Locke 1823 [1690]; Rousseau 1762.

8 Shafik 2021.

9 The World Bank defines the social contract as "a policy package that aims to contribute to a fairer society" (2019:124). It has used social contract diagnostics to improve its operational work at the country level, for example, to diagnose and explain complex development challenges such as entrenched inequalities, poor service delivery, weak institutions, and why decades of policy and institutional reforms promoted by external development actors could not fundamentally alter countries' development paths; see IEG (2019); for efforts to operationalize the concept further, see Cloutier (2021). For a critique on the World Bank understanding of social contracts during the structural adjustment and post-Washington Consensus period see Mkandawire (2012) and Nugent (2010).

10 Loewe et al. 2021.

11 Plagerson et al. 2022.

12 Kelsall and Hickey 2020.

13 McCandless 2018: Rettberg 2020.

14 Agamben 2021; Della Porta 2021; De Sousa Santos 2020; Ortiz et al. 2022.

15 Devereux 2021.

16 Hickey 2011; Shafik 2021.

17 Ulriksen and Plagerson 2014.

18 Sen and Durano 2014:5

19 Mills 2007.

20 Desai 2022; Loewe et al. 2021.

21 Therborn 2014.

22 Mills 1997; Pateman 1988. The attempt to deracialize social contracts was at the heart of several post-colonial nation-building social pacts in Africa, "often tolerating emerging vertical inequality along class lines," see Mkandawire (2012:10).

23 Desai 2022; Gough 2021; Hopkins et al. 2020; Willis 2020.

24 Klein 2007; Nyamnjoh 2020.

25 Foley and Piper 2020; Hujo 2019.

26 Chen and Carré 2020; Ghosh 2021; Plagerson et al. 2022.

27 Moellendorf 2009.

28 UNRISD 2016.

29 Beveridge 1942; Galbraith 2022.

30 Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2020.

31 Esping-Anderson 1990.

32 Mkandawire 2012.

33 Leonard 2013.

34 Radebe 2019; Wuta 2021.

35 Le Grange 2012.

36 Chemhuru 2017.

37 See Desai (2022). Ubuntu is not the only communitarian-philosophical approach in sub-Saharan Africa, but one that has received widespread attention outside the region. It is mainly associated with Buntu culture in Southern Africa, also referred to as Umunthu, Umundu, Bunhu, Unhu, Botho, Setso or Vhutu in other languages in the region (Letseka 2014).

38 Barié 2014; Paz Arauco 2020.

39 Desai 2022.

40 Loewe et al. 2021.

41 See Ergas (1980). An interesting experiment of translating African communalism into socialism was made by Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere after independence from Great Britain in 1961. The Ujamaa (meaning "fraternity" in Swahili) ideology was based on the central role of the community and the village, the principle of self-reliance, cooperative economics and communal farming, and state-led social investments, in particular in education. The model, which, despite some social development achievements, was eventually judged as a failure, both due to internal contradictions and external shocks (Ergas 1980), was replaced by market-oriented reforms in the 1980s, ushering in an informal agrarian policy regime characterized by relatively low inequality, high poverty rates and low levels of social protection coverage with a strong reliance on informal support schemes (UNRISD 2010). See also the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement) programme in South Korea, a state-led programme promoting rural development, rising rural incomes and food security through the Green Revolution. It channelled funds from industrialized urban to rural areas and built on radical land reform (implemented before Saemaul Undong), while emphasizing the "spirit of voluntary cooperation as a central characteristic of Korean people and national identity" (Douglass 2014:137).

42 Desai 2022.

43 Espinosa 2015; Martínez Novo 2018.

44 This is important to avoid a tendency toward cultural determinism associated for example with parts of the literature on neopatrimonialism in Africa; for a discussion see Mkandawire (2015).

45 Plagerson et al. 2022.

46 Sheingate 2008.

47 One cause for deteriorating rural livelihoods in Africa was the donor-driven dismantling of marketing boards, a cornerstone of agrarian pacts, during structural adjustment; marketing boards had "serviced the need of smallholders for inputs, provided marketing channels to remote and widely dispersed farms, and enforced commodity standards" (UNRISD 2010:49)

48 Palme and Kangas 2005; Sheingate 2008.

49 Sheingate 2008.

50 Kato and Fukumi 2020; Birner et al. 2011; Howes and Murgai 2003.

51 Pensado-Leglise and Smolski 2017.

52 Rosse 2018.

53 Seyfang 2004.

54 Smith 2015.

55 Smith 2019.

56 Houdret and Amichi 2020.

57 Houdret and Amichi 2020.

58 Peschard and Randeria 2020a.

59 Shiva 2022.

60 Peschard and Randeria 2020b.

61 Saunders 2020.

62 Auty 1993.

63 Hujo 2012, 2020; UNRISD 2010, 2016.

64 For a critical appraisal of the Botswana case, see Scott (2012) and Selolwane (2012).

65 Paz Arauco 2020.

66 Smart 2017; Svampa 2019.

67 Marglin and Schor 1992.

68 Sen and Durano 2014:6.

69 Adecco Group 2017:2.

70 Behrendt et al. 2019; Meagher 2022.

71 Hujo 2019; ISSA 2019; UNDP and UNRISD 2017.

72 Mesa-Lago 2021.

73 Hujo 2014; Mesa-Lago 2021.

74 Berar Awad 2021.

75 See McKinnon (2022) and other articles in the special issue on the role that social security systems can and should play in helping to meet the long-term medical and social care needs of older populations.

76 Hujo 2019.

77 UNEP 2019; UN-Habitat 2020.

78 MacLeavy and Manley 2022.

79 Sassen 2015.

80 Krozer 2020.

81 Kempf and Hujo 2022.

82 Tsikata and Eweh 2017.

83 Rettberg 2020.

84 Saba and Koehler 2022.

85 Arbuniés 2021; Beresford et al. 2018.

86 Leonard 2013.

87 UN and World Bank 2018.

88 Loewe and Zintl 2021.

89 Leonard 2013; Hujo and Bangura 2021.

90 McCandless 2018.

91 Rettberg 2020.

92 See Beresford et al. (2018) and Arbuniés (2021). Beresford et al. (2018:1232) argue that the hybrid governance regime in Rwanda, the combination of liberal and authoritarian norms and behaviours, can be seen as a strategic choice in order "…to maintain domestic and international legitimacy in the context of uneven development and slow economic transformation." For a critique of applications of the neopatrimonialism paradigm to Africa, see Mkandawire (2015).

93 Mir et al. 2020; Rojas Scheffer 2022; ILO 2020a.

94 Lamas 2021; Kaplani and Carter 2020.

95 Kempf and Dutta 2021.

96 Hujo 2021.

97 Haggard and Kaufman 2004.

98 Cornia 2021; Hujo 2021; UNRISD 2016, 2010.

99 Ocampo and Gómez-Arteaga 2017.

100 Paz Arauco 2020; Hujo and Rulli 2014; UNRISD 2016.

101 Dadap-Cantal et al. 2021; OECD et al. 2020.

102 UNRISD 2016. For a critique of the Brazilian model, see Lavinas et al. (2017).

103 Cloutier et al. 2021.

104 Adesina 2010; Aina 2021; Mkandawire 2009, 2012; Noyoo and Boon 2021; Nugent 2010.

105 Nugent 2010.

106 Adesina 2022.

107 Adesina 2022.

108 See Mkandawire (2009, 2020). For example, former labour reserve economies in Southern Africa displayed higher taxation and higher social expenditures compared with cash crop economies such as Ghana or Uganda. In the latter countries, peasants maintained their land, revenues were mainly derived from trade taxes and public social protection was limited, with predominantly informal and community-based systems.

109 See Mkandawire (2012, 2015). For the case of Mauritius, see Brautigam and Diolle (2009). For the case of Botswana, see Pitcher et al. (2009), who observe that legitimacy is created through rule of law and personal bonds between state and citizens, creating a mutually constitutive relationship between the personal and the public.

110 Loewe et al. 2021.

111 Haggard and Kaufman 2004.

112 UNRISD 2010; Yi and Mkandawire 2014; Krause et al. 2022; Kwame Sundaram and Popov 2022; Müller 2003.

113 Kabeer 2014.

114 Koehler and Chopra 2014.

115 Bonnerjee 2014.

116 Chopra 2014.

117 Moore and Seekings 2019.

118 Frances and Wang 2006; UNRISD 2016; Mkandawire 2012.

119 Aina 2021; Mkandawire 2009; Noyoo and Boon 2021.

120 Mkandawire and Soludo 1998; Nugent 2010; Mkandawire 2012.

121 Hujo and Bangura 2020.

122 Berry et al. 2021.

123 ACHPR and IWGIA 2005.

124 El Gomati 2022; Oross and Tap 2021.

125 Oross and Tap 2021.

126 Stern Plaza et al. 2016.

127 Berry et al. 2021:2

128 Grabowski 2002.

129 Engerman and Sokoloff 2005.

130 UNRISD 2010.

131 Grabowski 2002.

132 *The Economist* 2017.

