

A New Way Forward: Pathways for Social, Economic and Environmental Justice

Establishing a new eco-social contract to overcome inequalities and address multiple crises and the root causes of unsustainable development requires that we change our mindset, rethink priorities and move away from a dominant focus on growth and profits. A new eco-social contract needs to be grounded in integrated approaches for economic, social, climate and gender justice. Such a contract would rein in hyperglobalization and financialized capitalism; connect the spheres of production and reproduction through establishing a caring economy in ways that impede the exploitation of people and the planet; and reinvigorate a transformative social turn based on universal social policies, decent work and a rights-based approach. Pathways toward a new eco-social contract can be built on a new development model consisting of three key pillars: alternative economic approaches that centre environmental and social justice and rebalance state–market–society–nature relations, transformative social policies based on a fair fiscal contract, and reformed and strengthened multilateralism and solidarities.

What is needed to move this agenda forward and secure our common future is a combination of progressive leadership that goes beyond elite preferences and is inspired by the common good and public interest, together with grassroots pressure from below by progressive social movements and civil society, supported by multilateral organizations and frameworks.

1. A New Development Model



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The combination of multiple crises and the impact of Covid-19 on poverty, inequality and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has increased the urgency for political action. If we want to harness crisis as an opportunity for change, the time to act is now. This chapter is about the way forward, presenting a new development approach that promotes social, economic and environmental justice, reduces inequality and addresses economic, social, environmental and political crisis drivers. This model, vital for building a new eco-social contract, is grounded in an integrated approach for social, climate and gender justice and consists of three pillars which are mutually reinforcing: alternative economic approaches that centre environmental and social justice and rebalance state-market-society-nature relations, transformative social policies underpinned by a fair fiscal contract, and reformed and strengthened multilateralism and solidarities.

When designing new economic policies, policy makers need to recognize the value of ecosystem integrity and natural resources and minimize adverse consequences of economic activity for the environment. Such an alternative approach would create a contract for nature and future generations and facilitate a transition toward sustainable economies. Several proposals of new economic models that encompass this new vision, including alternative economic approaches, are discussed in this chapter:

Different actors, including governments, trade unions and international organizations, are proposing a Green New Deal (GND) and are lobbying for a just transition approach to ensure vulnerable groups do not bear the brunt of the costs of transitioning to a greened world. Business actors are increasingly active in seeking ways to incorporate environmental, social and governance concerns into their operations. Overarching economic policy concerns are related to the question of how to best create an economy that is stable, sustainable and dynamic, creates decent and productive employment, and is conducive to innovations and technological progress that help to tackle the big challenges of our times, while minimizing incentives for negative behaviours such as corruption or tax abuse. The current economic policy environment tends to favour powerful economic actors such as multinational corporations

(MNCs) and big business to the detriment of smaller entities, some of which are operating based on greater environmental sustainability and democratic governance. The state's role has often been reduced to fixing so-called market failures and providing an enabling environment for investors. In the context of globalization, this has often meant the liberalization and deregulation of the market, monetary stabilization policies and socializing investment risks of for-profit enterprises, which allows them to rake in huge profits without paying the costs related to their operations.¹ To make our economies more inclusive, sustainable and productive, it is imperative to rethink and retrofit the role of the state in economic development.² This would involve changing relations between states and markets, better governance of global value chains (GVCs) and new relationships between market actors and communities, embedding economic activities back into social and territorial contexts that are more conducive to inclusiveness and sustainability.

Social and solidarity economy (SSE) is an alternative economic approach which meets these requirements. By institutionalizing collective action, and by re-embedding the economy into society and promoting forms of production, exchange and consumption that protect both people and the planet, it aims to realize emancipatory purposes within economic spheres and the wider political economy.³ By facilitating environmentally and socially sustainable production, exchange and consumption, SSE recentres the commons and strikes a new equilibrium between the economy and society to ensure that everyone has what they need to live well, the essence of a new eco-social contract (see Spotlight by Guy Standing).⁴ As this chapter will show, appropriate legal frameworks and public policies are critical to promote SSE and maximize its potential to make economies and societies more sustainable.

Alternative economies and new economic relations need to go hand in hand with transformative social policies. These have a particular role in redistributing unpaid care work in society and supporting social reproduction, tying together these spheres that have been separated, which has led us into the current crisis scenario (see chapter 2). Social policy is also highly important for stabilizing the economy through so-called automatic stabilizers (when the economy contracts in a downturn, tax payments decrease and transfer payments increase, and vice versa during booms), for production through investing in healthy and educated workers and investors, and in terms of redistributing market income to increase equality, with positive impacts on growth and poverty reduction (as shown in chapter 2). Social insurance and assistance programmes protect people against lifecycle and market risks and are key instruments to cushion the impacts of crises, shocks and humanitarian emergencies.

We need to reinvent ideas around care and care ethics and how care work and care services are valued in market and non-market spheres. Care is a central component in every social contract, constituting both a right and a responsibility.⁵ Care needs to be at the centre of a new economic and social model. Global trends such as ageing and the Covid-19 pandemic have demonstrated that we might be at a tipping point of a care crisis (see chapter 2). To curb this development, we need publicly funded care services including for health care. Further, we must improve the working conditions of care workers while creating a supportive context for unpaid caregivers through policies that increase access to social services and social protection and facilitate the combination of paid and unpaid work. Reforming the care economy is an essential step toward a new gender contract grounded in justice (see Spotlight by Marta Lamas). It also requires changes in social norms and a redistribution of unpaid care, domestic and community work between men and women.

Transformative social policies, as opposed to residual or targeted social policies, are based on institutionalized rights and provide universal coverage for all and across the life course. They include income transfers, essential social services such as health and education and care services as well as labour market policies promoting productive employment and decent work (chapter 3).⁶ If well designed and implemented, they can address intersectional inequalities, social exclusion and

stratification while creating a stronger sense of citizenship and solidarity. Supporting marginalized and vulnerable groups can be achieved through affirmative action, awareness raising and education, and measures to minimize discrimination and bias in policy implementation.⁷ They include labour market policies that promote workers' rights and decent wages, while also expanding workers' capabilities to flourish in their professional life and fostering their capacities to adapt to changing economic environments. Social policies need to be financed through progressive and sustainable instruments, based on a fair fiscal contract, guaranteeing both the sustainability of financing and the reduction of inequalities and negative social and environmental impacts.⁸ Transformative social policies can constitute the cornerstone of a new eco-social contract that overcomes many of the limitations discussed in previous chapters.

Finally, the current situation of multiple crises and instability has challenged our system of global governance, multilateralism and international solidarity. Diverse global compacts are under threat or falling behind schedule, from the SDGs to international commitments to address climate change and natural disasters, to attempts to find collaborative solutions to international migration and displacement, to efforts to address the global Covid-19 pandemic and geopolitical crises and conflicts.⁹ Governments are turning inward and nationalist, moving away from multilateralism and questioning the value of global cooperation and solidarity. On the other side of the spectrum, calls are getting louder to strengthen rules and regulations that would re-embed the global economy into social and ecological norms, to decolonize global governance and increase the weight of the global South in international relations and the global economy, to empower civil society's



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voice and impact in multilateralism, and to foster solidarity and new values.

In sum, creating an economy and society that cares and thrives requires us to rethink priorities, to move away from an exclusive focus on growth and profits, and to change institutions, policies and behaviours that negatively impact our economy, environment and social relations, at national and global levels. In what follows we discuss evidence-based policy proposals that can serve as a basis for concrete reforms to drive an eco-social turn. The new sustainable development model would not only be more resilient toward crises but would also be much more inclusive, egalitarian and in harmony with nature than current ones, moving toward the principles of a new eco-social contract set out in chapter 4.

Chapter key messages

ONE

We need a new development model for social and climate justice. Implementing the vision of a new eco-social contract will require an integrated approach consisting of three pillars that are mutually reinforcing: alternative economic approaches that centre environmental and social justice and rebalance relations between the state, society, markets and nature; transformative social policies financed by a fair fiscal contract; and strengthened multilateralism and solidarities.



TWO

Alternative economic approaches—such as social and solidarity economy, progressive proposals for a Green New Deal and just transition strategies—**hold the promise to make our economies more sustainable and equitable.** To achieve this transformation, states need to play an active developmental role and expand their policy space, particularly in the global South.



THREE

Transformative social policies are key tenets of a new eco-social contract. They include universal social protection and social services, integrated care systems and labour market policies fostering decent work and productive employment. They need to be based on a fair fiscal compact where rich people pay relatively more than poor people while promoting innovative financing instruments that support the transition to sustainability.



FOUR

Progress toward transformation at regional, national and local levels can be strengthened through a reimagined multilateral system and solidarities.

International reform and regulation to support transformative change is needed in multiple areas: curbing tax competition and evasion; improving social and environmental standards along global value chains; reversing the concentration of economic and political power of the global business elite; and strengthening global redistribution and cooperation. Power asymmetries in multilateralism need to be rebalanced by empowering the global South and civil society actors.



FIVE

Transformative change can be supported by a new narrative, one that abandons the myths of self-correcting markets, endlessly renewable natural resources and “trickle-down” development. Such an approach must address structural crisis drivers, entrenched inequalities and internal contradictions associated with neoliberal hyperglobalization. Progressive leaders, active citizens and social movements need to join forces to achieve a truly inclusive vision of climate and social justice.



The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 presents alternative economic approaches for inclusive and sustainable development; section 3 focuses on transformative social policy and a fair fiscal contract; section 4 discusses approaches to strengthen international solidarities and reform the multilateral system; and section 5 presents an overview of policies for addressing inequalities and the political pathways toward a new eco-social contract.

2. Alternative Economic Approaches for Inclusive and Sustainable Development

Neoliberal hyperglobalization and financialized capitalism have been identified throughout the report as driving forces for inequalities and crises—from economic boom and bust cycles to the care and climate crises. Critics of neoliberal economic policy approaches emphasize internal contradictions that have produced the recent crises and turned into a threat to capitalism itself. For instance, feminist economists have long highlighted contradictions leading to cyclical crisis episodes as well as to a long-term hollowing out of system resilience and a breakdown of the social contract, as analysed in chapters 1 and 2.¹⁰ These internal contradictions reflect an artificial division between a market-based sphere of production and a non-market sphere of social and environmental reproduction. This separation has resulted in a hierarchy where market activities are assigned economic value while the entire system makes use of non-market resources and activities that are not properly valued in monetary terms or in business calculations, or whose value (for example, of natural resources and global commons) is discounted to favour present generations over future ones.¹¹ This has important implications for the natural environment and people who deliver this work, mainly unpaid care providers—the majority of whom are women—but also informal or family workers and traditional or Indigenous communities.¹² These exploitative structures are supported by entrenched social, cultural and religious norms which establish a “natural” hierarchy of sorts, for example, of humans over nature, or men over women (see Spotlight by Marta Lamas).



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Importantly, this model deprived many countries in the global South of policy autonomy and instruments to foster labour-intensive structural change toward higher-productivity sectors, often locking countries into growth patterns based on extractive sectors and lower value-added production activities within GVCs. The neoliberal model and its key features of liberalization, austerity and debt-led growth, as well as the rent-seeking behaviour of large MNCs,¹³ diminished the possibilities of developing countries to construct democratic developmental welfare states and to achieve advanced human development outcomes.

Alternative economic approaches, such as GNDs, just transitions or SSE, are required, embedded in a new global architecture governing trade, finance, investments, climate and human mobility. Economic policies need to respond to technological and demographic change and attend to social and environmental concerns. Rather than going through the same stages and repeating the mistakes of today’s industrialized countries through catching up, countries in the global South are well advised to leapfrog into more sustainable development models.¹⁴



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Alternative economic approaches need to overcome one of the key contradictions we have laid out in this report: the exploitation of people and planet and growing inequalities that erode the social contract and push people behind. They also have to provide a counter-narrative to the belief that free markets and the private sector on their own can deliver sustainable growth and development.¹⁵ And they need to put key relationships—between states and markets, between different market actors and along GVCs, and locally between markets and communities—on a new footing. To achieve this goal, we need to rein in inequality drivers such as neoliberal globalization and financialization (see chapters 2 and 3) and promote sustainable consumption and production patterns through transforming economic policies and institutions. A range of policies such as fiscal policies, industrial policies, credit policies, financial regulation and social policies, as well as international trade and investment policies and regulation of global financial markets, can be mobilized to this end.

The current unsustainable development approach can be put onto a more transformative pathway if policy makers support alternative economic models to address climate change, agreeing on a progressive

GND and promoting just transitions, by changing economic relations and rethinking the role of the state, and by investing in and strengthening social and solidarity economies.

2.1 Beyond green economy: Alternative economic models for addressing climate change

To transform our system, which is defined by inequality and unsustainability, we need a new global paradigm of environmental economics. In recent decades, calls for a green economy approach have taken centre stage in this debate, which entails decoupling economic growth from environmental impact. This approach, however, falls short in a number of ways. First, rather than making consumption patterns more sustainable, it aims to improve the efficiency and productivity of production through technological innovation, which has led to relative, but not to absolute, decoupling.¹⁶ Many have pointed out the ways in which this attention to green growth is not only insufficient to reduce global warming at the necessary rate¹⁷ but also disregards the social dimensions of climate change

The focus of economic policy needs to shift from a narrow focus on market production and exchange—specifically the growth of gross domestic product—to a broader goal of social provisioning that redefines the economy to include both market and non-market production and processes.