133 Cornia 2021.

134 Prügl et al. 2021.

135 UNRISD 2010.

136 Kelkar 2016.

137 Whitehead and Tsikata 2003.

138 Whitehead and Tsikata 2003.

139 Cousins 1995.

140 Relan 2010.

141 Kempf 2003.

142 Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2020, 2022.

143 Cook and Ulriksen 2021

144 Devereux 2021.

145 See Schneider (2020) for the case of Brazil.

146 Busso et al. 2020; ECLAC 2020a, 2020b; Garcia et al. 2020; UN Women and ECLAC 2020.

147 Mkandawire 2012; UNRISD 2010.

148 Regional governments, for example in Wales, UK, have designated a Minister for Future Generations, see *The Guardian* (2019).

149 Alfers 2022; Kabeer 2014; Koehler 2020; Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies 2021; Phillips 2020; UNRISD 2016.

150 UN 2015; ILO 2012. See also Behrendt et al. (2016).

151 UN 2021.

152 Sen and Durano 2014.

153 Based on Kempf and Hujo (2022).

154 Guterres 2020.

155 UN 2021.

156 Behrendt et al. 2016.

157 ITUC 2021; Trade Union Forum of the Americas 2020.

158 De Schutter 2021.

159 ETUI and ETUC 2021.

160 McKinsey Global Institute 2020:12.

161 BSR 2020.

162 Azevêdo 2022.

163 See for example Palladino and Gunn-Wright (2021), Muchhala (2021), WEDO (2021), Women's Major Group (2022) and Heffernan et al. (2021).

164 BSR 2020; ITUC 2021; McKinsey Global Institute 2020.

165 Hickey 2011; Sen and Durano 2014.

166 Hujo 2020.

167 UNRISD 2016.

168 UNRISD 2016.

169 Utting 2015; Utting and O'Neill 2020; Morena et al. 2019.

170 Cook et al. 2012.

171 Berry 2002.

172 Morena et al. 2019.

173 Kempf and Hujo 2022.

References

ACHPR (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights) and IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs). 2005. *Report of the Research and Information Visit to the Republic of Burundi*, March–April. Banjul: ACHPR; Copenhagen: IWGIA.

Adecco Group. 2017. *Time to Act: Creating a New Social Contract for Work in the 21st Century.* White Paper. Zurich: Adecco Group.

Adesina, Jimi O. 2022. "Variations in Postcolonial Imagination: Reflection on Senghor, Nyerere and Nkrumah." Special Issue from the Post-Colonialisms Today Project—Lessons to Africa from Africa: Reclaiming Early Post-Independence Progressive Policies. *Africa Development*, 47(1):31–58.

Adesina, Jimi O. 2021. "Social Policy in the African Context: An Introduction." In *Social Policy in the African Context,* edited by Jimi O. Adesina, 1–12. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Adesina, Jimi O. 2010. *Rethinking the Social Protection Paradigm: Social Policy in Africa's Development*. Paper prepared for the conference Promoting Resilience through Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa, 28–30 June. Dakar: European University Institute.

Agamben, Giorgio. 2021. *Where Are We Now? The Epidemic as Politics*. Milan: Eris.

Aina, Tade Akin. 2021. "Reclaiming Transformative Social Policy for Inclusive Development." In *Social Policy in the African Context,* edited by Jimi O. Adesina, 13–28. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Alfers, Laura. 2022. "Informal Workers Co-Producing Social Services in the Global South: Task Shifting or Political Strategy towards a New Social Contract?" In *Between Fault Lines and Frontlines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World*, edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 226–241. London: Bloomsbury.

Anseeuw, Ward and Giulia Maria Baldinelli. 2020. *Uneven ground: Land inequality at the heart of unequal societies*. Synthesis Report. Rome: International Land Coalition and Oxfam.

Arbuniés, Pablo. 2021. *Exploring Democratization and political reconstruction: The case of South Africa and Rwanda*. Essay. Navarra: University of Navarra.

Auty, Richard. 1993. *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Azevêdo, Robert. 2022. *The world needs a new social contract: Here's why*. Blog. World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2022. Davos: World Economic Forum.

Barié, Cletus Gregor. 2014. "Nuevas narrativas constitucionales en Bolivia y Ecuador: el buen vivir y los derechos de la naturaleza." *Latinoamérica: Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos,* 59:9–40.

Behrendt, Christina, Quynh Anh Nguyen and Uma Rani. 2019. "Social Protection Systems and the Future of Work: Ensuring Social Security for Digital Platform Workers." *International Social Security Review*, 72(3):17–41.

Behrendt, Christina, Isabell Ortiz, Emmanuel Julien, Youcef Ghellab, Susan Hayter and Florence Bonnet. 2016. *Social Contract and the Future of Work: Inequality, Income Security, Labour Relations and Social Dialogue*. Issue Note Series no. 4. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Berar Awad, Azita. 2021. "Foreword." In *Is the Future Ready for Youth? Youth Employment Policies for Evolving Labour Markets*, edited by Juan Chacaltana and Sukti Dasgupta, iv–vii. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Beresford, Alexander, Marie E. Berry and Laura Mann. 2018. "Liberation movements and stalled democratic transitions: Reproducing power in Rwanda and South Africa through productive liminality." *Democratization*, 25(7):1231-1250.

Berry, Marie, Yolande Bouka and Marilyn Kamuru. 2021. "Implementing Inclusion: Gender Quotas, Inequality, and Backlash in Kenya." *Politics & Gender*, 17(4):640–664.

Berry, Thomas. 2002. "Rights of the Earth: Recognising the Rights of All Living Beings." *Resurgence*, 214:28–29.

Beveridge, William. 1942. *Social Insurance and Allied Services*. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office. http://pombo.free.fr/beveridge42.pdf.

Birner, Regina, Surupa Gupta and Neeru Sharma. 2011. *The political economy of agricultural policy reform in India*. IFPRI Research Monograph. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Brautigam, Deborah and Tania Diolle. 2009. *Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the crisis of confidence at independence in Mauritius*. Research Paper no. 4, Development Leadership Program. Canberra: AusAID.

BSR (Business for Social Responsibility). 2020. *The Business Role in Creating a 21st Century Social Contract*. San Francisco: BSR.

Busso, Matías, Juanita Camacho, Julián Messina and Guadalupe Montenegro. 2020. *The Challenge of Protecting Informal Households during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Castro-Gómez, Santiago. 2019. "The Social Sciences, Epistemic Violence, and the Problem of the 'Invention of the Other'." In *Unbecoming Modern: Colonialism, Modernity, Colonial Modernities,* edited by Saurabh Dube and Ishita Banerjee-Dube, 211–227. Abingdon: Routledge.

Chemhuru, Munamato. 2017. "Gleaning the Social Contract Theory from African Communitarian Philosophy." *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 36(4):505–515.

Chen, Martha and Françoise Carré. 2020. *The Informal Economy Revisited: Reflections on Academic and Policy Debates*. London: Routledge.

Cloutier, Mathieu. 2021. *Social Contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa: Concepts and Measurements.* World Bank Policy Research and Policy Paper no. 9788. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Cloutier, Mathieu, Bernard Harborne, Deborah Isser, Indhira Santos and Michael Watts. 2021. *Social Contracts for Development: Bargaining, Contention, and Social Inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Africa Development Forum. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Cook, Sara, Kiah Smith and Peter Utting. 2012. *Green Economy or Green Society? Contestation and Policies for a Fair Transition*. Occasional Paper: Social Dimensions of Green Economy and Sustainable Development no. 10. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Cook, Sarah and Marianne Ulriksen. 2021. "Social policy responses to COVID-19: New issues, old solutions?" *Global Social Policy*, 21(3):381–395.

Cornia, Giovanni Andrea. 2021. *Latin America's Income Inequality under Five Political Regimes, 1870–2018.* Working Papers–Economics, WP 2021-12. Florence: Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.

Cousins, Ben. 1995. "Common Property Institutions and Land Reform in South Africa." *Development South Africa*, 12(4):481–507.

Cusicanqui, Silvia Rivera. 2012. "Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: A Reflection on the Practices and Discourses of Decolonization." *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 111(1):95–109.

Dadap-Cantal, Emma, Charmaine Ramos and Andrew Fischer. 2021. "Targeting versus Social Protection in Cash Transfers in the Philippines: Reassessing a Celebrated Case of Social Protection." Themed section on Social Protection and Inequality in the Global South: Politics, Actors and Institutions, edited by Katja Hujo. *Critical Social Policy*, 41(3):343–363.

Dastile, Nontyatyambo Pearl and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. 2013. "Power, Knowledge and Being: Decolonial Combative Discourse as a Survival Kit for Pan-Africanists in the 21st Century." *Alternation*, 1(2013):105–134.

Delanty, Gerard. 2021. "Introduction: The Pandemic in Historical and Global Context." In *Pandemics, Politics, and Society: Critical Perspectives on the Covid-19 Crisis*, edited by Gerard Delanty, 1–24. Berlin: De Gruyter.

De Schutter, Olivier. 2021. *Global Fund for Social Protection: International Solidarity in the Service of Poverty Eradication*. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. A/HRC/47/36. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

De Sousa Santos, Boaventura. 2020. *La cruel pedagogía del virus*. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano en Ciencias Sociales.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2021. "Progressive Social Movements, Democracy and the Pandemic." In *Pandemics, Politics, and Society: Critical Perspectives on the Covid-19 Crisis*, edited by Gerard Delanty, 209–226. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Desai, Manisha. 2022. *Communitarian Imaginaries as Inspirations for Rethinking the Eco-Social Contract?* Issue Brief no. 12. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Devereux, Stephen. 2021. "Social Protection Responses to COVID-19 in Africa." *Global Social Policy*, 21(3):421–447.

Douglass, Mike. 2014. "The Saemaul Undong in Historical Perspective and in the Contemporary World." In *Learning from the South Korean Developmental Success*, edited by Ilcheong Yi and Thandika Mkandawire, 136–171. London: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2020a. *Informe Especial Covid-19 No. 1: Efectos económicos y sociales*. Santiago: ECLAC.

ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2020b. Informes Covid-19 – Los efectos del COVID 19: Una oportunidad para reafirmar la centralidad de los derechos humanos de las personas migrantes en el desarrollo sostenible. Santiago: ECLAC.

The Economist. 2017. "For Asia, the Path to Prosperity Starts with Land Reform. Countries That Did It Properly Have Grown Fastest." 14 October. https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/10/12/for-asia-the-path-to-prosperity-starts-with-land-reform.

El Gomati, Anas. 2022. "The weaponisation of Libya's elections." *IPS Journal*, 14 February. https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/the-weaponisation-of-libyas-elections-5714/.

Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2005. *Colonialism, Inequality and Long Run Paths of Development*. NBER Working Paper no. 11057. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Ergas, Zaki. 1980. "Why Did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail? Towards a Global Analysis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(3):387–410.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Espinosa, Cristina. 2015. "Interpretive Affinities: The Constitutionalization of Rights of Nature, Pacha Mama, in Ecuador." *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 21(5):608–622.

ETUI (European Trade Union Institute) and ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation). 2021. *Benchmarking Working Europe 2021: Unequal Europe*. Brussels: ETUI.

Foley, Laura and Nicola Piper. 2020. *COVID-19 and Women Migrant Workers: Impacts and Implications*. Geneva: International Organization on Migration.

Freeland, Nicholas, Stephen Devereux and Lillian Mookodi. 2020. *Botswana National Social Protection Recovery Plan*. Gaborone: Republic of Botswana and United Nations Botswana.

Galbraith, James K. 2022. "Resource Limits to American Capitalism & the Predator State Today." *GPEnewsdocs.com*, 7 February. https://gpenewsdocs.com/resource-limits-to-american-capitalism-the-predator-state-today/.

Garcia, et al. 2020. Covid-19 Response in Latin America. *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 103(5):1765–1772.

Getachew, Adom. 2019. *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton: University Press.

Ghosh, Jayati (ed.). 2021. *Informal Women Workers in the Global South: Policies and Practices for the Formalisation of Women's Employment in Developing Economies*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Gough, Ian. 2021. *Two Scenarios for Sustainable Welfare: New Ideas for an Eco-Social Contract*. Brussels: The European Trade Union Institute.

Grabowski, Richard. 2002. "East Asia, Land Reform and Economic Development." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 23(1):105–126.

Greenson, Thadeus. 2021. "Dishgamu Humbolt." *North Coast Journal of Politics, People and Art*, 8 July. https://www.northcoastjournal.com/humboldt/dishgamu-humboldt/Content?oid=20929557.

The Guardian. 2019. "Meet the World's first minister for future generations." 2 March. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/02/meet-the-worlds-first-future-generations-commissioner.

Guterres, António. 2020. *Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: A New Social Contract for a New Era*. Message by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the 18th Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture, 18 July.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 2004. "Revising Social Contracts: Social Spending in Latin America, East Asia, and the Former Socialist Countries, 1980–2000." *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)*, 24(1):3–37.

Heffernan, Rose, Patrizia Heidegger, Gabriele Koehler, Anke Stock and Katy Wiese. 2021. *A Feminist European Green Deal: Towards an Ecological and Gender Just Transition*. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Hickey, Sam. 2011. "The Politics of Social Protection: What Do We Get from a 'Social Contract' Approach?" *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 32(4):426–438.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1996 [1651]. *Leviathan*. Hamburg: Meiner.

Hopkins, Chris, Oliver Greenfield and Najma Mohamed. 2020.*Is the Moment for a New Social Contract Here?* Green Economy Coalition blog, 27 September. https://www.greeneconomycoalition.org/news-analysis/is-the-moment-for-a-new-social-contract-here.

Houdret, Annabelle and Hichem Amichi. 2020. "The Rural Social Contract in Morocco and Algeria: Reshaping through Economic Liberalisation and New Rules and Practices." *The Journal of North African Studies*, 1848560.

Howes, Stephen and Rinku Murgai. 2003. "Incidence of Agricultural Power Subsidies: An Estimate." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38(16):1533–1535.

Hujo, Katja. 2021. "Social Protection and Inequality in the Global South: Politics, Actors and Institutions." *Critical Social Policy*, 41(3):343–363.

Hujo, Katja (ed.). 2020. *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Hujo, Katja. 2019. "A Global Social Contract: New Steps towards a Rights-Based Approach to Migration Governance?" *Global Social Policy*, 19(1/2):25–28.

Hujo, Katja (ed.). 2014. *Reforming Pensions in Developing and Transition Countries*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Hujo, Katja (ed.). 2012. *Mineral Rents and the Financing of Social Policy: Opportunities and Challenges*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Hujo, Katja and Yusuf Bangura. 2020. "The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development: An Introduction." In *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*, edited by Katja Hujo, 1–40. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Hujo, Katja and Mariana Rulli. 2014. "Towards More Inclusive Protection: A Comparative Analysis of the Political Process and Socio-Economic Impact of Pension Re-reforms in Argentina and Chile." In *Reforming Pensions in Developing and Transition Countries*, edited by Katja Hujo, 278–310. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2019. *Social Contracts and World Bank Country Engagements: Lessons from Emerging Practices*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

ILO (International Labour Organization). 2020a. *ILO Monitor: Covid and the world of Work. Sixth Edition. Updated Estimates and Analysis*. Geneva: ILO.

ILO (International Labor Organization). 2020b. *Implementing the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169: Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable and Just Future*. Geneva: ILO.

ILO (International Labour Organization). 2012. *Recommendation No. 2020 on Social Protection Floors*. Geneva: ILO.

ISSA (International Social Security Association). 2019. *Ten Global Challenges for Social Security*. Geneva: ISSA.

ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation). 2021. *New Social Contract: Five Workers' Demands for Recovery and Resilience*. Brussels: ITUC.

Kabeer, Naila. 2014. "Social Justice and the Millennium Development Goals: The Challenge of Intersecting Inequalities." *Equal Rights Review*, 13:91–116.

Kaplani, Maria Elli Doufexi and Maggie Carter. 2020. *VoiceIt Report: Strengthening LGBTQI+'s Voice in Politics – Policy Report*. Athens: KMOP.

Kato, Atsushi and Atsushi Fukumi. 2020. "Political economy of agricultural electricity tariffs: Rural politics of Indian States." *Energy Policy*, 145:111755.

Kelkar, Govind. 2016. *Between Protest and Policy: Women Claim Their Right to Agricultural Land in Rural China and India.* UNRISD Working Paper 2016-10. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Kelsall, Tim and Sam Hickey. 2020. *What is political settlements analysis*? Blog, ESID Research Centre. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre.

Kempf, Isabell. 2003. "Pobreza y pueblos indígenas: Más allá de las necesidades." *Observatorio de Conflictos del Centro de Investigación para la Paz.* Madrid: FUHEM.

Kempf, Isabell and Paramita Dutta. 2021. "Transformative Social Policies as an Essential Buffer during Socio-Economic Crises." *Sustainable Development,* 29(3):517–527.

Kempf, Isabell and Katja Hujo. 2022. "Why Recent Crises and SDG Implementation Demand a New Eco-Social Contract." In *Financial Crises, Poverty and Environmental Sustainability in the Context of the SDGs*, edited by Andreas Antoniades, Alexander S. Antonarakis and Isabell Kempf, 171–186. New York: Springer Nature.

Klein, Naomi. 2007. *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. Toronto: Knopf.

Koch, Natalie and Tom Perrault. 2019. "Resource Nationalism." *Progress in Human Geography*, 43(4):611–631.

Koehler, Gabriele. 2020. *Creative Coalitions in a Fractured World: An Opportunity for Transformative Change?* Occasional Paper: Overcoming Inequality in a Fractured World no. 4. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Kothari, Ashish, Federico Demaria and Alberto Acosta. 2014. "Buen Vivir, Degrowth and Ecological Swaraj: Alternatives to Sustainable Development and Green Economy." *Development*, 57(3/4):362–375.