– James Heintz

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responses and in turn creates a “triple injustice” that exacerbates negative social and distributional consequences for already disadvantaged groups, further compounds existing inequalities, violates human rights and even produces unintended environmental consequences.¹⁸

Such efforts often lack integrative and inclusive solutions that address not only the risks faced by these communities, but also the inequalities and social vulnerabilities at their root. Transitions to green energy or cleaner production systems that introduce new regulations without social protection systems in place often lead to loss of livelihood, as shown in the example of Jeepney (bus) drivers in the Philippines unable to comply with new legislation to reduce transport emissions.¹⁹ Further, these measures often offload the costs associated with mitigation onto low-income groups, which can lead to deeper impoverishment and, as has been seen in the case of the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) movement in France, widespread social unrest, demonstrating that climate issues are not technocratic but are highly political and linked with social justice concerns.²⁰

Second, green economy relies on what can be understood as the “economization of the climate protection,”²¹ a process of assigning market value to it in a way that will protect it from overexploitation, with a heavy reliance on market instruments.²² However, the “selling nature to save it” approach²³ does not address the structural causes of climate change and unsustainable practices as it allows those who can afford it “an easy way out,” in effect shifting the burden of mitigating climate change to those who cannot afford to offset their emissions (see Spotlight by Vicente Paolo Yu).²⁴ Further, this financialization of nature disregards its social context and wholly divorces it from its function as part of the commons. This approach only views nature through the same neoliberal logic that has led us to this moment, characterized by privatization, appropriation and extraction. Finally, it fails to address the underlying systemic causes of climate change, namely the current economic system oriented toward continuous growth for profit with no regard for planetary boundaries. In this financialized world, actors operating in global financial markets show little accountability to governments, disempowering states and diminishing their capacity to protect their citizens and their natural environment.²⁵

It becomes clear that green economy approaches that rely mostly on technological fixes to reduce the environmental impact of current systems will not be sufficient and can only be a first step. They would need to be discussed at the community level to ensure they respond to the needs of local populations and be complemented by social and redistributive policies offsetting potentially negative impacts on low-income groups. However, they are unlikely to address root causes of climate change and environmental destruction.²⁶ New approaches and policy alternatives have recently been developed by different actors, some of which, depending on concrete design and scope of the policies, may hold transformative potential by addressing root causes of unsustainable practices.

2.2 A Green New Deal for the global North and South

Many progressive thinkers have rallied behind a plan termed the Green New Deal which has made its way into political discourse in Europe and the United States, but which also has recognized potential for the global South if properly designed and financed (see Spotlight Vicente Paolo Yu). Unlike the green economy approach, the GND calls for a transformation of our economic system on a structural level, going beyond behavioural, community and technological change and addressing the inequalities that block change.²⁷ The GND proposal put forward by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its 2019 *Trade and Development Report* combines environmental recovery, financial stability and economic justice through massive public investments in decarbonizing energy, transport and food systems while guaranteeing jobs for displaced workers and supporting low-carbon growth paths in developing countries through the transfer of appropriate technologies and sufficient financial resources. The proposal from Ian Gough (2017, 2021) and international trade unions, targeted at richer countries but also relevant for global discussions, advocates combining the GND with a rethinking of the welfare state, investing in employment, fair wages and income guarantees as well as universal basic services including housing, adult and social care, basic transport services and digital access. Progressive GND proposals are aimed in particular at radically shifting the financial sector to rein in the power of the super-rich and stop the

A key to success of the multilateral effort to combat climate change, therefore, is ensuring that the economic and social consequences of climate change response measures, such as the EU Green Deal, are addressed equitably and do not adversely affect developing countries.

– *Vicente Paolo B. Yu III*
Visiting Fellow, UNRISD

gross accumulation of wealth.²⁸ Their vision calls to mind Kate Raworth’s concept of a doughnut, the space between the boundaries of human well-being and environmental limits in which social and environmental objectives are aligned.²⁹

However, the extent to which a GND approach can lead to transformative change will depend on how it is implemented, what the country’s development strategy looks like and what incentives are provided by global governance. Indeed, many of the reforms that were promised in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 were not implemented, while the climate crisis was increasingly addressed by green neoliberal solutions.³⁰ Successfully implementing a global GND will require international cooperation and a rethinking of multilateral institutions to ensure the rules work to promote social, economic and environmental justice and are free from external political pressures (see section 4).³¹ Further, whether the GND, which so far has mainly been discussed in the global North, is also a good deal for the global South depends on a variety of factors (see Spotlight Vicente Paolo Yu). For developing countries, environmentally sustainable development requires an integrated approach to sustainable development and poverty eradication, consistent with the 1992 Rio Principles and framework, with

three interrelated pillars—environmental protection, economic development and social development—as well as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, placing greater responsibilities, in particular for mitigation and financial support for developing countries, on countries in the global North. However, the particular interests of the global South are often not taken into account. Some of the proposals included in green transition proposals in the European Union and the United States bear the risk of unilateral trade protectionism, such as carbon-based border adjustment measures, which could have considerable spill-over effects on developing countries which rely heavily on carbon-intensive exports, decreasing growth while further increasing inequalities between countries.³² A key to success in combating climate change, therefore, is to ensure that the economic and social consequences of climate change policies such as the EU or US green deals are addressed equitably and do not adversely affect developing countries while respecting principles of interdependence and mutual prosperity.

Major controversies in the debate around a GND have also arisen with regard to the dominant growth paradigm. Some proponents of the GND argue in favour of promoting economic growth to finance, for example, the energy transition. This approach is based on research that has shown that advances in environmental and climate policies as well as technological innovations have led to efficiency gains and a relative decoupling of GDP and resource use. However, these policies have not achieved progress in minimizing material consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the aggregate level.³³ Against this backdrop, we see an emerging debate on degrowth and post-growth development models (box 5.1),³⁴ pushing for “an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of well-being”³⁵ by reducing resource-intensive activities, both production and consumption, that make up a large share of GDP.³⁶ Proponents of this approach consider that conventional responses to climate change, especially green economy approaches and those that rely mainly on technological innovations, are not adequately considering problems associated with growth, overconsumption and affluence.³⁷ Finally, GND proposals such as the European Green New Deal (EGND) have been criticized by feminist groups for being largely gender-blind and failing to centralize care and well-being in the

framework. Recommendations to make the EGND gender transformative while also delivering better on equality and climate objectives include collecting gender-disaggregated data, systematic gender budgeting, ex-ante gender impact assessments and improved strategies to ensure parity in political representation and climate negotiations.³⁸ Similar proposals are made by the Feminist Green New Deal coalition with regard to the GND proposed for the United States, asking for “structural reforms to address the intersectional crises of care and climate.”³⁹ At the global level, the coalition suggests wide-ranging reforms that challenge the current paradigm of the global economy, reform the international financial architecture, redress power asymmetries and decolonize policy and knowledge.⁴⁰

Other positive proposals such as new ways to measure GDP as well as alternative measures on economic progress⁴¹ or well-being economics,⁴² now applied by various governments, for example, New Zealand and Finland, move in a similar direction—toward alternative economic systems that strike a balance between economy, society and the environment, preserving the natural environment and ensuring its sustainable use, and distributing resources more equally.⁴³ In a similar vein, a “rights-based economy” is based on a holistic understanding of human well-being and is supported by the widely agreed framework of values and obligations of human rights. It demands action to redistribute resources, remedy inequalities and rebalance power in our economies.⁴⁴

Box 5.1 The degrowth movement

Rooted in progressive environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s and debates around the *Limits to Growth*,^a degrowth (*décroissance*) emerged as a radical proposal to tackle the depletion and irreversible degradation of natural resources. Inspired by the work of the founding father of ecological economics, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, the degrowth idea gained considerable traction in two periods of crises. First, the 1973/1974 oil crisis opened up a space for questioning natural resource use and gave rise to more radical environmental movements challenging the mainstream development model and calling for degrowth and eco-development to stay within the earth’s carrying capacity. The end of the oil crisis and expanding neoliberalism, with the simultaneous institutionalization of environmental protection, sidelined the degrowth debates until the early 2000s when it reappeared in French public discourse. The 2008/2009 financial crisis and its aftermath then triggered a renewed proliferation of degrowth thinking throughout Europe.^b

Proponents of degrowth recognize the incompatibility of the growth paradigm with sustainability and development within planetary boundaries. Whereas green growth strategies rely on the idea of decoupling emissions and environmental impacts from economic growth, degrowth is based on the reality that this has at best happened in relative but not in absolute terms. While there are a few recent cases of absolute decoupling at the national level, those can be based on “offshoring” emissions to other countries, tend to occur during periods of low growth and are “far insufficient to address stringent climate targets.”^c Even the countries that have achieved absolute decoupling (at least for some of the years) are still emitting far more than what is compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement, “thus showing the limits of ‘green growth’ and growth paradigm.”^d

Degrowth, then, is a concept and political mobilizer that aims not to do less of the same, but to do something fundamentally and qualitatively different in order to secure human well-being and reduce inequalities while “[decreasing the] global carbon and material footprint, starting from the wealthy.”^e A movement of activists and researchers, degrowth rallies a pluriverse of visions, actions and strategies for a socially just, low-carbon future that are rooted in critiques of neoliberal globalization. Subject to passionate debate between different groups, degrowth and post-growth supporters can range all the way from eco-liberals at one extreme to anarchists at the other.^f As a result, degrowth proposals encompass a diverse range of solutions to reduce environmental impacts, redistribute income and wealth and transition to a convivial and participatory society.^g Among the most prominent ones are proposals to reduce and relocalize production and consumption, establish basic and maximum income schemes, reduce working hours and promote work and job sharing, and to change values and practices to strengthen local communities and promote sufficiency- rather than growth-oriented lifestyles.

Importantly, degrowth must not be equated to an economic downturn or recession. Instead, it aims to abolish the fixation on GDP and to pursue a systemic social and economic transformation consisting of both policy changes (for example, carbon taxes, abolishing fossil fuel subsidies) and lifestyle changes to tackle affluence and superfluous overconsumption.^h

^a Meadows et al. 1972; ^b Akbulut 2021; ^c Haberl et al. 2020:30; ^d Hubacek et al. 2021:9; ^e Kallis 2015; ^f Dale 2019; ^g Cosme et al. 2017;

^h Mastini et al. 2021; Wiedmann et al. 2020.



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Radically altering patterns of production and consumption and reversing the dominant normative hierarchy that places economic priorities over social and environmental ones requires a new societal consensus. In this report we propose to call this new consensus an eco-social contract and to use a variety of deliberative processes and inclusive, democratic decision making to create such a contract as a basis for a more egalitarian and democratic eco-social state and society (see chapter 4).⁴⁵

2.2.1 A just transition to a greener world

Justice and equity must form an integral part of the transition toward a low-carbon world if we are to tackle not only GHG emissions, but also inequalities and social injustices. The just transition approach in its different variations has emerged as a promising concept that seeks to address questions of fairness in the transition away from fossil fuels. Originating in the North American labour movement and strongly associated with struggles for occupational safety and health and improved workplace rights, it has since been taken up and mobilized by a range of different stakeholders, which has led both to growing popularity of the concept and to an increase in the variety of meanings associated with it.⁴⁶

While the role and voice of workers and their communities remain a central element of just transition debates, approaches and initiatives represent a diverse set of world views and objectives ranging from those that largely seek to preserve the existing political economy at one end of the spectrum to those that envision significantly different futures at the other.⁴⁷ Fossil fuel workers, and in particular coal miners, play a prominent role in the call for a just transition and illustrate the complexity of the transition challenge, which remains highly contested even in situations of relatively small numbers of affected workers. In Germany, for example, opposition to a hard coal exit in the Ruhr area remained strong and influential for decades despite the sector's economic decline and diminishing workforce. Coal mining is an important part of the regional identity and also a source of post-war prosperity and economic development. As a result, a coalition of business, politicians and trade unions managed to defend industry interests and preserve existing structures rather than proactively embrace a transition.⁴⁸ By the time the end of hard coal mining was decided, a huge share of employment had already been lost (32,800 workers at the end of 2007 compared with a peak of over 600,000 workers in 1957)⁴⁹ and a general trend toward more precarious work contracts and erosion of workplace rights and benefits in the German economy led to a lack of decent, quality jobs that miners could transition into. Despite sizeable public investments and support from the European Union, unemployment rates in the Ruhr area remain significantly higher than the German average (9.1 percent compared with 5.2 percent in October 2021).⁵⁰

The Ruhr example shows how difficult a proactive transition is even in contexts of high GDP, a diversified national economy, comparatively low levels of unemployment and a relatively small number of directly affected workers. Tackling the climate crisis as a whole will require much more comprehensive decarbonization and restructuring of the economy and will impact workers and communities in many different sectors such as transport, agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and health, both formal and informal. Addressing justice and equity is even more important in contexts of widespread inequality and poverty and where employment in extractive industries contributes a much more significant share to the overall labour

force and GDP. In South Africa, for example, overall high levels of unemployment, economic inequality and energy poverty as well as a large number of coal workers present a barrier to phaseout. Regional disparity in terms of the location of coal mines (and jobs), which are concentrated in the northeast, and the sites with the best renewable energy potential, which are concentrated in the southwest, adds to the struggle. Trade unions have mobilized against any job losses in the transition and opposed plans to expand renewables through further energy market liberalization and privatization,⁵¹ calling instead for a socially owned renewable energy sector, “a sector under public, community or collective ownership and designed to put people before profit.”⁵²