Krause, Dunja, Dimitris Stevis, Katja Hujo and Edouard Morena. 2022. "Just transitions for a new eco-social contract: Analysing the relations between welfare regimes and transition pathways." *Transfer*, 1–16.

Krozer, Alice. 2020. *Seeing Inequality? Relative Affluence and Elite Perceptions in Mexico*. Occasional Paper: Overcoming Inequality in a Fractured World no. 8. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Kwame Sundaram, Jomo and Vladimir Popov. 2022. "Global Economic Inequalities: Trends and Drivers." In *Between Fault Lines and Frontlines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World*, edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 25–41. London: Bloomsbury.

Lamas, Marta. 2022. "Aborto y democracia en México, Uruguay y Argentina." In *Crisis política, autoritarismo y democracia*, edited by René Torres-Ruiz and Darío Salinas Figueredo, 71-108. México: Siglo XXI/ CLACSO.

Lavers, Tom. 2020. "Distributional Concerns, the 'Developmental State', and the Agrarian Origins of Social Assistance in Ethiopia." In *The Politics of Social Protection in Eastern and Southern Africa,* edited by Sam Hickey, Tom Lavers, Miquel Niño-Zarazúa and Jeremy Seekings, 68–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lavinas, Lena. 2021. "The Anatomy of the Social Question and the Evolution of the Brazilian Social Security System, 1919–2020." In *One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa*, edited by Lutz Leisering, 303–342. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lavinas, Lena, Denise Gentil and Barbara Cobo. 2017. *The Controversial Brazilian Welfare Regime.* UNRISD Working Paper 2017-10. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Le Grange, Lesley. 2012. "Ubuntu, Ukama and the Healing of Nature, Self and Society." *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 44(S2):56–67.

Leonard, David K. 2013. "Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical Africa Conflict States: An Overview. *IDS Bulletin*, 44(1):1–14.

Letseka, Moeketsi. 2014. "Ubuntu and Justice as Fairness." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 5(9):544–551.

Locke, John. 1823 [1690]. *Two Treatises on Government.* London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G. and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; and J. Gumming, Dublin.

Loewe, Markus and Tina Zintl. 2021. "State Fragility, Social Contracts and the Role of Social Protection: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region." *Social Sciences*, 10(1):447.

Loewe, Markus, Tina Zintl and Annabelle Houdret. 2021. "The Social Contract as a Tool of Analysis." Introduction to the special issue on Framing the Evolution of New Social Contracts in Middle Eastern and North African Countries. *World Development*, 145:104982.

MacLeavy, Julie and David Manley. 2022. "Socio-Spatial Inequalities and Intergenerational Dependencies." In *Between Fault Lines and Frontlines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World*, edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 45–61. London: Bloomsbury.

Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2007. "On the Coloniality of Being." *Cultural Studies*, 21(2):240–270.

Marglin, Stephen A. and Juliet B. Schor. 1992. *Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Martínez Franzoni, Juliana and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea. 2022. *A Lost Opportunity to Build Social Protection for All? Scenarios Following Emergency Cash Transfers in Central America*. UNRISD Think Piece Series, The Time is Now! Why We Need a New Eco-Social Contract for a Just and Green World. Geneva: UNRISD.

Martínez Franzoni, Juliana and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea. 2020. *Pactos sociales al servicio del bienestar en América Latina y el Caribe: ¿qué son y qué papel tienen en tiempos de crisis?,* Documentos de Proyectos (LC/TS.2020/169). Santiago: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe.

Martínez Novo, Carmen. 2018. "Discriminación y colonialidad en el Ecuador de Rafael Correa (2007–2017)." *Alteridades*, 28(55):49–60.

Mbembe, Achille. 2021. *Out of the Dark Night: Essays on Decolonisation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McCandless, Erin. 2018. "Forging Resilient Social Contracts: A Pathway to Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace." New York: United Nations Development Programme.

McKinnon, Roddy. 2022. "Introduction: Making the case to formally revise the international social security standards to include long-term care for the elderly." *International Social Security Review*, 75:5–18.

McKinsey Global Institute. 2020. *COVID-19 Has Revived the Social Contract in Advanced Economies—for Now. What Will Stick Once the Crisis Abates?* Chicago: McKinsey and Company.

Meagher, Kate. 2022. "Rewiring the Social Contract: Economic Inclusion and the Gig Economy in Nigeria." In *Between Fault Lines and Front Lines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World,* edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 80–97. London: Bloomsbury.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2021. *Evaluation of Four Decades of Pension Privatization in Latin America, 1980–2020: Promises and Reality*. Mexico City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Mignolo, Walter D. and Catherine E. Walsh. 2018. *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics and Praxis*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mills, Charles W. 2007. "The Domination Contract." In *Contract and Domination*, edited by Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, 79–105. London: Polity Press.

Mills, Charles W. 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mir, Gazala, Saffron Karlsen, Winnie Mitullah, Upendra Bhojani, Benjamin Uzochukwu, Chinyere Okeke, Tolib Mirzoev, Bassey Ebenso, Naila Dracup and Gary Dymski, Doan Thi Thuy Duong, Bui Thi Thu Ha, Steve Ouma, Felicia Onibon, Joyce Ogwezi and Shahab Adris. 2020. *Achieving SDG 10: A Global Review of Public Service Inclusion Strategies for Ethnic and Religious Minorities*. Occasional Paper: Overcoming Inequality in a Fractured World no. 5. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2020. "Colonial Legacies and Social Welfare Regimes in Africa: An Empirical Exercise." In *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*, edited by Katja Hujo, 139–172. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2015. "Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections." *World Politics,* 67(3):563-612.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2012. *Building the African State in the Age of Globalization: The Role of Social Compacts and Lessons for South Africa*. Inaugural Annual Lecture, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection. Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2009. "From the National Question to the Social Question." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, 69:130–160.

Mkandawire, Thandika and Charles Soludo (eds.). 1998. *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*. Dakar: International Development Research Centre, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa and Africa World Press.

Moellendorf, Darrel. 2009. *Global Inequality Matters*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moore, Elena and Jeremy Seekings. 2019. "Consequences of Social Protection on Intergenerational Relationships in South Africa: Introduction." *Critical Social Policy*, 39(4):513–524.

Morena, Edouard, Dunja Krause and Dimitris Stevis (eds.). 2019. *Just Transitions: Social Justice in the Shift towards a Low-Carbon World*. London: Pluto Press.

Muchhala, Bhumika. 2021. A *Feminist and Decolonial Global Green New Deal: Principles, Paradigms and Systemic Transformations*. Issue Brief. Action Nexus for Generation Equality. New York: Women's Environment and Development Organization.

Müller, Katharina. 2003. *Privatising Old-Age Security. Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2013. "The Entrapment of Africa within the Global Colonial Matrices of Power: Eurocentrism, Coloniality, and Deimperialization in the Twenty-first Century." *Journal of Developing Societies*, 29(4):331–353.

Noyoo, Ndangwa and Emmanuel Boon. 2021. "Nation-Building and the Nationalist Discourse: Revisiting Social Policy in Ghana and Zambia in the First Decade of Independence." In *Social Policy in the African Context,* edited by Jimi O. Adesina, 45–64. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Nugent, Paul. 2010. "States and Social Contracts in Africa." *New Left Review*, 63:35–68.

Nyamnjoh, Francis. 2020. *Covid-19 and the Resilience of Systemic Suppression, Oppression and Repression*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Ocampo, José Antonio and Natalie Gómez-Arteaga. 2017. "Social Protection Systems, Redistribution and Growth in Latin America." *CEPAL Review*, 2017(122):7–30.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), CAF (Corporacion Andina de Fomento – Development Bank of Latin America) and EC (European Commission). 2020. *Latin American Economic Outlook 2020: Digital Transformation for Building Back Better*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Ontiveros, Eva. 2021. "Elisa Loncón: From Poverty to PhD to Writing Chile's Constitution." *BBC News*, 11 July. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-57733539.

Oross, Daniel and Paul Tap. 2021. "Using deliberation for partisan purposes: evidence from the Hungarian National Consultation." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 34:5:803-820.

Ortiz, Isabell, Sara Burke, Mohamed Berrada and Hernán Saenz Cortés. 2022. *World Protests: A Study of Key Protest Issues in the 21st Century*. New York: Springer.

Palladino, Lenore and Rhiana Gunn-Wright. 2021. Care and Climate. Understanding the Policy Intersections. A Feminist Green New Deal Coalition Brief. Feminist Green New Deal Coalition.

Palme, Joakim and Olli Kangas (eds.). 2005. *Social Policy and Economic Development in the Nordic Countries*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Pateman, Carole. 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies. 2021. *From Rhetoric to Action: Delivering Equality & Inclusion*. New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation.

Paz Arauco, Verónica. 2020. "Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development in Bolivia (1985–2014): Protests, Hydrocarbons and a New State Project." In *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*, edited by Katja Hujo, 269–303. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Pensado-Leglise, Mario Del Robe and Andrew Smolski. 2017. "An Eco-Egalitarian Solution to the Capitalist Consumer Paradox: Integrating Short Food Chains and Public Market Systems." *Agriculture*, 7(9):76.