Calls for a different approach to just transition are generally growing louder. Civil society and climate justice organizations in particular often propose just transition projects and plans that envision fundamentally different futures, which are often rooted in solidarity economy thinking and tackle different dimensions of existing injustices and inequalities intersectionally. Cooperation Jackson, a network of worker cooperatives and supporting institutions in Mississippi, for example, aims to build up a vibrant, democratic solidarity economy that develops autonomous, self-reliant spaces of power locally while also engaging and pushing for political change at different levels of governance.⁵³ Cooperation Jackson’s approach to just transition

Box 5.2 Just transition in South Africa: Successes and challenges

South Africa is a prime example of the multidimensional challenges associated with balancing conflicting interests in the process of transitioning to cleaner energy in a just manner. The political economy of South Africa is dominated by the economically crucial Mineral Energy Complex, which is reliant on cheap electricity and cheap labour to generate profits for large corporations. Eskom—the vertically integrated state-owned electricity utility—distributes around 60 percent of all electricity in South Africa, mostly to energy-intensive industries that represent around 15 percent of all customers; the remaining 40 percent of electricity, for households and commercial users, is distributed by (and generates revenues for) municipal governments.^a Under the current pricing system, Eskom subsidized both large consumers—such as extractive industries—and smaller consumers, especially households in rural areas. Mineworkers also play an important role in shaping the political economy by exerting political pressure through well-organized unions such as the National Union of Mineworkers and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. More recently, environmental groups have organized campaigns highlighting the environmental and health impacts of coal, taking the South African government to court over their failure to tackle toxic levels of air pollution.^b

As the government has committed to pursue a just energy transition, all stakeholders are concerned about how this transition will be implemented, with the most complex question concerning potential job losses in the coal mining sector. In the process of implementing further market-oriented reforms, the government plans to unbundle and privatize Eskom, as well as support privately-owned independent renewable energy producers, especially Black-owned ones, an attempt to redress apartheid-era inequalities. Unions across South Africa are against privatization of the energy sector and are concerned about the ownership of energy production, as it directly affects their job security and access to affordable energy. Unions and municipalities call for “energy democracy,” that is, publicly owned renewable energy systems that provide affordable, clean and reliable access to electricity for all. Environmental groups advocate for the fastest route to decarbonizing energy and achieving clean energy systems. Mining unions view private renewable energy producers as a trojan horse for the privatization of the energy sector, which has sometimes pitted them against environmental groups.

Strategies for just energy transition must go beyond these conflicting interests, and be sensitive to the historical, racial, environmental and socio-economic inequalities in South Africa. From the environmental perspective, the just energy transition is ideally financed by making polluters pay. However, in the case of coal mining in South Africa, additional taxes on coal companies can lead to earlier-than-anticipated closure of less profitable mines, meaning that some miners will lose their jobs. While South Africa has a carbon tax in place, large tax exemptions for mining and energy companies reduce the effectiveness of the carbon tax.^c Making developed countries—the historic polluters—pay and finance the just energy transition is also a popular proposal, although it has proven to be challenging. However, increasing certainty around climate change coupled with increasing bottom-up pressure from activists is starting to show results; at the COP26 in 2021, the EU, France, Germany, the UK and the US committed to mobilize around USD 8.5 billion to accelerate South Africa’s transition away from coal.^d This will be instrumental in shutting coal plants promptly, as well as facilitating the early retirement of older coal miners, expediting South Africa’s just energy transition.

^a van Niekerk 2020; ^b Reuters 2021; ^c Pant et al. 2020; ^d European Commission 2021a.

Sources: Cock 2018; van Niekerk 2020.

is a transformative one that seeks to overcome oppression and a long history of racism and injustice by “radically shifting wealth and power, and overhauling how things are produced, distributed, consumed and recycled back into the natural resource systems that we depend on.”⁵⁴ In practice, this means actively building a community and ecosystem of interdependent cooperatives aiming to farm food locally, provide sustainable and affordable housing through collective landownership, generate renewable energy and promote a circular economy approach.

Finally, women’s advocacy groups are increasingly raising their voice to make sure that just transitions incorporate an intersectional, ecofeminist approach that ensures inclusive decision making and strengthens the care economy as a central part of just transition strategies.⁵⁵

2.3 A new role for the state

One important step toward more sustainable economies is to move away from the dominant narrative of self-regulating markets and private sector innovation and to rethink the role of the state in economic development. In practice, most states in the world are far from being laissez-faire states, regulating markets in one way or another. The question is not whether to regulate or not, but rather what type of market regulation and who benefits. Market intervention during neoliberal globalization has shifted from production-oriented interventions and social pacts typical for late-industrializing countries or so-called developmental states, toward “a state preoccupied with macroeconomic stability, property rights, and contract enforcement.”⁵⁶

In general, states have an important role to play in providing direction for private investment and for investing in infrastructure that supports sustainable development and economic transformation. State intervention is, for example, essential in relation to climate mitigation (reducing GHG) and adaptation (minimizing negative socioeconomic impacts).⁵⁷ In the global South, these objectives need to be combined with concerns for rising income, structural change and productivity, and addressing high levels of poverty and inequality. In this context, the model of a democratic developmental welfare state deploying purposeful actions and establishing developmental social contracts (between politicians, bureaucrats



One important step toward more sustainable economies is to move away from the dominant narrative of self-regulating markets and private sector innovation and to rethink the role of the state in economic development.

and key business sectors) as part of a long-term developmental vision remains relevant (see chapter 4).⁵⁸ More recently, this model has been upgraded to a green or climate-conscious developmental state, one that is proactively seeking possibilities to decarbonize the economy while reducing risks associated with climate change through economic diversification and resilience-building instead of applying conventional risk-management strategies based on pricing and market assessment techniques (see section 2.3.2).⁵⁹

Contrary to this vision of a proactive, developmental state, during neoliberal globalization, policy has focused on creating an enabling environment for the private sector. The role of the state was reduced to reactively correcting market failures rather than shaping and creating markets, and to policies that have focused on value-for-money targets but were blind to real public value (see Spotlight by Mariana Mazzucato). Frequently profits emerging from state support were privatized whereas production and employment gains in sectors supported by state policies remained insufficient, and governments socialized costs of private risk taking to stem systemic crises (see chapter 2).⁶⁰ In contrast, active entrepreneurial states⁶¹ redesign the rules of the game; they act as venture capitalists structuring investments as a portfolio, cross-subsidizing any losses with gains and reinvesting surpluses in further

Any new eco-social contract must be founded upon a new approach to economic theory and practice that rejuvenates the role of the state.

– Mariana Mazzucato
Professor, University College London

rounds of innovation. They do so by starting to identify key missions, ideally aligned with the SDGs, through deliberative processes with the participation of a broad group of stakeholders.⁶²

Moving toward this vision of a new and more proactive state role, however, requires a considerable amount of state capacity, resources and autonomy, conditions that have in the past been associated with developmental states in East Asia⁶³ but have only been replicated in some countries since then, for example, in Argentina, Brazil, China, Ethiopia and Rwanda, where growth strategies have involved centralizing rent management, strengthening political ties between government and domestic capitalists and adapting industrial policy and state-backed finance to create new competitive advantages.⁶⁴ What is important to note here is that high state capacity is not necessarily a precondition; in East Asia, it was developed alongside success in industrialization, rather than prior to it.⁶⁵ A second important issue is that developmental states should be democratic,⁶⁶ and, as mentioned above, become climate conscious, for example, by implementing green industrial policies (section 2.3.2) and just transition policies (section 2.2.1).

2.3.1 Regaining policy space

Establishing democratic, inclusive and climate-conscious developmental states has become more challenging in recent decades. Under neoliberal globalization, governments' ability to make use of the economic policy toolbox has been further constrained, in particular in the global South, as

monetary and exchange rate policies were often designed to appeal to international investors or to counteract adverse market reactions, while fiscal policies have frequently lost their countercyclical potential and succumbed to austerity pressures due to dependence on external financing and weak domestic financial systems. Regarding financing policies, global South governments continue to be dependent on volatile external flows with high associated costs given their weak domestic currencies. Finally, asymmetries in the international economy have led to high entry barriers for late industrializers into mature sectors and technologically dynamic activities, constraining the policy space for structural change and productive development.⁶⁷ Two factors have produced obstacles for developing countries seeking to absorb a maximum of (low-skilled) labour into high-productivity sectors: first, premature deindustrialization, driven largely by market liberalization, a reprimarization of economies during the period of the global commodity price boom, and the expansion of (low-skilled) labour-saving technologies; and second, the need to rely on capital-intensive, high-skilled technologies to be competitive in world markets.

A key goal for all countries, but in particular developing countries, is therefore to regain policy space to design and implement monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies that combine stability with incentives for investments and employment in order to promote stable eco-social contracts. Macroeconomic policies need to be geared toward providing sufficient stability to avoid unsustainable debt, currency devaluation, capital flight and erosion of incomes and savings through inflation. At the same time, productive investment can be facilitated through low and positive real interest rates, development finance channeled into strategic productive activities (for example, through public banks), competitive and stable real exchange rates, management of short-term capital flows and regulation of international mobility of financial capital. Financial systems need to be regulated in ways that favour accumulation and innovation instead of rent seeking and excessive speculation.⁶⁸

Economic policy, both macro and sector policies, needs to be concerned with providing incentives for just transitions toward sustainable economies. It should drive innovation and create dynamic competitive advantages by developing strategic



The recent Covid-19 pandemic was a telling example of how unequally policy space is distributed across global North and South.

industries and activities. Finally, it should aim to improve skills and knowledge production through investments in education, research and labour market policies.

A range of transformative policies and institutional reforms exist that can promote employment-intensive structural change and sustainability and help address diverse economic inequalities and their root causes, for example, industrial policies and state-led innovation policies that upgrade production and its public value,⁶⁹ support of employment-intensive sectors such as the care economy⁷⁰ and regulatory policies that guide consumption and production toward greater sustainability.⁷¹ In addition, macroeconomic policies require a new focus on aggregate demand and a pattern of growth that fosters decent work, productivity and high value-added economic activities while safeguarding ecosystem integrity and protection of natural resources. Policy reforms need to rein in hyperglobalization, curb financialization and equalize relations along GVCs. Policies should support a market constellation that results in better distributional outcomes, allocating a greater share of national output to labour in the form of decent work, and curb income concentration at the top. This would not only have positive effects on equality and inclusion but also reduce the amount of fiscal redistribution necessary to reach an acceptable level of income or consumption equality (see chapter 2). Policies to foster horizontal equality through, for example, anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action and quota systems need to complement these broader policies targeted at vertical inequalities.

The recent Covid-19 pandemic was a telling example of how unequally policy space is distributed across the global North and South (chapter 2). Access to vaccines, health infrastructure, social protection coverage and availability of financial resources to support the population and the economy was highly skewed toward the global North. The unequal capacity to finance large-scale fiscal stimulus packages between rich and poor countries and the question of who has benefited from fiscal stimulus (chapters 2 and 3), the impacts of the crisis on sovereign debt and inflation, and the role of regional and multilateral bodies has come to the fore. First of all, fiscal stimulus in the global South represents a tiny fraction of the money channeled into advanced economies (chapter 3 and figure 2.12). In addition, consequences of fiscal stimulus have been more difficult to manage in the case of developing countries. Expansionary fiscal policy—while important to stabilize aggregate demand in times of downturn, protecting the population and the economy—can lead to inflation when it meets supply constraints due to bottlenecks (such as the global supply chain problems that occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic) or full utilization of productive capacity.⁷² The situation has now become worse due to mounting geopolitical tensions related to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, with its economic repercussions on global markets, in particular energy, fertilizer and grain markets, producing supply shocks, inflation and downturns in market confidence. This could disrupt the current economic recovery and lead to stagflation scenarios, which are difficult to manage through conventional monetary and fiscal policies, as the oil price shocks in the 1970s showed.⁷³

Another consequence of fiscal stimulus can be rising debt. In response to the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic, extraordinary fiscal measures were implemented that helped mitigate the crisis, but they have also pushed up debt levels. In 2020, we observed the largest one-year debt surge since the Second World War, with global debt—both public and private—rising to USD 226 trillion.⁷⁴ Rising sovereign debt levels are particularly problematic for developing countries holding large amounts of external debt. This points to the need for a more comprehensive approach to tackling the foreign debt challenge in developing countries, for example, through a multilateral debt workout process, if we want to avoid future crisis and retrenchment

in public investment.⁷⁵ Finally, the allocation of stimulus spending has important impacts on future growth paths. During the Covid-19 pandemic, stimulus measures were meant to achieve economic, social and environmental goals. However, the “greening” of the recovery has been patchy.⁷⁶ An analysis of spending by leading economies, led by Oxford University’s Economic Recovery Project and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), finds that only 18 percent of announced recovery spending can be considered “green,” while only one-third of measures registered by the UNDP-UN Women Covid-19 Global Response Tracker had a clear gender focus, an example of how environmental and social concerns take a back seat in times of crisis.⁷⁷

2.3.2 Green industrial policy

Macroeconomic policies need to be aligned with production-oriented policies, such as industrial policies that support strategic sectors contributing to an economic transition, in terms of both sustainability and structural change.⁷⁸ Sectoral policies often target the manufacturing sector for its potential to create forward and backward linkages, formal employment and stable social contracts. Industrial policies have the objective to increase dynamic efficiency, innovation and learning processes that promote successive waves of structural change. They need to be supported by a range of macroeconomic policies such as competitive and stable real exchange rates as well as financing policies for long-term investments, implying a stronger role for development banks.⁷⁹ Industrial policies need to go hand in hand with efforts to overcome dualist structures in the economy, the division between a low-productivity informal economy and the formal economy, and with policies addressing challenges associated with natural resource-based sectors dominating economic structures in large parts of the global South.⁸⁰ Such an integrated approach is crucial for the distributional outcomes associated with industrial policies and structural change, as they can also result in further market concentration (box 5.3).