Peschard, Karine and Shalini Randeria. 2020a. "'Keeping Seeds in Our Hands': The Rise of Seed Activism." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 47(4):613–647.

Peschard, Karine and Shalini Randeria. 2020b. "Taking Monsanto to Court: Legal Activism Around Intellectual Property in Brazil and India." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 47(4):792–819.

Phillips, Ben. 2020. *How to Fight Inequality (And Why That Fight Needs You)*. Cambridge: Polity.

Pitcher, Anne, Mary H. Moran and Michael Johnston. 2009. "Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa." *African Studies Review*, 52(1):125–56.

Plagerson, Sophie. 2021. *Human Well-Being and Capabilities*. UNRISD Report. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Plagerson, Sophie, Laura Alfers and Martha Chen. 2022. "Introduction: Social Contracts and Informal Workers in the Global South." In *Social Contracts and Informal Workers in the Global South*, edited by Laura Alfers, Marty Chen and Sophie Plagerson, 1–30. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Prügl, Elisabeth, Fenneke Reysoo and Dzodzi Tsikata. 2021. "Agricultural and Land Commercialization: Feminist and Rights Perspectives." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 48(7):1419–1438.

Quijano, Anibal. 2007. "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality." *Cultural Studies*, 21(2–3):168–178.

Radebe, Nompumelelo Zodwa. 2019. "Singabantu bendawo: understanding the concept of land from the perspective of ubuntu." *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 42(3):247–258.

Raworth, Kate. 2017. *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist*. London: Random House Business Books.

Relan, Manju Arora. 2010. "The Forest Right Act, 2006: Victory and Betrayal." *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 52(3/4):484–521.

Rettberg, Angelika. 2020. "Peace-Making Amidst an Unfinished Social Contract: The Case of Colombia." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 14(1):84-100.

Rojas Scheffer, R. 2022. "Building Networks, Bridging Divides? Organizational Experiences of Paid Domestic Workers in Uruguay and Paraguay." In *Between Fault Lines and Frontlines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World*, edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 209–225. London: Bloomsbury.

Rosse, Eduardo Lopez. 2018. *Participatory Guarantee Systems: A Transformative Public Policy to Boost Organic Farming in Bolivia*. Think Piece. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. *Du Contrat Social*. Paris: Gallimard/Folio Essais no. 233.

Rubio, Magdalena. 2021. "Nueva constitución: las propuestas medioambientales de los constituyentes electos." *Ladera Sur*, 3 June. https://laderasur.com/estapasando/nueva-constitucion-las-propuestas-medioambientales-de-los-constituyentes-electos/.

Saba, Alina and Gabriele Koehler. 2022. *Toward an Eco-Social Contract in Nepal: The Role of Rights-Based Civil Society Activism*. Issue Brief no. 13. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2014. *Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Sassen, Saskia. 2015. "Who Owns Our Cities – and Why This Urban Takeover Should Concern Us All." *The Guardian*, 24 November. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/nov/24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-takeover-should-concern-us-all.

Saunders. Richard. 2020. "The Politics of Resource Bargaining, Social Relations and Institutional Development in Zimbabwe Since Independence." In *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*, edited by Katja Hujo, 371–404. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Schneider, Aaron. 2020. "Democratic Deepening and State Capacity: Taxation in Brazil and India." In *The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development*, edited by Katja Hujo, 173–206. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Scott, Pegg. 2012. "Has Botswana Beaten the Resource Curse?" In *Mineral Rents and the Financing of Social Policy: Opportunities and Challenges*, edited by Katja Hujo, 257–284. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Seekings, Jeremy. 2021. "(Re)formulating the Social Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Zola Skweyiya, Dignity, Development and the Welfare State." In *One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa*, edited by Lutz Leisering, 263–300. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Selolwane, Onalenna (ed.). 2012. *Poverty Reduction and Changing Policy Regimes in Botswana*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Sen, Gita and Marina Durano. 2014. *The Remaking of Social Contracts: Feminists in a Fierce New World*. London: Zed Books.

Seyfang, Gill. 2004. *Local organic food: The social implications of sustainable consumption*. CSERGE Working Paper EDM no. 04-09. Norwich: University of East Anglia, The Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment.

Shafik, Nemat (Minouche). 2021. *What We Owe Each Other: A New Social Contract for a Better Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sheingate, Adam. 2008. "Agrarian Social Pacts and Poverty Reduction." Paper prepared for the UNRISD Flagship Report: *Combating Poverty and Inequality*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Shiva, Vandana. 2022. "Epilogue: Oneness versus the 1 Percent: Economic Polarization and the Threat to Freedom." In *Between Fault Lines and Frontlines: Shifting Power in an Unequal World*, edited by Katja Hujo and Maggie Carter, 243–257. London: Bloomsbury.

Shiva, Vandana. 2016. *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace*. London: Zed Books.

Smart, Sebastián. 2017. "Resistance Against Mining Extractivism in Chile." *Critical Planning*, 23:59–81.

Smee, Ben. 2021. "Indigenous Traditional Owners Win Back Daintree Rainforest in Historic Deal." *The Guardian*, 28 September.

Smith, Kiah. 2019. "Localizing SDG2 Zero Hunger through 'Fair Food' in Australia." *Asian Development Perspectives*, 10(2):135–148.

Smith, Kiah. 2015. *Collective empowerment? Producer cooperatives versus women's groups in Kenyan ethical trade*. Think Piece. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Stern Plaza, Maya, Geneviève Binette, Isabel Ortiz, Valerie Schmitt, Luis Frota and Kagisanyo Kelobang. 2016. *South Africa: Extending Social Protection by Anchoring Rights in Law.* Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Stewart, Frances and Michael Wang. 2006. "Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the World Bank, or is it the other way round?" In *Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank*, edited by Stephen Kosack, Gustav Ranis, James Vreeland, 290–322. London: Routledge.

Svampa, Maristella. 2019. *Neo-extractivism in Latin America: Socio-environmental Conflicts, the Territorial Turn, and New Political Narratives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tamale, Sylvia. 2020. *Decolonization and Afro-feminism*. Québec: Daraja Press.

Therborn, Göran. 2014. "Los pactos en la teoría y en la historia social en Europa y la política de los Estados de bienestar: algunas experiencias." In *Pactos sociales para una protección social más inclusiva. Experiencias, obstáculos y posibilidades en América Latina y Europa*, edited by Martín Hopenhayn, Carlos Maldonado Valera, Rodrigo Martínez, María Nieves Rico and Ana Sojo, 134–140. Serie Seminarios y Conferencias no. 76. Santiago: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe.

Trade Union Forum of the Americas. 2020. *Declaration 'What's Public Stays Public'*. Trade Union Forum of the Americas, 7 October. https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/1d056627-5f9d-4ff7-b681-0229257b6231_Declaration_Union_Forum_of_the_Americas.pdf.

Tsikata, Dzodzi and Promise Eweh. 2017. *Land and Agricultural Commercialisation and Gendered Livelihoods: A Synthesis of the Qualitative Study of 4 Districts in Ghana.* DEMETER Working Paper. Accra: Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana.

Ulriksen, Marianne and Sophie Plagerson. 2014. "Social Protection: Rethinking Rights and Duties." *World Development*, 64:755–765.

UN (United Nations). 2021. *Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General*. New York: UN.

UN (United Nations). 2015. *Addis Ababa Action Agenda*. New York: UN.

UN (United Nations) and World Bank. 2018. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2020. *World Social Report 2020: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World*. New York: UN DESA.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). 2017. *Global Trends: Challenges and Opportunities in the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals*. New York: UNDP; Geneva: UNRISD.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2019. *Global Environment Outlook – GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

UN-Habitat. 2020. *World Cities Report 2020: The Value of Sustainable Urbanization*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.

UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). 2016. *Policy Innovations for Transformative Change: Implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Geneva: UNRISD.

UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). 2010. *Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics*. Geneva: UNRISD.

UN Women and ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2020. Cuidados en América Latina y el Caribe en tiempos de Covid-19: Hacia sistemas integrales para fortalecer la respuesta y la recuperación. New York/Santiago: UN Women/ECLAC.

Utting, Peter (ed.). 2015. *Social and Solidarity Economy: Beyond the Fringe*. London: Zed Books.

Utting, Peter and Kelly O'Neill. 2020. *Accounting for Sustainability: What Can and Should Corporations Be Doing?* Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organization). 2021. *Feminist Action Nexus for Economic and Climate Justice*. New York: WEDO. https://wedo.org/what-we-do/our-programs/feminist-action-nexus-for-economic-and-climate-justice/.

Whitehead, Ann and Dzodzi Tsikata. 2003. "Policy Discourses on Women's Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Implications of the Re-Turn to the Customary." *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3(1/2):67–112.

Willis, Rebecca. 2020. "A Social Contract for the Climate Crisis." *IPPR Progressive Review*, 27(2):156–164.

Women's Major Group. 2022. *A Feminist Analysis of Our Common Agenda: The Women's Major Group's Response to the UN Secretary General's Report*. Women's Major Group.

World Bank. 2020a. *Poverty and Shared Prosperity: Reversals of Fortune*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2020b. *Strengthening Conditional Cash Transfers and Single Registry in Brazil*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2019. *World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Wuta, Rodwell Kumbirai. 2021. "Appraising Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme in the Context of Unhu/Ubuntu: Towards an Appropriate Ethical-Moral Ideology on Land Distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *Philosophical Perspectives on Land Reform in Southern Africa*, edited by Erasumus Masitera, 309–334. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wynter, Sylvia. 2003. "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument." *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 3(3):257–337.

Yi, Ilcheong and Thandika Mkandawire. 2014. *Learning from the South Korean Developmental Success: Effective Developmental Cooperation and Synergistic Institutions and Policies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

SEWA and the future of work: Justice, livelihood, security and decent work for women workers

Reema Nanavaty
Director, Economic and Rural Development,
Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA)
@SEWAFed

The Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) is a member-based organization of over 2.1 million poor self-employed women workers from the informal economy. The informal economy is often characterized by small or undefined workplaces (that is, public spaces—streets, squares, fields—not usually understood as workplaces), unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, low or irregular incomes, long working hours, and lack of access to finance, training, technology and markets. As workers in the informal economy are not recognized, regulated or protected under labour legislation, they often lack social protection, and many remain trapped in poverty. SEWA's experience of organizing informal-sector women workers for over five decades in India has shown that, to address the multiple challenges these workers are facing, there is a need to strengthen their collective agency, bargaining power and leadership to help them fight against unjust working conditions and bring them voice, visibility and validity as workers.

At the same time, adopting a needs-based and demand-driven approach, SEWA works toward building the skills of its members, preparing them to be able to access new forms of employment. The association also supports the organization of informal women workers into collectives, cooperatives, federations, producer companies and micro-enterprises—completely owned and managed by members themselves—thereby increasing their collective bargaining strength. These organizations are non-political, democratic and often based on trusteeship. The members not only remain workers or producers but also become owners and managers of their own economic organizations or enterprises. This builds a strong sense of ownership and belongingness and makes the organizations sustainable both economically and in terms of leadership capacities.

These organizations or enterprises not only improve the livelihoods of their members but also broaden access to markets and generate an array of employment opportunities for more women workers like them. Many of these organizations have further goals such as capacity building and advocacy in addition to generating livelihood opportunities for their members. They apply commercial strategies to facilitate improvements in financial, social and environmental aspects of the members' lives and livelihoods.

One such initiative is RUDI (short for RUral DIstribution), an agri-business enterprise of over 250,000 small and marginalized female farmers. This enterprise seeks to address disparities that characterize women's roles along the food value chain. Two-thirds of SEWA's members live in rural areas, with agriculture being one of their main occupations. Shouldering the responsibility of fulfilling the family's food and nutritional needs, women are the backbone of an informal worker's household, while men assume different roles and occupations. Women also play a major role in the entire food value chain system—in producing, processing and trading food, as well as in decisions about consuming and purchasing food at the household level. However, despite their importance for family nutrition and the food value chain, numerous constraints linked to patriarchal cultural norms and gender discrimination keep women in a subordinate position. Because women lack access to land ownership, for example, it is impossible

“

SEWA’s experience of organizing informal-sector women workers for over five decades in India has shown that, to address the multiple challenges these workers are facing, there is a need to strengthen their collective agency, bargaining power and leadership to help them fight against unjust working conditions and bring them voice, visibility and validity as workers.”

for them to receive agricultural input subsidies or participate in fair market price schemes linked to land ownership. Constrained access to other productive resources, and to support, extension and capacity-building services; lack of direct access to markets (which is often reserved for male relatives or middlemen); gender-based violence; and lower wages for equal work (the gender pay gap) all remain rife.

RUDI seeks to institutionalize gender equality and gender transformative approaches in homes, farms, communities and the entire food value chain system. The enterprise is fully owned and operated by the small-scale women farmers. The company has its own procurement channels, processing centres, packaging units and distribution network. The smallholder farmers sell their produce to RUDI; it is then graded, processed and packaged into affordable small packages. Distribution to the villages for consumption by poor rural households is handled by SEWA’s salesforce. These women, called Rudi-bens or Rudi Sisters, are formally trained and employed by SEWA and earn a commission on all sales. RUDI’s annual turnover is over USD 1.4 million.

This initiative brings nutrition and food security to over a million households in India today. In this process, the farmers get fair returns and the landless labourers have increased employment opportunities. RUDI demonstrates how the grave situation of female smallholder farmers can be transformed into a favourable and sustainable one, providing sustainable food and nutrition security for farmers’ households; ensuring the integration of small and marginalized women farmers and labourers higher up in the value chain; bridging the gender discrimination and pay gap; and, most importantly, bringing voice and visibility to these informal-sector women workers, contributing to sustainable development in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

SEWA is also working to incorporate objectives of sustainability and nutrition into these re-envisioned value chains. To do so, it has trained over 2,500 informal-sector women workers (both urban and rural) in the production and distribution of “smart foods”—foods that are good for people and the planet. Through this initiative, called Kamala, women labourers act as the owners, planners and mangers of a food processing enterprise that organizes producers and provides them with a platform for selling their goods. Kamala processes the coarse grains produced by SEWA’s farmers into traditional hot and dry snacks, bakery products and condiments that are nutritional and sustainable, thereby promoting food security.

Through initiatives such as RUDI, Kamala and others, SEWA has made informal-sector women workers the owners and managers of their own value chains, distributing profits and risks equitably across all the stakeholders. Scaling up such women-owned solutions can generate formal employment opportunities for more informal women workers, integrating them higher up in the value chains; combat female poverty as well as lower female workforce participation issues, lack of decision-making power and traditional forms of gender-based violence; and facilitate access to markets and decent work, as well as other services such as health care, childcare and decent housing. As a result, self-reliance, which means the ability to work individually and collectively to achieve economic freedom and retain decision-making power over matters that concern one’s life and livelihood, is strengthened. We at SEWA call this: The Future of Work.

Are green deals a good deal for the global South?

Vicente Paolo B. Yu III
Visiting Fellow, UNRISD;
Senior Legal Adviser, Third World Network
@VicentePaoloYu

The idea of "greening" the economy—to make national economies environmentally sustainable, including through the lowering of greenhouse gas emissions—has risen in prominence in multilateral discourse over the past decade and a half. The idea of a green economic framework has been expressed in various policy initiatives at national, regional and global levels, such as the European Union's Green Deal. However, the question of how economies can be made green is very complex, and the use of terms such as "green economy" or "green deal" does not imply an international consensus, as the meanings of these terms are context specific.

There is no single path toward sustainable development. Different countries will require different strategies. But certain development imperatives are common to developing countries. These include eradicating poverty, reducing economic and social inequalities, and expanding decent livelihood and income opportunities for the poor. The environmental and climate crises mean that developing countries also have to make their economies more environmentally sustainable, more climate change-adapted and resilient, and more diversified in terms of productive economic sectors and activities.

However, most developing countries find it difficult to achieve their development objectives in an environmentally sustainable way. This is due to systemic and structural obstacles resulting from the way resources were extracted from these countries by colonial powers between the sixteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, and due to the resource-extractive and financialized hyperglobalization of recent decades. For developing countries, considerations of environmentally sustainable development are understood through an integrated approach to sustainable development and poverty eradication. This is consistent with the 1992 Rio Principles framework of sustainable development as having three interrelated pillars—environmental protection, economic development and social development. A key aspect is Principle 7 on common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), which recognizes that "In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command."

The discussion in developed-country policy circles and multilateral institutions around a green economy, or a green recovery or a green new deal, tends to focus on the environmental aspects rather than the economic and equity challenges and impacts developing countries face. This policy rhetoric creates a dynamic in which the primary objective is to make domestic economies go "green" through market economy-oriented approaches. These do not, however, tackle the underlying structural inequalities domestically and internationally that need to be addressed to support long-term sustainable development and address poverty eradication in a systemic manner. This undermines efforts to achieve Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) along the three pillars of sustainable development.

For example, the EU Green Deal and the proposed US Green New Deal focus on putting in place domestic policy measures to reduce environmental pollution (including greenhouse gas emissions) by tightening environmental regulations and shifting domestic investments and infrastructure toward

“

To address climate justice and equity considerations, a significantly greater level of international cooperation and action across multiple areas is needed. This should address the structural failures in the global economic system that gave rise to today’s economic and social inequalities and environmental crises.”

perceived “green” industrial sectors. At the same time, they also include policy proposals that aim to have other countries, especially developing countries, conform to EU or US “green” policy approaches. Such proposals could open the floodgates to unilateral trade protectionism, such as carbon-based border adjustment measures (CBAMs). These are measures such as additional fees, charges or documentary requirements that are imposed as conditions for the importation of goods into the European Union. UNCTAD (2021) has estimated that CBAMs could have adverse implications on developing countries while generating little positive impact on emission reductions. This could erode the multilateral trust and international cooperation that is needed for all countries to work together to combat the climate crisis, address the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and achieve the SDGs within the next decade. A key to success of the multilateral effort to combat climate change, therefore, is ensuring that the economic and social consequences of climate change response measures, such as the EU Green Deal, are addressed equitably and do not adversely affect developing countries.