Success in promoting strategic industries through industrial policy is the result not so much of choosing a particular policy but of sticking to particular objectives conducive to industrial development, for example, the achievement of scale economies and the development of domestic productive capabilities,

and then deciding how to get there through applying a mix of instruments.⁸¹ Pragmatism, flexibility and enabling conditions were also seen as important ingredients for industrial catching-up in Asian countries. While some instruments used in industrial policy are no longer feasible in the context of globalization due to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules,⁸² for example, export subsidies or local content requirements for foreign direct investment (FDI), many others can still be used,⁸³ such as targeted subsidies for investment or skills development, tariffs, research and development (R&D) subsidies, or technology transfer requirements for FDI. GVCs, while increasing competition in final goods markets, also create opportunities for countries to specialize in intermediate goods and to help firms develop capabilities in quality control, abilities to coordinate R&D with buyer firms, and workers’ skills (as intermediate goods tend to be more skill intensive than final goods), among others.⁸⁴ Second, industrial policy implementation requires “embedded autonomy,”⁸⁵ which means having strong social ties and institutionalized channels of negotiation and communication between state and business, without business interests capturing the state.⁸⁶

Green industrial policies are proposed to support structural change that is simultaneously associated with productivity and employment creation, while also supporting the ecological transition



Given the slow pace in the growth of renewable energy and the continuous rise in global demand for fossil fuels and electricity, calls for greater state engagement in the energy transition, including through the option of public ownership, are growing louder.

Box 5.3 Industrial policy and Black Economic Empowerment In South Africa

Industrial policy can also play a role in addressing historical injustices such as those created by the former apartheid regime in South Africa. According to Goga and Korku Avenyo (2021), combining Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy with industrial policy can result in greater inclusion beyond ownership transfer. The BEE policy, changed into the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) in 2003, is a policy of successive post-apartheid governments to make corrections for the injustices created by the apartheid regime toward Black South Africans through their systemic exclusion and suppression from access to critical productive resources, including capital, land, product markets and manufacturing jobs. It is meant to bring about critical transformation in the ownership and control of productive assets in the economy. However, increasingly seen as part of South Africa's elite transition,^a BEE worked to connect a small Black elite to entrenched white business actors without opening up the economy to support entry and expansion by new and dynamic businesses. To foster the economic transformation of South Africa's manufacturing sector and to overcome the obstacles to empowerment faced by Black entrepreneurs such as high levels of concentration, barriers to entry and lack of access to capital, it is recommended to promote public funding providing patient capital at concessional rates through incentive schemes and development finance targeted at micro, small and middle enterprises, where the bulk of Black entrepreneurs are concentrated (instead of favouring big capital as in the past), as well as tariff protection and support for technology development.

^a Bond 2014.

Source: Goga and Korku Avenyo 2021.

through a reduction of GHG emissions, pollution, biodiversity loss and resource use. They are part of the GND package some countries or regional blocs have recently proposed. Green investment, for example, in energy efficiency and renewable energy supply, can help to decarbonize the economy while supporting structural change, employment and better income distribution. Green industrial policies combine productivity-enhancing structural change with environmental objectives, for example, phasing out harmful technologies and using incentives and regulations to diffuse sustainable

alternatives.⁸⁷ Green fiscal policies and circular economy approaches are important complementary measures.⁸⁸ However, given the slow pace in the growth of renewable energy and the continuous rise in global demand for fossil fuels and electricity, calls for greater state engagement in the energy transition, including through the option of public ownership, are growing louder.⁸⁹

Finally, industrial or sectoral policies have also been mobilized for social justice purposes, as the example of South Africa shows. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was meant to achieve two objectives in tandem: overcoming the discrimination and exclusion of Black South African entrepreneurs during the apartheid regime and fortifying a domestic capitalist class for the South African developmental state (see box 5.3).

2.4 Re-embedding the economy back into society and nature

The economy is a part of larger institutional or social structures and the natural environment. In our current economic system, which is based on the narrative of fully self-regulating markets, the economy is increasingly disembedded from society and nature.⁹⁰ This disembedded economy creates dislocations and tensions, to which counter-proposals have emerged.⁹¹ A variety of alternative economic approaches to re-embed the economy in society have been proposed.

The private for-profit and not-for-profit sectors can play crucial roles in bringing the economy under social control and facilitating the social and ecological transition that the SDGs are promoting. Previous chapters have demonstrated that markets are characterized by high inequalities, with large MNCs, mostly from the global North, dominating national economies and world markets along GVCs, while smaller entities, including small and medium-sized enterprises, are providing the bulk of employment opportunities and sustaining livelihoods.

Efforts to re-embed the economy in social and environmental norms have involved different approaches. Many MNCs and other profit-oriented firms are engaged in a process of incremental change centred on reducing negative environmental impacts, improving working conditions, providing livelihood opportunities within their supply or



In our current economic system, which is based on the narrative of fully self-regulating markets, the economy is increasingly disembedded from society and nature.

distribution chains for low-income producers, increasing community support and promoting aspects of good governance.

In this chapter, we focus on two alternative approaches that promise more transformative impacts: One approach, associated with SSE, reconfigures the primary objective of enterprise, production and marketing. Instead of profit maximization and shareholder primacy, SSE organizations and enterprises (SSEOs) prioritize a combination of social, environmental, democratic and emancipatory objectives, as well as the interests of members and users (see Spotlight by Reema Nanavaty). Section 2.4.2 suggests a range of public policies that can support SSEOs as part of the sustainability transition. The second approach, presented in section 2.4.3, proposes a more holistic methodology to measure the sustainability performance of for-profit and not-for-profit firms and organizations, which promises to increase both transparency and accountability of enterprises while also providing incentives to shift business strategies toward greater sustainability and equity.

2.4.1 Social and solidarity economy

Financial crises, welfare imperatives, activist pressures and globally recognized agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals and SDGs have fueled an interest in forms of economy that

are more people centred and planet sensitive. As a result, an increasing number of governments have turned their attention to the role that SSEOs can play in economic transformation, social protection, decent work, green transition and other aspects of inclusive and sustainable development.

Defined as economic activities and relations, giving primacy to i) social, cultural and environmental objectives and the equitable distribution of surplus over profit maximization and financial returns to investors; ii) democratic governance over hierarchy and bureaucratic control; and iii) principles and practices of solidarity, mutual help and cooperation over self-centred individualism and competition, SSE comprises autonomous forms of organizations that produce, exchange and consume goods and services with the above purposes.⁹² They include but are not limited to cooperatives; non-profit organizations of various forms, including associations engaged in economic activity; mutuals; foundations; social enterprises; women's self-help groups; and community-based organizations.

At the core of SSE is the call for a significant transformation in both values and methods of valuation, economic activities and the structure of market-driven economies. SSEOs pursue social and solidarity financing in which the investors predominantly consider the needs of people seeking finance for redistributive and equitable socioeconomic activity. Methods and valuation criteria for investment decisions focus on the degree of involvement, cooperation and associative solidarity relationships among workers, customers, producers and consumers, and also the extent to which the entity practises democratic governance. Social and solidarity financing includes credit unions, cooperative banks, ethical banks, microcredit and microfinance and to a certain extent socially responsible investment. SSEOs tend to go beyond the conventional meaning of sustainable production and consumption (SPC), focusing on limiting negative environmental impacts and encouraging green intentions of consumers. It considers social-economic systems and endeavors to put in place or "revamp" an economy that can support the societal and cultural changes necessary for SCP. Addressing not just market failure but also institutional failure in which production and consumption demands exceed nature's ability to continue to supply people with all the goods and services they rely on, the

SSEOs focus not only on environmental issues within an industrial context but also on the political, social and cultural dimensions of SPC.⁹³

SSEOs often design and implement political as well as economic strategies which challenge and transform the status quo in a wide range of policy fields. They include but are not limited to work integration, peace, reduction of hunger and poverty, reduction of multidimensional inequalities, care and home support services, local community development, gender equality and empowerment, food and agriculture, finance, housing, energy, water and waste management, tourism, social services, information and communications technology, education, health care, and culture, sports and leisure.⁹⁴

2.4.2 Promoting social and solidarity economy through public policy

While public policy has long supported and regulated aspects of SSE related, for example, to producer, marketing and consumer cooperatives, credit unions, mutual aid societies, foundations, and associations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a number of legal and institutional innovations have emerged more recently. They include:

The promotion of new types of SSEOs. These include social enterprises and non-traditional forms of cooperatives. The former comprise organizations that blend entrepreneurial practices and social priorities and/or serve the general interest rather than that of members. The latter include social cooperatives providing social services to members and/or a wider public, worker cooperatives comprising employees that reconstitute failed or failing companies, and multipurpose cooperatives which engage in activities associated with various sectors.⁹⁵

Focusing on SSE as a sector. Governments and policy makers are recognizing the potential of SSE as a sector in itself—one comprising a variety of organizations and enterprises that have in common an institutional logic or set of economic, social and democratic principles and practices that differ from conventional business and public sector activities. From Brazil to the European Union, governments are attempting to map and generate data on the scale and impact of this sector in terms of geographical

spread, employment and GDP. By mid-2021, national parliaments in 16 countries of Europe, Latin America and Africa had passed framework and other laws promoting SSE, for example, Mexico in 2012, France in 2014, Uruguay in 2019 and Tunisia in 2020.⁹⁶ Passing such laws, however, is often a protracted process that can be stalled or blocked by party politics and changing priorities. In lieu of laws, or additionally, some governments have drafted comprehensive national development plans for SSE, for example, the National Strategy for Social and Solidarity Economy 2010–2020 in Morocco, the 2018 Master Plan for Human Resource Development for the Social Economy in the Republic of Korea and the Public Policy for SSE 2021–2025 in Costa Rica.

Integrating SSE in the welfare system. While many SSEOs have traditionally provided services related to health, care and work integration, several governments have scaled up and formalized their participation in national welfare systems and employment generation strategies. Examples include the role of community health and mutual health organizations in West Africa;⁹⁷ the promotion of social enterprises that generate employment for persons with disabilities in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Poland; and the provision of childcare services in Quebec and Uruguay.⁹⁸

Institutionalizing SSE in public policy. Measures are being taken to ensure that public sector support for SSE is not dependent on a particular party or transitory circumstances but is a consistent feature of state policy.⁹⁹ Beyond laws and national development plans or policies targeting SSE,¹⁰⁰ governments are establishing entities with direct responsibility for supporting this sector (see box 5.4). Such institutions include ministries (Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Senegal) and vice ministries (Costa Rica), as well as departments (France, Morocco), secretariats (Brazil),¹⁰¹ specialized and technical agencies (Republic of Korea, Ecuador) and decentralized institutes (Argentina, Mexico) within a ministry or similar entity.

Co-construction of policy: A key component of this institutionalization process is the establishment of consultative processes comprising SSE actors and intermediary organizations that speak and advocate on their behalf.¹⁰² Such processes may involve formal

structures, such as the Consultative Council for SSE in Uruguay, or institutionalized informal interactions as has occurred in Quebec and the Republic of Korea where large SSE umbrella organizations are recognized as key interlocutors.¹⁰³ In several countries and jurisdictions co-construction has played an important role in overcoming the limitations of top-down policy design and implementation, and in ensuring that policy making, evaluation and review are aligned with the diversity, needs and preferences of SSE actors. Important in this regard are decentralized consultative structures at the territorial level—the case of Brazil, for example—or involving multi-stakeholder working groups organized on a sectoral or thematic basis, as in Costa Rica.¹⁰⁴

Toward an ecosystemic approach. Early efforts to promote SSE often centred on interagency coordination and ad hoc initiatives related to training or access to finance and markets. Increasingly, governments are recognizing the importance of a broader integrated “ecosystemic” approach comprising interconnected actors and institutions.¹⁰⁵ Such an approach recognizes that an effective enabling environment for SSE involves mobilizing support from multiple public sector, private sector and civil society actors, as well as regulating their behaviour where it impedes SSE formation and development. Furthermore, it acknowledges the nested nature of governance at multiple levels and the need to mobilize resources and coordinate support and regulation at municipal, provincial/state, federal/national and supranational or international levels. Further central to an ecosystemic approach is the notion that promoting SSE requires efforts to strengthen the asset base of SSEOs related to multiple forms of “capital”—financial, human, social, knowledge, physical. This approach is being actively promoted, for example, within the European Union and by intergovernmental organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It has also been actively promoted within the Republic of Korea,¹⁰⁶ as well as in regions of countries such as Quebec, Canada, and Emilia Romagna, Italy, where SSE has a strong presence.