Developing countries evoke the necessity of taking climate justice and equity into account in green economy or green deal proposals to propel the transition away from fossil fuel dependency. Justice and equity are material in the context of mitigation and adaptation burden-sharing, common but differentiated responsibility and capability, addressing loss and damage arising from the impacts of climate change, provision of the means of implementation (finance, technology) to developing countries, and ensuring the survival and development of vulnerable local communities and marginalized sectors in the face of climate change impacts.

For example, different national circumstances mean that countries will have different challenges when it comes to transitioning away from fossil fuel dependence. Here equity considerations mean that richer and more diversified economies (such as those of developed countries) are better able to and should phase out fossil fuels fastest and earliest. Developing countries whose economies depend largely on the production or the consumption of fossil fuels should be supported in prioritizing and implementing policies that promote rapid, societally just and equitable economic diversification and transition away from fossil fuel dependence. Other developing countries, such as least developed countries, might require other support measures to enable them to pursue equitable development efforts adapted to climate change and its impacts.

To address climate justice and equity considerations, a significantly greater level of international cooperation and action across multiple areas is needed. This should address the structural failures in the global economic system that gave rise to today’s economic and social inequalities and environmental crises.

Such international cooperation should consider the following key elements:

- At the *national level*, governments should strengthen the ability of national economies to address the interlinked challenges of climate change, energy sufficiency, economic development and social progress in a manner that is nationally appropriate, socially and economically equitable and environmentally sustainable.
  - The global North would need to emphasize the reduction of their economies' ecological footprint (such as through rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions) by changing unsustainable resource consumption patterns and should prioritize the provision of financing and technology to support developing countries.
  - In the global South, greater emphasis would need to be placed on pursuing climate-adapted development pathways that enhance energy access and sufficiency, and climate change-resilient economic productivity, while at the same time shifting away from fossil fuel use.

- At the *international level*, cooperative arrangements are needed to enhance financial and technological support from the global North that will buttress (but not impose on) the national development efforts of developing countries.
- These need to be based on the coherent, strategic and active engagement of developing countries in international policy-setting forums (climate, trade, etc.), and on ensuring that they have the requisite policy space to accommodate their chosen development policies. Examples include:
  - reflecting and operationalizing special and differential treatment for developing countries in international trade agreements and negotiations so that they can explore sustainable trade policies;
  - prohibiting unilateral trade protectionism, including CBAMs, as environmental or climate change response measures;
  - ensuring fairer treatment for developing country subsidies that support diversification into climate-adapted industrial, energy and other economic sectors;
  - having a "peace clause" on engaging in dispute settlement (including in the World Trade Organization) concerning trade-related environmental measures of developing countries to encourage them to adopt such measures;
  - ensuring that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is made operational through the effective implementation of the provisions of both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement; promoting transfers of environmentally sound and climate change-related technologies and know-how to developing countries under conditions that support longer-term domestic technology development, including providing intellectual property rights waivers or flexibilities with respect to such technologies;
  - providing adequate financial support to developing countries for climate change actions, sustainable development and economic diversification, including increased need-based and demand-driven climate financing under the multilateral climate change regime; liquidity injections through reallocating and issuing new Special Drawing Rights by the International Monetary Fund to developing countries; cancelling developing countries' sovereign external debt; supporting and adopting countercyclical fiscal stimulus policies and avoiding the imposition of austerity measures as policy conditionalities on developing countries; global and national regulation of financial trading transactions to limit speculation and prevent financial instability; developing multilateral macroeconomic and financial surveillance mechanisms under the United Nations; and avoiding "green" conditionalities on the provision of financial support to developing countries;
  - engaging in multilateral policy discussions on equity-oriented and rights-based approaches to economic and social development considering the environmental and climate crises.

References

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2021. "A European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Implications for Developing Countries." Geneva: UNCTAD.

The role of states in shaping equitable and sustainable economies

Mariana Mazzucato
Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value, University College London; Founding Director, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose
@MazzucatoM

Over the past half-century, the efficient operation of the market for the pursuit of private profit has been allowed to run roughshod over any notion of the public good. In this neoliberal era, the state has been limited to reactively fixing or correcting market failures rather than proactively shaping or creating markets. Neoliberal discourse disparaged industrial strategies aimed at "picking winners" and restricted state interventions to at most "levelling the playing field" to ensure only the most competitive would win … But where has that gotten us?

It is now abundantly clear that this experiment has only exacerbated damaging inequalities in life chances, capabilities and power between people, both *within* and *between* countries—not least the United Kingdom, which now contains regional disparities, in GDP per capita, as wide as the gap between the richest and poorest in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a whole.[1] No less obvious is a parallel inequality in power between the state and the corporation, as platform corporations outcompete governments to define the very terms of platform capitalism.[2]

The dominance of the private over the public in the way we conceive of and organize markets for the creation and distribution of value has all but blinded and paralysed society as a collective actor. This is evident in states' attempts to respond effectively and equitably to the Covid-19 pandemic.[3] For example, despite massive public investments that successfully accelerated vaccine research and development, this innovation was not properly governed for the common good, leading to significant global inequities in access to vaccines that have undermined their positive impact.[4] State capacities have been hollowed out, with governments avoiding active market shaping, outsourcing key governmental functions and fixating on balancing budgets through value-for-money targets blind to real public value.

If we are to genuinely *build back better*—the aim of so many post-pandemic plans, from the European Union's to the OECD's[5]—this must mean building back *smarter* with renewed dynamic capabilities for foresight and vision built into the system from the outset. The state needs to step up as the visionary coordinator of societal and ecological transformation—with an eye on democratic participation in, and innovative responses and flexible adaptation to, complex change.

Any new eco-social contract must be founded upon a new approach to economic theory and practice that rejuvenates the role of the state. Such a goal is at the heart of a *mission-oriented* approach to policy making.[6] This entails a new form of public–private partnership in which the state partners with private and civic actors not to socialize risks and privatize rewards, as happens all too often, but rather to engage *all* actors in the economy—government agencies, corporations, small businesses, social enterprises, civic institutions, charities and citizen groups—to work together toward the realization of *common goals*. The value created in the process, through positive spillovers and multipliers—for instance, the innovations and spin-offs from the NASA Apollo space programme—need to be fairly distributed between partners and reinvested in further innovation.

These common goals—or *missions*—would be determined by democratic deliberation inside and outside formal government through, inter alia, elected representatives, directly democratic digital platforms, participatory budgeting, community

consultations, citizen assemblies and neighbourhood forums. Through this deliberative process of mission making, a vision and public purpose is outlined to act as a shared horizon toward which all actors can direct their energies.

Mission making begins by asking the question "what is the problem we want to solve?", framed as a goal to be achieved through investments in sectors and collaborations within individual projects. EU innovation policy is already beginning to use a similar approach, specifically in the Horizon programme.[7] Five mission areas were selected by the European Commission: (i) adaptation to climate change; (ii) prevention of and solutions to cancer; (iii) healthy oceans, seas and coastal and inland waters; (iv) carbon-neutral and smart cities; and (v) soil health and food. These missions map neatly onto five of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this way, the SDGs can be mobilized as the navigational stars guiding and illuminating mission maps.

Fundamental to delivering a successful mission is setting a clear direction, with targeted, measurable and time-bound goals amenable to reflexive evaluation and continual improvement through experimental trial and error. The mission-led policy model can be summed up with the acronym ROAR: setting a *Route and direction* of change; building a decentralized network of willing *Organizations* to form mutually beneficial collaborations; evaluating their impacts through *Assessment* that can capture positive spillovers, multiplier effects and feedback loops; and sharing *Risks and rewards* fairly between public, private and civic partners through a renewed social contract.[8]

For missions to really *ROAR*, the institutional machinery of the state will have to be re-engineered to gear legal, fiscal and regulatory tools toward stimulating and directing innovation across sectors. No longer will the state act to level the playing field; it will rather redesign the rules of the game. The aim is not to fix failures in otherwise functioning markets; it is to transform problematic markets—for example, carbon-intensive industries—and foster new, alternative markets, such as for green energy and circular production, through public investment in research and development, as well as patient capital pipelines for enterprise incubation (longer-term finance suited to start-ups that focus on social value over financial return). This crowds in private investments to new and nascent markets that create public value, while crowding out old industries that produce little public value or that contribute to problems.

> **"The dominance of the private over the public in the way we conceive of and organize markets for the creation and distribution of value has all but blinded and paralysed society as a collective actor. … State capacities have been hollowed out, with governments avoiding active market shaping, outsourcing key governmental functions and fixating on balancing budgets through value-for-money targets blind to real public value."**

Such a mission-oriented, entrepreneurial state is engaged not in a strategy of picking winners but rather one of partnering with the *willing*—that is, supporting those actors and agencies that are capable and committed to finding solutions to wicked problems.[9] This means seeing government not as lender of last resort but as *investor of first resort*. The state is thus engaged in the public support, subsidy and incubation of innovation *ecosystems* whose

development is essential to meeting a mission, and in shaping an economy that is geared toward producing public value rather than maximizing profit.

There is growing evidence that focusing on visionary missions that motivate diverse actors around ambitious common goals is far more conducive to producing positive spillovers, spin-off innovations and unforeseen multiplier effects than focusing on more immediate metrics and instrumental targets such as job creation and business start-ups, as in conventional economic policy. NASA's Apollo mission led to multiple innovations and generated massive employment gains and cooperative capabilities across diverse sectors, yet it only ever had its sights set on the singular objective of "putting a man on the moon," as John F. Kennedy famously put it.[10] When the state keeps its eyes fixed firmly on the prize of achieving clear public value objectives, commercial benefits tend to be won, too—but not vice versa.

Key in all this is the state's relationship to risk. Rather than putting all its eggs in one basket by picking a particular company, technology or sector to support while forgoing any public stake in its future success—as has been the model for far too long—an *entrepreneurial state* acts more like a venture capitalist to structure its investments as a portfolio, cross-subsidizing any losses with gains and reinvesting surpluses in further rounds of innovation.[11] It is vital that the state takes a more direct and considerable stake in the companies and patents in which it invests—through, for instance, equity shares or future revenue participation agreements—to transform shareholder capitalism into *stakeholder* capitalism.

At the centre of this new political economy of stakeholder capitalism are various institutional innovations that ensure value is more equitably distributed as well as sustainably created. State investment banks can provide the much-needed patient capital—whether grants or low-interest loans—to incubate innovation ecosystems while taking a non-controlling equity stake and distributing dividends for public value. State dividends can be endowed in a "public-wealth fund"[12] to provide a citizens' dividend or universal basic income, services and infrastructure to effectively end poverty and dramatically reduce inequalities.

Such innovations reimagine value distribution from *re*distribution *ex post* to *pre*-distribution *ex ante*. These are just a few of the new or recently rediscovered ideas for radically reforming capitalism, a mode of production that at the very least needs urgent reorienting around missions with public value at their heart.

Endnotes

1 McCann 2016.
2 Srnicek 2016; Zuboff 2019.
3 Tooze 2021.
4 WHO Council on the Economics of Health for All 2021.
5 OECD 2020.
6 Mazzucato 2021.
7 Mazzucato 2018.
8 See Mazzucato et al. (2020).
9 Mazzucato 2013.
10 Mazzucato 2021.
11 Mazzucato 2021.
12 Mazzucato 2021.

References

Mazzucato, Mariana. 2013. *The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths*. London: Anthem Press.

Mazzucato, Mariana. 2018. *Mission-Oriented Research & Innovation in the European Union MISSIONS: A Problem-Solving Approach to Fuel Innovation-Led Growth*. Brussels: European Commission.

Mazzucato, Mariana. 2021. *Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism*. London: Allen Lane.

Mazzucato, Mariana, Rainer Kattel and Josh Ryan-Collins. 2020. "Challenge-Driven Innovation Policy: Towards a New Policy Toolkit." *Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade*, 20(2):421–437.

McCann, Phillip. 2016. *The UK Regional-National Economic Problem: Geography, Globalisation and Governance*. London: Routledge.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2020. *Building Back Better: A Sustainable, Resilient Recovery after COVID-19*. Paris: OECD.

Srnicek, Nick. 2016. *Platform Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tooze, Adam. 2021. *Shutdown: How Covid Shook the World's Economy*. London: Allen Lane.

WHO (World Health Organization) Council on the Economics of Health for All. 2021. *Governing Health Innovation for the Common Good*. Geneva: WHO.

Zuboff, Shoshana. 2019. *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for the Future at the New Frontier Of Power*. London: Profile Books.

People's pathways to climate justice

Kumi Naidoo
Senior Advisor for the Community Arts Network (CAN); Special Advisor to the Green Economy Coalition; Professor of Practice, Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University; Global Ambassador, Africans Rising for Justice, Peace and Dignity; Visiting Fellow, Oxford University and Honorary Fellow, Magdalen College
@kuminaidoo

Ordinary people should be front and centre in developing green climate policies. This is critically necessary if we are to face up to the inequality in our society and address climate change. We also have to acknowledge the injustices of the past and move forward to create a new social contract for people and the planet. People have a range of resources and creative potential to influence the process: as voters, as wealth owners, as consumers, as citizens and as holders of knowledge. While such a proposal might be radical in that it suggests an overhaul, if not outright overthrow, of our current systems, I urge you to consider people's inherent power as a tool to address the ingrained social and economic inequality in our societies and build a new planet-friendly social contract.

If we're honest with ourselves, the majority of our current governments and businesses, at best, have paid lip service to the imminent threat of climate change and, at worst, have continued to act in ways that take us closer to the climate precipice. With climate change we are running against a clock that is counting down, and we cannot rely on governments or businesses alone if we are to address soaring inequality and mitigate climate change. It is the majority that builds the foundation of the societal pyramid, and governments need to be pushed into action from the bottom up. In order to address inequality and build a new eco-social contract, people should organize themselves to take a range of actions based on their skills and interests, from planting more trees and recycling consumer product waste, to more complex collective actions such as setting up community-owned renewable energy initiatives. In short, we will need to take private action for public good with or without government support if we are to secure our children's future.

Activism is generally focused on addressing what people lack and their repression, exclusion, disempowerment and marginalization. However, we also need to focus on what people do have and what they can do to address inequality and build a new eco-social contract.

First, people are agents of change as free-thinking individuals, with the ability to make a difference in their own and fellow human beings' lives. People have power as enforcers of transparency and accountability, both individually and through social movements, NGOs, trade unions and other organizations. In this way, people have the power to interrogate governments' local and national energy plans, for example, and the progress toward meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, and generally to hold our leaders to account for the actions they promise and need to deliver.

Second, people have power through their individual and collective creative abilities and participation. Western colonial actions over a long period have decimated the earth's ecological integrity and biodiversity and, in the process, have created one of the most unequal realities imaginable. Indigenous wisdom and knowledge, including how to live in a mutually beneficial relationship with nature and sacred teachings about eschewing materialism, should be what we lift up right now, as they are a critical part of the solution to our climate disaster.

People also have power as shapers of values, ethics and beliefs. I believe that one of the reasons we are failing to address inequality or the climate catastrophe is that activism has a disproportionate focus on the repressive state apparatus, such as the military, police and legal system. However, I

“With climate change we are running against a clock that is counting down, and we cannot rely on governments or businesses alone if we are to address soaring inequality and mitigate climate change. It is the majority that builds the foundation of the societal pyramid, and governments need to be pushed into action from the bottom up.”

submit that the biggest threat we face is from the fascist-leaning, climate-denying politicians, using the ideological state apparatus available to them—the framework for education and religion, the basis of social norms and the media in all its diversity. Significant facets of activism are disconnected from the prevailing needs of people, who have resorted to trusting those who reflect their culture and values, however ugly these might be.

Third, we overlook our wealth. Many people hold bank accounts even if they don’t have much money in them, and that gives them power. People have power as holders of insurance policies and as owners of capital and assets. Whether you have USD 5 or USD 5,000,000 in the bank, if you go to your bank and say, “we do not want you to invest in the destruction of our children’s future by funding fossil fuel projects,” this could bring about substantial change. In 2015, for example, campaigners were able to get every bank in Australia to agree to refuse to fund one of the largest coal mines yet proposed, even though it had the backing of the government. The banks were persuaded not to lend because ordinary account holders picketed until the banks declared that they would not support the mine.

Lastly, people have power as consumers of energy, food, transport, television shows, clothing and more. Most multinationals and other big businesses must acknowledge that they have likely committed multiple moral transgressions in their single-minded pursuit of profit, which has justified inhuman and unecological behaviour in so many parts of the world. Now is the time for them to do the right thing to reverse these transgressions rather than simply greenwashing their actions with slick public relations moves. We can harness this power to show and say to the business community that we will stop buying products and services that destroy the planet. We must also demand products and services that help combat the climate crisis so that companies are forced to change (or go out of business). As a child activist in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, I learned that consumer boycott campaigns can have direct material results. People have an opportunity to work collectively to address inequality and build a new eco-social contract. Failure to do so will leave future generations with an uncertain and potentially horrific future.

We, the people, our elected governments and business must realign our food, our energy, our transport and our primary economic system to be far more equitable to human beings and gentle on the earth itself. Travelling this challenging though exciting path requires that we build a new eco-social contract that balances sustainability and equity. As citizens and individuals, we have the only real power to safeguard our planet and our children’s future. This brave and potentially beautiful new world will require the highest level of moral courage yet, from all of us.

Figure S.1 People’s pathways to climate justice



Source: Author.