Ongoing challenges. While such policy innovations bode well for scaling up and strengthening SSE, they often occur in political, institutional and macroeconomic contexts that constrain their effectiveness.¹⁰⁷ Key concerns include the following:¹⁰⁸

- The diversity of SSE practices and organizations and the transformational potential of SSE can be undermined when state incentives are tied to a narrow range of social policy objectives, activities and enterprise forms.¹⁰⁹
- Despite encouraging changes in government discourse promoting SSE, resource allocation often remains minimal while regulations and incentives continue to be skewed in favour of conventional forms of enterprise.¹¹⁰
- Policy support for SSE is often highly constrained in contexts where governments adopt austerity policies and regressive fiscal policies, experience cuts in official development assistance (ODA) or gear macroeconomic and investment policy toward conventional models of economic growth and development.
- The sudden availability of financial support and other incentives for particular types of SSEOs can foster the emergence of unsustainable organizations that lack key assets and capabilities associated with human capital (for example, managerial skills and technical know-how) and social capital (for example, support networks, relations of trust).
- Core aspects of SSE related to democratic governance, active citizenship, collective action and environmental justice can be sidelined as attention focuses on service provisioning and social inclusion.
- State support and the scope for co-construction at different levels of governance can change significantly with the rotation of parties and leaders in power.

On balance, despite the upsurge in public policy discourse and initiatives promoting SSE over the past decade, state support remains inchoate and fragile. Locking in such support legally and fiscally and building strong intermediary organizations and networks that can advocate for SSE at different levels of governance are key for addressing these challenges.¹¹¹

Box 5.4 Promoting SSE through public policies: Guidelines for local governments—Dakar

In Senegal, SSE has been promoted as a response to a growth context that failed to trickle down to provide broader social development gains. The Senegalese economy has been growing at an average annual growth rate of more than 6 percent in recent years (2016–2019), driven mainly by domestic demand, fueled by public spending and household income growth, including remittances from Senegalese workers abroad. Despite economic growth, unemployment and underemployment rates reached 16.9 percent and 27.7 percent respectively in 2019, with rates being higher in rural areas and for women. In 2019, the unemployment rates for women and men were 27.6 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. The majority of Senegalese citizens do not think they share the benefits of economic growth, and poverty is entrenched.

SSE has played a key role in addressing this situation, most notably in the form of housing cooperatives and health mutuals. In the context of rising costs of housing, the cooperative option has become an alternative for people who want to own a house. In the Dakar region, more than 600 housing cooperatives have been established. In addition, more than 100 health mutuals have been set up since 2012. They provide health insurance, filling the large gap in public health provision, and contribute to the improvement of health conditions of the population in both urban and rural areas.

Responding to the growth of the SSE sector and its benefits, the Senegalese government established SSE as a priority sector within the framework of the Emerging Senegal Plan, placing it as the second most important among five major initiatives. The government decided to promote and develop the SSE sector, noting that the productive and redistributive function of SSE can help disadvantaged and marginalized people share in the benefits of economic growth and consequently strengthen democratic society.

In June 2021, the Senegalese national parliament passed the SSE Framework Law, which introduced the official definitions of the terms used in the SSE sector, special taxes for the sector and the creation of a National SSE Council to promote SSE throughout the country. RACTES (Réseau des Acteurs et Collectivités de l'ESS—Network of SSE Actors and Communities) played a significant role in providing inputs to the lawmakers and lobbying to pass the SSE Framework Law. In particular, its recommendations on policies to promote SSE, drawn from UNRISD's research on "Public Policies for Social and Solidarity Economy: The Experience of the City of Dakar"^a and "Guidelines for Local Governments on Policies for Social and Solidarity Economy,"^b have been adopted as Chapter IV. Mésures d'accompagnement et de promotion de l'ESS (SSE support and promotion measures) of the SSE Framework Law.

^a Diop and Samb 2021; ^b Jenkins et al. 2021.

Sources: Diop and Samb 2021; RTES 2021.

It is also apparent that public policy for SSE is still focused primarily on the social dimension of sustainable development. The environmental dimension often assumes a back seat, notwithstanding important developments in certain countries—for example, enshrining the rights of nature in constitutional law in Ecuador and Bolivia (chapter 4); promoting sustainable agriculture in Cuba and Kerala, India; community-based forest management in Nepal;¹¹² waste recycling in Brazil; and renewable energy in Germany.

Whether or not SSE can realize its transformative potential will depend crucially on whether governments recognize the environmental potential of SSE, which derives from the fact that it has a relatively light environmental footprint, has few incentives to externalize environmental costs and,



Public policy can play a far more proactive role in positioning SSE to meet the increasing demand for environmental goods and services and enabling a process of green transition that is also fair and inclusive.

in certain sectors, involves practices that protect the environment and manage natural resources sustainably. Public policy can play a far more proactive role in positioning SSE to meet the increasing demand for environmental goods and services and enabling a process of green transition that is also fair and inclusive.¹¹³

Another crucial factor is the need for broad-based alliances of social and political forces that recognize that an enabling policy environment for SSE ultimately requires deeper changes in macroeconomic and fiscal policy, a shift from fragmented to universal social protection systems, and structural changes related to investment, production, exchange and consumption patterns, as proposed in this chapter.

2.4.3 Measuring corporate performance as if sustainability matters

New economic entities such as Benefit Corporations (B Corps), business models associated with stakeholder capitalism and the triple-bottom line, and sustainability standards of business performance are gradually being integrated into market structures and operations and can contribute to making the economy and society more sustainable. Such initiatives, however, confront a major challenge, namely, how to fundamentally promote decoupling, greater returns to labour and suppliers, and tax justice in contexts where the pressures for profit maximization, managerial hierarchy and shareholder interests remain intense. The result is that initiatives to improve Economic, Social and Governance (ESG) performance often constitute a fairly minimalist agenda, involving, for example, improvements in resource intensity rather than absolute reductions in GHG emissions, compliance with the minimum wage rather than paying a living wage and so forth. In a context where corporate sustainability is being institutionalized via a new standards regime, it is important to recognize that the methodologies used in the field of sustainability accounting, and the way that standards are interpreted, applied and reported, are themselves often flawed from the perspective of transformative change.

Corporate sustainability reporting has advanced in leaps and bounds since world leaders at the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro called upon the business community to assume responsibility for company activities that negatively impact people

and the environment. Today, sustainability reports provide vast amounts of information and data on an ever-expanding portfolio of issue areas—from community support to wages, gender representation, carbon emissions, corruption and human rights. And influential standard-setting and other bodies are constantly revising guidance regarding appropriate indicators and reporting methods.

Such information, however, can leave the reader or analyst somewhat overwhelmed and confused. In addition to information overload, the data often provide little tangible evidence of where a company is positioned on a sustainability pathway and the trajectory of change. A four-year UNRISD project on Sustainable Development Performance Indicators (SDPI), conducted during 2019–2022, is examining ways in which corporate sustainability reporting can be reformed to allow stakeholders to better gauge performance and assess progress over time. An initial stocktaking of the quality of sustainability reporting identified several key concerns:

1. *Blind spots.* Current approaches tend to focus on “harm reduction”—reducing negative social and environmental impacts—rather than addressing structural or systemic conditions that reproduce those harms in the first place. These include, for example:
 - gender disadvantage in pay and promotion associated with lack of recognition and support for care-giving roles (see box 5.5);
 - skewed power relations within corporate structures and value chains that weaken the bargaining power of low-income stakeholders;
 - ownership and governance structures that privilege returns to shareholders and senior management that can result in extremely large CEO–worker pay gaps and wage levels well below the living wage;
 - profit shifting to tax havens;
 - the role of corporate political influence in shaping adverse public policy environments;
 - ongoing increases in carbon emissions despite reductions in resource intensity.

2. *Contextualization.* To assess how a company is faring in relation to a specific issue area, it is necessary to know what the normative end goal is. Assessment requires not only quantifying the extent of an impact, but also comparing performance to an agreed metric that defines what a sustainability threshold or fair allocation would be. Presenting quotients with a numerator that indicates the current level of performance and a denominator that indicates a norm makes it possible to assess progress in a meaningful way. Average workers' pay, for example, could be calculated as a percentage of the living wage; the number of women in senior management could be assessed in relation to a norm approximating parity; and annual changes in levels of carbon emissions could be considered in relation to a science-based target compatible with the 1.5°C globally agreed norm.
3. *Time series data.* Corporate sustainability reports are usually produced annually and highlight information related to performance in one particular year, often with comparative data for the preceding year. Such data snapshots make it difficult to gauge performance trends over time, say, during the past five, 10 or 20 years. While it is important to know, for example, what percentage of a company's employees are currently covered by collective bargaining agreements, it is also necessary to know how collective bargaining coverage has changed over time. The same applies for many other indicators.
4. *Granular disclosure.* Data in the form of company-wide averages can mask significant variations in performance by jurisdiction, occupational category, affiliate or supplier. Data related, for example, to tax payments and where

profits are booked, as well as the gender pay gap, freedom of association and carbon emissions, need to be more granular.

To address these concerns the SDPI project identified 35 indicators related to taxation, environmental, social and institutional aspects, which have been pilot tested. The project aims to lay a foundation for future work by UN agencies, standard-setting organizations and corporations themselves that will raise the bar so that sustainability reporting can effectively measure progress in relation to sustainable development.

Box 5.5 Applying SDPI: Gender equality in the workplace

Combating gender inequality in the workplace requires that corporations direct far more attention to key structural issues that determine women's disadvantage in the workplace and set meaningful normative targets for moving toward equality.^a First, there are significant shortcomings in the way the gender pay gap is measured, in particular due to underreporting and methodological inconsistencies. Relatedly, the unadjusted pay gap should be more heavily weighted as an indicator, as it reflects larger structural factors that influence women's average earnings being lower than men's. Further, more attention must be paid to women's representation throughout the corporate hierarchy relative to men. Finally, as caregiving is a crucial structural constraint affecting women's ability to earn equal pay and advance up the company hierarchy, company care policies must be much more comprehensive and address caregiving as a long-term lifecycle issue. Companies need to create a broad portfolio of measures to support employees with care responsibilities across the lifecycle.

^a Utting and O'Neill 2020.

Source: McElroy 2019; UNRISD 2020a; Utting and O'Neill 2020.

3. Transformative Social Policies and a Fair Fiscal Contract

Social policy and a fair fiscal contract play a key role in shifting the current development model toward social and climate justice. They are at the core of a new eco-social contract, benefiting economy and society, strengthening social cohesion and trust, and providing legitimacy and credibility to governments. Institutionalized, long-term, universal and human rights-based approaches to social protection that empower all segments of society to play a role in the development of their communities are key to reducing inequalities and building resilience in the face of future shocks and crises.¹¹⁴ Social protection schemes and public services can support climate change adaptation, just transitions and mitigate negative impacts of various types of crises.¹¹⁵

A range of transformative social policies and institutions exist which curb inequalities, for example, efforts to extend protection across the lifecycle through universal child benefits and social pensions,¹¹⁶ social inclusion policies¹¹⁷ as well as extension of coverage of social protection toward informal and self-employed workers,¹¹⁸ basic income guarantees¹¹⁹ and minimum wage policies (see box 5.6).¹²⁰ Integrated approaches with the potential for creating synergies between social policies and service delivery are of particular importance, for example, integrated care systems,¹²¹ and between social and environmental goals, for example, eco-social policies.¹²²

3.1 Rights-based social protection

One of the key instruments to address inequality, poverty and social exclusion is social protection. Social protection policies, broadly understood as social insurance, social assistance and labour market policies, protect people from adverse market effects and lifecycle contingencies (childhood, maternity, sickness, disability, old age) while playing important roles for production, reproduction and redistribution.¹²³ According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), social protection is a fundamental human right for all people.¹²⁴ However, depending on their objectives, design and implementation, social programmes

can reinforce inequalities and exclusions, for example, when public provision or cash transfers are targeted at the poor, while higher-income groups are covered by social insurance or private schemes which provide better benefits. They can also lack transformative impact, when social policies are too residual to address structural inequalities or to contribute to productivity and stability, or not implemented correctly due to institutional bias or a lack of acknowledgement of the role of informal institutions in a particular country context.¹²⁵

Countries with effective health and social protection systems in place that provide universal coverage are not only doing better in terms of economic and social outcomes (see chapters 3 and 4), but they have also been better prepared to respond to the Covid-19 crisis.¹²⁶ Before the pandemic, 55 percent of the world's population—about four billion people—did not have any form of social protection, but coverage with cash transfers has increased more than twofold during the Covid-19 pandemic.¹²⁷ Many lessons have been learned regarding the usefulness of social protection as a crisis response as well as the advantages of having institutionalized systems with universal coverage in place that can be quickly activated in times of need (see chapters 3 and 4). These lessons



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need to feed into policy reforms to make social protection floors a reality for all. Scaled-up social protection systems need to be funded domestically through progressive fiscal systems; they must avoid entrenching gender or poverty stereotypes through conditionalities and income-based targeting; and they need to connect income transfer programmes with improved access to quality social services and decent work opportunities.¹²⁸ Further expanding age-, disability- and gender-responsive social protection coverage, in particular to the most vulnerable people, including informal workers, the rural poor, women, children, older persons, migrants, refugees and persons with disabilities, is among the most critical interventions that will need to be resourced and strengthened to generate synergies across the SDGs.¹²⁹ Social policies that are detrimental in terms of equity and sustainability, for example, energy subsidies that favour higher-income households, should be replaced by other instruments, although careful design of reforms is necessary as social gains associated with subsidy reform are not automatic.¹³⁰

3.2 Universal social services

Universal social services are a key instrument for well-being, development and social cohesion, and they lie at the core of the social contract. Chapter 3 has provided evidence on the recent history of downsizing and dismantling of public service provision, which has left many societies more unequal, less productive and less resilient in times of crisis, as the Covid-19 pandemic has shown.

Tax-financed public services such as health services, care and education not only improve capabilities and well-being but also are inherently redistributive and thus enhance equality.¹³¹ This holds true even when the tax system is neutral rather than progressive.¹³² An OECD study found that existing public services are worth the equivalent of 76 percent of the post-tax income of the poorest quintile compared with just 14 percent of the richest.¹³³ Public services also reduce income inequality by between one-fifth and one-third depending on the inequality measure.¹³⁴

There is a need for public health systems that deliver comprehensive, integrated, quality primary health services that are accessible across all population groups, in particular to those who are stigmatized and marginalized due to age, disability, location, ethnicity, gender, SOGIESC (sexual



Tax-financed public services such as health services, care and education not only improve capabilities and well-being but also are inherently redistributive and thus enhance equality.

orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics) and other factors. Countries must sustain health services across the life course, including sexual, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health services, and care for older persons, especially in low- and middle-income countries and in settings of fragility, conflict and violence.¹³⁵

Public health systems are more efficient and produce better social and environmental outcomes than private systems:¹³⁶ for example, the per capita carbon footprint of market-dominated health care in the United States is more than three times greater than in Italy, France, Spain or Sweden.¹³⁷ This is explained by greater macro-efficiency and lower expenditure shares of public health systems and to lower emissions related to spending, thanks to better allocation of resources and procurement practices. Commercialized health systems generate more duplication and waste as well as greater health inequality.

Health strategies need to be adapted for different contexts and groups. Intersecting inequalities have huge implications for health outcomes, as chapter 3 has shown, for example, for Black women,

Indigenous peoples, people living in remote or underserved areas, people affected by mental health issues and migrants.¹³⁸ Health injustices such as discrimination and mistreatment of vulnerable groups need to be addressed through comprehensive approaches including resource allocation, investment in health staff, intercultural training, awareness raising and ethical standards,¹³⁹ as well as integration of affected groups in the design of reform proposals. Inequalities make people more vulnerable and undermine public systems that are designed to protect the health and well-being of the population. Six out of seven adolescent HIV cases in sub-Saharan Africa are among girls, numbers that are rooted in inequalities of power, while two-thirds of African countries have been charging user fees for health at all levels. Addressing pandemics and health inequalities requires public provision of essential social services, curbing marginalization and discrimination and improving access to life-saving health technology (see Spotlight Winnie Byanyima).

Sustainable and holistic approaches to health require increases in the quantity and quality of fiscal resources for health policy spending beyond the current 6 percent of global annual spending, to address malnutrition, for example, by improving sanitation and hygiene infrastructure and ensuring access to clean water,¹⁴⁰ and to mitigate the detrimental health effects of environmental and climate change and of unsafe living spaces and working conditions.

Access to quality education at all levels should be ensured regardless of background.¹⁴¹ Building a functioning education system with trained staff, skilled professionals and empowered citizens requires a holistic approach with strong capacities and sufficient resources at all levels, including primary, secondary and tertiary. Expansion of access to university education, as analysed in chapter 3, when based on fee-paying modules and private institutions, has shown some success in overcoming horizontal inequalities, but oftentimes it reinforces disadvantages related to class and income, which then intersect with other group identities.¹⁴² Medium- and long-term investment strategies toward this goal may be incremental, dependent on each country's educational profile. Ensuring a safe and accessible learning environment involves an integrated approach that engages actors across sectors, including government ministries, municipal

service providers, labour unions, and child and gender advocates, as well as parents and students.¹⁴³ Finally, access to health and education also requires affirmative action and proactive reaching out to disadvantaged communities as well as ensuring their agency, for example through co-production of services.¹⁴⁴

3.3 Inclusive labour market policies

Countries are implementing a range of policies to address labour market problems, depending on country context. More advanced countries with large shares of formal employment, which tend to have high coverage rates of unemployment insurance (so-called passive labour market policies), are more focused on reducing unemployment and increasing labour market participation and the efficiency of labour markets through active labour market policies (retraining, skills development and so forth). Some countries have introduced minimum wage policies or subsidies for temporary or low-income workers.

Countries in the global South often implement social assistance-type labour market policies targeted at poor adults of working age who cannot cover their basic needs. Typical programmes are public works programmes, employment guarantee schemes or employment programmes for young adults. Other important policies are those directed at the informal economy, for example, simplified taxation and social insurance schemes for micro-enterprises and self-employed workers such as the *monotributo* system that has expanded tax and social security coverage in several Latin American countries.¹⁴⁵ Minimum wage policy has been an important tool to address labour market inequalities such as non-living wages, as the South African example demonstrates (see box 5.6). If social protection benefits are linked with minimum wages, as in Brazil's social pension schemes or in India's employment guarantee scheme, they can set an effective basic income floor for poor people.¹⁴⁶

Typical labour market problems such as unemployment, underemployment, insufficient wages, informal employment lacking social protection and fundamental rights at work, and increasing wage inequalities are related to development patterns, macroeconomic constellations and global trends such as technological processes (chapter 1). Addressing these problems requires integrated policies that promote productive and formal

Box 5.6 South Africa's national minimum wage policy

The adoption of a minimum wage for South Africa is an important advance in the social protection architecture of the country through progressive labour market reform. South Africa is an upper-middle-income country that also tops global rankings in income and wealth inequality (the Gini coefficient was 0.68 in 2017),^a and it has half of its population living below the national poverty line and a legacy of entrenched racial and gender-based inequalities that post-apartheid African National Congress governments have struggled to overcome.^b South Africa combines a relatively strong state role in social policy with a liberal economic approach: while it further expanded and institutionalized social policies in the democratic transition in line with new constitutional social rights, it adopted mainstream economic policies biased toward big capital, financial services and extractive industries. Promoting the country as a developmental state, rather than a welfare state, policy-making elites proclaim a conservative discourse against redistribution, rooted in assumptions about a supposed dependency culture that might result from social handouts.^c With an expressed preference for work over transfers to combat poverty, policy makers have nevertheless failed to tackle persistently high unemployment rates and labour market segregation. The labour market in South Africa is at the heart of a structural problem of constant production and reproduction of inequalities (62 percent of persons in the lowest income quintile are unemployed), a dynamic that one of the most comprehensive social grant systems that has been established in the global South (around 45 percent of South African households are beneficiaries of a social grant) fails to address.

In this context, the government initiated a reform process in view of implementing a national minimum wage policy which was grounded in both the country's tradition of social dialogue and extensive consultations with experts. The aim was to systematically address poverty and the low wage structure in the labour market itself, in addition to post-market distribution measures. Unemployment rates exceeded 29 percent in 2019, and almost half of workers in wholesale and retail trade earn less than USD 213 per month. In 2019, the reform was implemented, and a National Minimum Wage Commission was created to monitor and adjust the minimum wage. As intended, wages at the lower end of the wage distribution have increased, compressing the wage gap without increasing unemployment in 2019. It has thus provided a wage floor for the most vulnerable workers, including women and Black South Africans, reducing vertical and horizontal inequalities which often cluster in highly unfavourable ways.

^a Palma 2019; ^b Plagerson et al. 2017; ^c Seekings 2022.

Source: Francis and Valodia 2021.

employment as well as decent work as defined by the International Labour Organization.¹⁴⁷ The challenge to overcoming labour market segmentation and further precarization of work through the rise of the gig economy, a phenomenon that has also affected high-income countries in the global North, has strengthened calls for decoupling social protection from formal employment (see box 5.7), a proposal that is also supported by business actors as part of a new social contract (see chapter 4). However, there are good reasons to maintain the link between labour and capital through social insurance, for example, with regard to financing social protection and workers' bargaining power.

3.4 Creating just care systems

At the heart of our current system's failure to deliver just outcomes is its devalorization of care (see chapter 2). Recognizing the centrality of care systems and rebuilding them with objectives of



Minimum wage policy has been an important tool to address labour market inequalities. If social protection benefits are linked with minimum wages they can set an effective basic income floor for poor people.

Box 5.7 Social policy and employment: Decoupling or reconnecting?

In the context of neoliberal globalization and rapid technological change, we observe an accelerated process of delinking employment from social rights and social policy, which has been promoted as a model for a new social contract.^a While historically welfare states had tied social protection programmes to employment status and assumed that sustaining full employment was necessary to finance and sustain comprehensive social welfare systems, the neoliberal version of the social turn implied changing ideas about the employment–social policy nexus, with economic policy focusing on growth and social policy on poverty reduction (chapter 1).^b One of the big mistakes in this thinking was that growth was automatically believed to increase employment and jobs and social policy was minimized to a residual category (supporting those in need due to poverty, for example), delinked from employment. This ideational shift was soon reflected in an actual delinking of employment from social and labour rights through the growth of informal, precarious and non-standard jobs, a process which, with some exceptions and temporary turns, continues today.

The argument in favour of decoupling social policy from employment is supported not only by mainstream economists aiming to avoid market distortions they associate with labour regulations, but also by alternative economists, for example, those who advocate a basic income grant.^c The argument is that by decoupling social policy from employment it is possible to reduce and eliminate the coercive forces that propel individuals into the labour market and allow more flexible and creative ways of combining different types of work, leisure and capability development.

There are, however, good reasons to maintain the link between labour and capital through social insurance—for example, to keep employers responsible for financing social insurance schemes and social services, and to emphasize the productive contribution of informal workers, which can enhance their bargaining position in claiming support from business and the state.^d Best practices in extending social protection to informal workers therefore combines social insurance, social assistance, active labour market and economic inclusion policies, and public services.^e Employment should be put at the centre of economic policy, including labour standards and protections as well as robust social provisions in health, education, care, affordable housing and transport. The latter is reflected in a proposal for universal basic services that embodies transactions that are public, shared and largely decommodified, rather than private, individual and marketized.^f

^a Meagher 2022; UNRISD 2021a; ^b Hujo 2021b; ^c Standing 2009; UNRISD 2013; ^d Alfes et al. 2017; Alfes 2022; ^e Barca and Alfes 2021; Lund and Moussié 2018; ^f Gough 2021.

equality, justice and sustainability is essential if we are to build economies that leave no one behind. Central elements of a new policy paradigm are, therefore, the redistribution of unpaid work in households, communities and the social economy, and the upgrading of paid care work in terms of wages, skill levels and working condition.¹⁴⁸ The cross-sectoral nature of and the multiplicity of actors involved in care work requires an integrated model spanning sectoral divides between health, education, the labour market and social protection policies.¹⁴⁹ For example, governments should aim to ensure universal access to quality early childhood care for all children (including pre-primary education, childcare centres, home care) and support for informal care provided by family, friends, neighbours and communities.¹⁵⁰ Next, social insurance and social assistance programmes should be expanded to support providers and recipients of care. Further, labour markets should be reformed to allow for a better balance of paid

work with unpaid care tasks. Reforms to the care economy must also take place at subnational levels, which are critical for care service delivery, especially the local level, the place where social policies meet the ground and engage with actors who participate in the provision of care. Alternative localized visions of care delivery that involve rethinking the roles of the state and communities also provide possibilities for transformation, though carry risks of further entrenching inequalities in care provision.¹⁵¹ From solidary-based community aid networks, which expanded greatly during the Covid-19 pandemic, to co-production of services between local actors and the state, there are many lessons to be learned around how best to deliver care, and also empower those who provide it to influence policies and shift power from the state to citizens.¹⁵²

Addressing inequalities in care requires a five-pronged approach, known as the 5R Framework: recognizing, reducing and redistributing unpaid



Recognizing the centrality of care systems and rebuilding them with objectives of equality, justice and sustainability is essential if we are to build economies that leave no one behind.

care and domestic work, rewarding paid care work fairly and creating space for representation, both for caregivers (paid and unpaid) and receivers.¹⁵³ First, due to social norms and gender stereotypes, unpaid care work is largely undervalued, which is evident in terms of working conditions and remuneration. Reversing these and *recognizing* care work and systems of social reproduction as of equal value to paid labour and systems of production is essential for building equitable and efficient care systems. Second, there are many factors that increase the time necessary for care, such as poor infrastructure, and investments in these areas can *reduce* the time and drudgery of care. Third, as the burden of care is heavily weighted toward households, specifically women, *redistributing* care toward men and the state is essential to achieve socially just outcomes. Forth, even when paid, care work is often poorly remunerated and lacks labour protections. Equitably and justly *rewarding* paid care work is therefore essential. Finally, the realm of care often carries with it many invisibilities, for caregivers—in particular, unpaid family caregivers and informal care workers, who often come from marginalized groups—as well as receivers, who are often denied their agency and autonomy. *Representation* is therefore critical for both groups to ensure that building a just care economy is inclusive and co-constructed.

While the inclusion of care in SDG 5.4 has been a milestone in the efforts of women's movements and several UN agencies, including UNRISD, this

The Self-Employed Women's Association's (SEWA) experience of organizing informal sector women workers for over five decades in India has shown that, to address the multiple challenges these workers are facing, there is a need to strengthen their collective agency, bargaining power and leadership to help them fight against unjust working conditions and bring them voice, visibility and validity as workers.

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time calls for a bolder approach, putting care at the centre of a new development paradigm. This approach has recently been championed by several organizations, notably the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the ILO and UN Women. While UNRISD (2016) has identified transformative care policies as a key innovation for achieving the SDGs, the ILO has emphasized the importance of care work and care jobs for the future of decent work;¹⁵⁴ for positive health, economic and gender equality outcomes; and for the recovery from Covid-19.¹⁵⁵ As stressed by both the ILO and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Solidarity Economy, social enterprises can play a key role in positioning care


far more centrally in economic and social development.¹⁵⁶ UN Women has published a Feminist Plan for Sustainability and Social Justice for the Covid-19 recovery, which puts care at the centre of economic recovery and transformation and positions care as a public good.¹⁵⁷ The report suggests casting care expenditure as investment to empower community-based care networks, to build coalitions of change and to improve data on outcomes and policy efforts.¹⁵⁸ ECLAC and member states represented in the Regional Women's Conference in Latin America and the Caribbean are proposing to advance toward a society of care, where care is seen not as a cost but as an investment in social infrastructure with multiplier effects for growth and employment. A society of care would prioritize sustainability of life and care of the planet, guarantee rights of caregivers and care receivers, promote self-care and address the precarity of employment in care sectors.¹⁵⁹

3.5 A fair fiscal contract

The universalization of public social policies depends to a large degree on the availability of financial resources. UNRISD has advocated for more than two decades to integrate social policies and financing policies in order to achieve sustainable and fair outcomes.¹⁶⁰ A new eco-social contract must go hand in hand with a fair fiscal contract that raises sufficient resources for climate action and SDG implementation and fairly distributes the financing burden within and between countries.¹⁶¹ A stable fiscal contract with voluntary tax compliance and high tax levels is an indicator for a stable social contract (see chapter 4).¹⁶² In addition to raising revenues and redistributing income, taxation has the potential to reprice public goods and bads (by taxing, for example, tobacco or applying lower tax rates to merit goods), and to enhance representation of tax payers in public affairs, which has an important impact on the quality of state-citizen relations.¹⁶³

In the age of neoliberal globalization, fiscal contracts have been undermined alongside social contracts in most countries, with big corporations and high-

Figure 5.1 Corporate tax cuts, 2001–2021



Source: OECD 2022.

income earners decreasing their contributions. Taxes with greater potential for progressive redistribution have fallen victim to political and market pressures, as can be observed in recent cuts to personal income tax and corporate tax rates (see figure 5.1), while indirect taxes with regressive distributional impacts, such as value added tax, are expanding.

In addition to lower direct taxes, illicit financial flows (IFFs) by MNCs are estimated to deprive developing countries of USD 50 billion to USD 200 billion a year in fiscal revenues,¹⁶⁴ while other estimates calculate that the combined global revenue losses from cross-border tax abuse by people with undeclared offshore assets and of multinational companies amount to some USD 483 billion a year.¹⁶⁵ According to research, between 2010 and 2015 the amount of wealth in tax havens has increased over 25 percent, reaching record levels. This hidden wealth accounts for at least USD 7.6 trillion, equivalent to 8 percent of the global financial assets of households.¹⁶⁶ A system of unitary taxation grouping profits of MNCs together, as well as global minimum effective corporate income tax rates on MNCs' profits, as suggested recently by the European Commission as well as the OECD/G20 BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting) proposal, are potential measures to curb IFFs.¹⁶⁷ These taxes could then be distributed across countries, prioritizing employment and productive physical assets over total sales.¹⁶⁸ Other measures such as automatic exchange of financial information, beneficial ownership transparency, and country-by-country reporting have also been adopted in principle by the G20 countries, but implementation lags behind.¹⁶⁹

Despite some progress in overall tax performance in some countries, national fiscal contracts in the global South need strengthening, which requires both economic transformations and effective

domestic resource mobilization strategies, which in turn are the outcome of contestation and bargaining.¹⁷⁰ Taxation has the highest potential to contribute to demand growth, economic stability and greater equality when it targets high incomes (which are largely saved) and speculative activities.¹⁷¹ Tax-to-GDP ratios vary significantly across countries in the global South and within regions, a result of structural factors, historical legacies and differences in state capacity to strike favourable fiscal bargains.¹⁷² In Africa, in 2018, Seychelles (32.4 percent), Tunisia (32.1 percent) and South Africa (29.1 percent) had the highest tax-to-GDP ratios in a sample of 30 countries, while Nigeria (6.3 percent), Equatorial Guinea (6.3 percent), Chad (7.1 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.5 percent) had the lowest.¹⁷³

UNRISD research has revealed a range of factors that are conducive to increasing tax capacity and equity. These include political leadership and bargaining power vis-à-vis elites and big corporations, the design and marketing of reforms (including information campaigns), technological innovations (to improve tax enforcement and administrative efficiency), inclusive and transparent bargaining processes, a positive growth context, the extension of citizenship rights, and electoral competition.¹⁷⁴ Many countries in the global South rely on revenues from natural resource sectors, such as mining or agriculture. When policy reforms related to rent capture or rent distribution from extractive industries or natural resource sectors have been linked with social policy, countries have benefited more from extractive industries, as seen in Bolivia and Mongolia, where mineral rents have been channeled into social policies such as child grants or universal pensions. However, increasing social spending, while a necessary condition, is not sufficient. Mineral-led development requires macroeconomic policies and productive strategies that foster diversification while safeguarding stability and environmental protection (chapter 4).¹⁷⁵

The need to strengthen the fiscal contract has become more urgent during the Covid-19 pandemic, and proposals including new taxes on wealth and excess profits are becoming more palatable.¹⁷⁶ According to the OECD (2020), the pandemic pushed developing countries into a shortfall of USD 1.7 trillion for 2020 in addition to an existing gap of USD 2.5 trillion in annual financing to achieve the 17 SDGs by 2030.



A new eco-social contract must go hand in hand with a fair fiscal contract that raises sufficient resources for climate action and SDG implementation and fairly distributes the financing burden within and between countries.

Recent data show that during the first year of the pandemic, a record growth of ODA took place, increasing to its highest level ever in 2020, reaching USD161.2 billion. However, at the same time, the poorest developing countries spent 14 percent of revenue on debt interest payments, almost four times higher than developed countries, spending 3.5 percent, undermining their fiscal space.¹⁷⁷

Directing just 1.1 percent of total global financial assets (valued at USD 379 trillion) would be sufficient to fill the gap in financing the SDGs.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, it is not merely reallocation of resources but the more intractable allocation of political action that is necessary here, in the form of a new multilateral agreement on financing the SDGs, debt relief and innovative financing solutions at national levels.

Finally, while fiscal contracts are the outcome of processes of contestation and bargaining, it should be noted that they are also an integral part of states' commitments to dedicate a maximum available amount of financial resources to implement their human rights obligations. As a report by the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) and Christian Aid (2020:19) lays out,

"The 'maximum available resources' norm also applies internationally. All countries have an obligation to cooperate in meeting their economic and social rights obligations, and those in a position to do so have a duty to provide economic and technical assistance to less well-resourced countries for this purpose. At minimum, wealthier countries must refrain from constraining the fiscal space of poorer ones—for example, through loan conditions; or by enabling corporate tax avoidance, failing to provide agreed minimum levels of foreign aid or refusing to restructure or forgive foreign debts. When they do so, and people are deprived of their socioeconomic rights as a result, these countries breach their extraterritorial human rights obligations."

In sum, transformative social policies that are based on a fair fiscal contract are key pillars of a new eco-social contract. Integrating social and fiscal policies can lead to greater policy coherence for achieving objectives such as social protection, reduction of inequalities and poverty, while fostering more

productive and resilient economies. For example, bringing more people into formal employment increases social insurance contributions as a financing source for social protection and social services such as health. Reallocation of fiscal resources can free up financial resources for social or climate spending, for example, away from military spending or subsidies that benefit large companies or unsustainable industries such as fossil fuels.¹⁷⁹ Careful analysis of the incidence of fiscal policies, assessing both social spending and financing policies and how they impact on different social and income groups, is necessary to move toward a fair fiscal system.¹⁸⁰ Successful fiscal bargains at the national level require bringing economic elites back into the social contract (see chapters 3 and 4). To achieve this goal, it is necessary to change elite perceptions and preferences and to enable the state to deliver high-quality services that benefit the entire population, while also increasing transparency and combating corruption and waste.

4. Reimagining Multilateralism for a New Eco-Social Contract

Transforming economies and societies through alternative economic approaches and progressively financed transformative social policies will go a long way in moving toward more egalitarian, just and sustainable societies. However, in a deeply integrated world where transnational issues are becoming more and more important, national policy reforms will only take us so far. This is especially true given the constrained policy space many countries and actors have in the current global economic system due to asymmetric power structures and unequal access to resources, finance and technology. Lack of policy space at the national level combined with the skewed nature of the global economic system that puts profits above people and planet can result in policy incoherence, where policies in one area contradict or undermine policies in another.¹⁸¹ The third pillar of our proposed new development model envisages a reimagined global governance system, grounded in renewed multilateralism and strengthened solidarities, recognizing the interdependencies of all people and between humans and nature.¹⁸² This global regime should create an enabling environment



The multiple interconnected crises that mark our world today are to a large extent the result of these changes in global economic governance, which allowed private capital and financial elites to regain political power and to shape and use the multilateral system for their own interests.

for coherent policies for security, peace, human rights and sustainable development, overcoming the fractures and inequalities that are dividing us and providing the necessary policy space for each country to decide on their development strategies and guarantee decent livelihoods, larger freedoms and a safe future for all while respecting planetary boundaries and the diversity of humankind.

While multilateralism is built on peaceful collaboration, mutual respect and an international framework of norms and regulations, it also demands that its member states trade some parts of national sovereignty and interests for the global common good. As mechanisms remain largely voluntary, this often leads to lags and gaps in implementation or to agreements which are not ambitious enough, or even detrimental, to address the global challenges we are facing. This is especially true since the United Nations has partly lost its ideational leadership, which was more aligned with the post-war global economic order of highly regulated capitalism,

while giving way to neoliberal ideologies and greater dominance of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and corporate interests (see chapters 1 and 2).¹⁸³ The multiple interconnected crises that mark our world today are to a large extent the result of these changes in global economic governance, which allowed private capital and financial elites to regain political power and to shape and use the multilateral system for their own interests.¹⁸⁴

The UN Secretary-General has recently proposed a new roadmap for reforming the United Nations and the multilateral system. In *Our Common Agenda*, António Guterres underlines the importance of investing in prevention and resilience, the protection of our planet, and rebuilding equity and trust at a global scale through solidarity and a renewed social contract.¹⁸⁵ His call resonates with this report and different voices across civil society and social movements demanding a new social contract that is more inclusive, just and in harmony with nature (chapter 4). This said, in the design of a new networked multilateralism, it will be imperative to recognize the different power resources stakeholders own as well as intersecting inequalities that might affect them. Feminist groups call for the co-production of policies as well as more equal and meaningful participation of less powerful actors such as civil society or those representing marginalized and vulnerable groups. This is considered a necessary step to rebalance power vis-à-vis corporate actors that have accumulated disproportionate amounts of wealth and power over the last decades, and who often fail to respect human rights, tax law and social and environmental standards in their operations.¹⁸⁶

In this report, we have suggested a range of principles which could guide these processes of creating new eco-social contracts at multiple levels. The following section outlines some key reform steps in global governance necessary to support the eco-social transformation, to overcome inequalities, strengthen solidarities and values, and rebalance asymmetric power relations.

4.1 Reining in neoliberal hyperglobalization: Rules and regulations for economic, social and climate justice

The current global trade, investment and financial governance regime has been identified as a driver of crises and inequalities rather than a shock absorber,

stabilizer and enabler for sustainable development. This is partly due to how global economic governance was shaped during the neoliberal era, allowing financialized hyperglobalization to flourish and undermining sustainable economic models. This served as an obstacle to economic diversification and structural change, greater independence of the global South from external debt and aid, greater equality along GVCs, access to essential technology for developing countries, and accountability of MNCs regarding tax payments and respect of workers' rights and environmental standards. With the launch of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the mid-1980s, previous national regulations and instruments of industrial policy became violations of private property rights and liberal trade norms. Intellectual property rules have strengthened monopoly power and kept competitors out, while WTO rules and further liberalization rounds, as well as circumvention of national courts through specialized investor-state dispute settlements, have hollowed out equality principles of the multilateral trading system, penalizing states that exercise their regulatory power to protect rights.¹⁸⁷

UN organizations, experts and civil society organizations (CSOs) have developed concrete proposals for reforming the system.

4.1.1 Economic governance and global public goods

According to the Geneva Principles for a Global Green New Deal, “renewed multilateralism is required to provide the global public goods needed to deliver shared prosperity and a healthy planet, cooperate and coordinate on policy initiatives that demand collective action, mitigate common risks, and ensure that no nation’s pursuit of these broader goals infringes on the ability of other nations to pursue them.”¹⁸⁸ Concretely, they recommend a multilateral framework that ousts austerity and promotes public investment, green industrial policies, raising wages in line with productivity, regulation of private finance to contribute to social goals and curtailing restrictive business and predatory financial practices.

Regarding the promotion of health as a global public good, national health policies can be strengthened through enabling poorer countries’ access to pharmaceuticals, health technology and vaccines, a

demand which has received much attention during the recent Covid-19 pandemic (see Spotlights by Jayati Ghosh and by Winnie Byanyima) and which requires reforms in the global governance of intellectual property rights (IPR), such as proposed Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waivers and technology transfers. Indeed, IPRs are a major source of rents captured by big MNCs in the age of hyperglobalization.¹⁸⁹

Further proposals exist to reduce inequalities associated with MNCs and GVCs, which should commit to basic standards for workers and the environment across different locations rather than exploiting lower standards in the global South to the detriment of local populations and the environment. Concrete proposals on how to reform the commodity trading sector, which has huge implications for how benefits and costs are distributed along GVCs (see chapter 2), have been elaborated in a project on local lifeworlds along the copper value chain (see box 3.3). They include more state regulation (for example, the creation of central market authorities akin to national financial sector oversight institutions), increased transparency and information sharing beyond voluntary initiatives such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, ending of minimalist tax policies in host countries where MNCs and global commodity trading companies have their headquarters (for example, through establishing a minimum corporate tax level at the international level) and involving producer countries in political debates in trading countries.¹⁹⁰

Curtailing rent-seeking opportunities, tax evasion and capital flight for rich corporations (and individuals) can also contribute to curbing economic inequalities and increasing the labour share in the economy, which is an important step in rebalancing the unequal relationship between capital and labour. Another driver of inequality in labour markets is the emergence of technology-driven platform jobs, which demands new forms of regulation at national, regional and global levels.¹⁹¹ Workers’ rights are not only determined by national governments but are also shaped by powerful MNCs with dominant positions in GVCs (see section 5.3 and chapter 3), which has led to the development of several instruments such as the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the 2000 UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises revised in 2011, the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard

on Social Responsibility launched in 2010, and the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, revised in 2017.¹⁹² As a common shortcoming is the voluntary character of the listed instruments, current efforts concentrate on the negotiation of a binding UN treaty on business and human rights.¹⁹³

Finally, despite the power asymmetries between governments and big corporations (see chapter 3), a range of proposals have been put forward on how to improve market regulation in the public interest. These include the creation of public credit rating agencies and a global competition authority, legislation to prevent private creditors from suing governments, the introduction of capital controls, promotion of central bank coordination to better support the sustainability transition, and price stability for critical goods to cushion negative impacts of decarbonization on low-income groups, among other measures.¹⁹⁴ In combination with measures to strengthen access to finance and technology for sustainable investments at national and international levels—for example, through strengthening public development banks or new global financing mechanisms, creating technology access pools (for example for health technology), eliminating trade restrictions related to climate measures, and implementing international taxes and minimum tax thresholds, as discussed in this chapter—these reforms can drive the necessary changes in economic governance with tangible benefits for global South countries.

4.1.2 Migration

More binding commitments by richer countries are also required on the rights of migrants and refugees. This is a contentious and highly politicized policy field that, despite its potential for reducing inequalities and contributing positively to development in sending and receiving countries (see chapter 1), has been guided by security-focused approaches shaped by anti-migrant or even xenophobic discourses. The securitized, managerial approach to migration policy that has dominated global migration governance over the last decades is in line with broader neoliberal agendas on market liberalization above and beyond the protection of social and economic rights.¹⁹⁵

What is urgently needed is to strengthen the rights-based approach to migration governance: under international human rights law, all migrants are



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entitled to the respect, protection and full enjoyment of their human rights, regardless of their migration status. Legal instruments, such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), ILO conventions (No. 97 migration for employment, 143 on migrant workers, 189 on decent work for domestic workers) and recommendations (R202 on social protection floors, R204 on the informal economy), as well as international law on refugees, labour rights and humanitarian action, protect and promote the rights of migrants and refugees. However, conventions related to labour migration, for example, have the lowest rates of ratification of core human rights conventions, and implementation of these rights in practice remains a challenge in most countries. In the past, governments were reluctant to agree to more binding supranational rules and agreements on migration, especially labour migration, preferring voluntary coordination mechanisms such as the Global Forum on Migration.¹⁹⁶

Following the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, two global compacts were adopted in 2018: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees.¹⁹⁷ The GCM, the first intergovernmentally negotiated migration agreement, is a non-binding document which aims

to promote international cooperation on migration, in line with SDG 10.7 in which UN member states committed to cooperate internationally to facilitate safe, orderly and responsible migration (see chapter 1). Every four years, starting in 2022, the International Migration Review Forum will be the platform to share progress on the implementation of the compact, with preceding regional processes feeding into it.

The agreement on the two global compacts, and in particular the GCM, are important milestones for global migration governance, creating a much-needed multilateral platform for coordination, exchange and mutual learning. However, it remains to be seen if another set of non-binding agreements and declarations of intent are sufficient to achieve structural changes in national migration policies, in particular regarding human rights-based claims such as the right to global mobility and the rights of labour migrants regardless of their status. In a context of highly different national, bilateral and regional approaches to migration as well as increasing resource constraints in post-Covid-19 times, questions remain about the implementation and effectiveness of GCM commitments and its accountability mechanisms.

4.2 Addressing power asymmetries in multilateral governance

4.2.1 Promoting the interests of the global South

The multilateral system needs to provide clearer benefits for developing countries instead of trying to remedy the fallout of a system that is inherently flawed, producing and reproducing inequalities within and between countries, leading to periodic crises and destroying the environment. As has been analysed extensively in this report, the current system has led to further concentration of income, wealth and power in the global North, while most global South countries, with some notable exceptions in Asia, remain dependent on asymmetric financial and trade relations. The reforms in the international trade, finance and investment regimes suggested above would increase policy space and allow developing countries to implement policies to support their social and economic development, including countercyclical macroeconomic and fiscal policies and sectoral policies. Transfers of knowledge, technology and finance (for example,

reallocating and issuing new special drawing rights by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as debt relief) and less policy conditionality are necessary measures to equalize the playing field and redress historical injustices. Efforts to decolonize knowledge (box 4.1), policy practice and international relations need to tackle the implicit or explicit assumption in various donor and academic discourses that developing countries are problems to be solved. It is often argued that state fragility, bad governance or neopatrimonialism undermine the legitimacy and capacity of governments in the global South to design and implement effective development strategies, leading to the conclusion that development can only be achieved by applying best practices and models endorsed by the donor community or Northern scholars.¹⁹⁸ This approach does not only ignore past and current structural drivers of underdevelopment rooted in colonialism, imperialism, slavery and various forms of exploitation and oppression exercised by today's rich countries, but it has also led to "maladjusting" states in the global South through reforms that have undermined state capacity and development outcomes.¹⁹⁹

One way of addressing these asymmetries is by invigorating the principle of equality of all member states in the multilateral system by shifting power back from IFIs—where decisions are dominated by countries with the highest capital quotas, with the United States currently holding 16.5 percent of voting shares in the IMF board of governors—toward agencies where each country has an equal vote. This would also require better funding of UN agencies and a reduced dependence by some agencies on private sector funding.²⁰⁰

Developing countries need to have greater impact in international policy setting forums, which is especially important in view of the international climate response. While enhanced global cooperation and action is urgently needed, this should be accomplished without undermining governments' policy space and ability to pursue their development agendas (see Spotlight by Vicente Paolo Yu and section 4.2 above): this requires, for example, special and differential treatment in international trade agreements and negotiations; prohibiting unilateral trade protectionism as environmental or climate change response measures; ensuring fairer treatment for developing country subsidies that support diversification into climate-adapted industrial, energy and other economic sectors; and



Developing countries need to have greater impact in international policy setting forums, which is especially important in view of the international climate response.

avoiding “green” conditionalities on the provision of financial support to developing countries.

Regarding social policy, we need a strategic shift in donor approaches.²⁰¹ Aid-funded policies, including social protection strategies promoted by multilateral organizations, should be diversified and move away from promoting targeted cash transfers as a silver bullet, toward investments in public social services and strengthening of long-term public social insurance schemes and productive employment, which is usually the preferred strategy of governments in the global South (see chapter 3).

Realizing the human right to social security and basic services requires new funding sources, which is a key element of a new fiscal contract. While domestic funding through progressive taxes is the high road option, global bargains can support national policies if they are well aligned with recipient countries’ strategies. At the global level, a Global Fund for Social Protection has been proposed by human rights advocates²⁰² and has recently been adopted by the ILO constituencies²⁰³ and endorsed in the *Our Common Agenda* report of the UN Secretary-General.²⁰⁴ According to the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Olivier De Schutter, a global fund for social protection should be set up to increase the level of support to low-income countries, thus helping them both to establish and maintain social protection floors in the form of legal entitlements, and to improve the resilience of social protection systems against shocks. Such a fund is

considered affordable, whether funding comes from ODA or from other sources, including unused or new special drawing rights or international taxes.

4.2.2 Strengthening civil society’s voice in multilateralism

Strong civil society participation and advocacy work has played a key role in influencing and shaping the agendas and policies of the entire multilateral system. Civil society actors, including NGOs, experts, academics, independent commissions and other individuals engaging with the United Nations on a regular basis have been called the third United Nations, next to the first United Nations (member states) and the second United Nations (the UN secretariat and agencies).²⁰⁵ While national governments have a key responsibility for implementation of the SDGs and mobilizing sufficient resources for it, it is the interface and the power relations between the three United Nations, and subsets within these groups, that determine to what extent an agenda such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can be made reality.²⁰⁶

The role and impact of global civil society have increased over the last decades, aided by the opening of spaces within the United Nations and increased transparency in some global institutions which makes accessing information easier: “Because of public pressure, commitment and effective lobbying, the presence and influence of civil society in multilateral discussions have grown exponentially, from roughly 100 NGOs in the 1970s to 4000 in 2013.”²⁰⁷ Access to negotiations has been opened up for the nine “major groups” (women, children and youth, Indigenous peoples, NGOs, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological community, and farmers) as they have become acknowledged partners in the 2030 Agenda, though their role is limited.²⁰⁸ Sustained and concerted civil society advocacy and engagement at global, regional and national levels has played a crucial role in promoting the rights of marginalized groups such as migrants, ensuring migrants’ rights remain on the agenda in global migration policy processes.²⁰⁹ Indeed, strong bottom-up participation by CSOs is critical in providing voice to migrants at all levels of decision making.²¹⁰ Human rights advocates and civil society actors have also been instrumental in promoting the rights of Indigenous peoples, of women and

LGBTIQ+ groups, and of children and older persons and have successfully lobbied for putting inequality, climate change and economic justice visibly onto UN agendas, while holding governments to account on SDG progress.²¹¹

At the same time, civil society actors are struggling to have meaningful and qualitative participation due to a number of constraints. One is the rise of the business sector as an accepted partner in the United Nations, pushing for its corporate interests, for example, through public-private partnerships.²¹² Given the power of big business, there is a risk that corporate influence overrides the progressive trends of not-for-profit NGOs.²¹³ While private business actors often get a privileged seat at the negotiation table, which is visible in the changes in global governance in their favour, CSOs struggle to make their voices heard in what are often very restricted opportunities in formal UN processes: NGOs with Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status have, for example, guaranteed access to Human Rights Council sessions but usually only 90 to 120 seconds of speaking time. While this right can also be extended to representatives of communities without consultative status and even individual petitioners, merely appearing at a UN forum does not suffice for effective advocacy.²¹⁴ In other decision-making forums, the participation of civil society or experts can be even more constrained, reduced to consultations without clear accountability to reflect civil society positions in final decision making. Overall, the space for CSO participation and influence differs from forum to forum, with some processes restricting CSO participation to making statements or providing written inputs, to processes where CSOs can make more concrete proposals which can be taken up in final negotiation texts, sometimes on the condition that they are supported by member states.

Civil society participation at local, national and global levels is key for creating a new eco-social contract that inspires trust and promotes the well-being of people and planet. In a global context where civic space is increasingly constrained (see chapter 2) and backlash against democracy and human rights is gaining ground, widening meaningful participatory space for NGOs in the multilateral system is of paramount importance.

4.3 Strengthening solidarities and values

“In a context of converging crises propagated by greed, consumerism, nationalism, exploitation and systemic discrimination, more and more people are clamouring to re-programme our economies based on a radically different set of values, centred on human wellbeing and flourishing within planetary boundaries” argues the Center for Economic and Social Rights and Christian Aid (2020:8). In a similar vein, this report argues that in order to move toward global social, economic and ecological justice, we need to rethink the fundamental values that guide our economies and societies and strengthen solidarity structures at all levels of human interaction. The often repeated slogan during the Covid-19 pandemic that no one is safe until everyone is safe is a strong reminder of the interconnectedness of human existence and our mutual dependence within families, communities and societies and with regard to our natural environment.



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Box 5.8 From research to action: Rethinking values for a new eco-social world—The People's Summit

UNRISD has partnered with the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) and a large group of partner organizations representing millions of professionals in the social sectors and beyond to convene a People's Summit on co-building a new eco-social world and leaving no one behind. The People's Global Summit has provided spaces for individuals and group representatives to advance their ideas as well as a platform for engagement across different cultures, diverse lived experiences, professional groups and perspectives. All contributions shaped the Global Values Declaration for a new eco-social world that was delivered to the United Nations High-Level Political Forum in July 2022 and the General Assembly in September 2022. It will create a catalyst for further global action and also promote new alliances and partnerships for developing new local and global values, policies and practices for our joint futures.

To further this global conversation, steering principles have been generated as a starting point to inspire new ideas and contributions. These clusters of principles aim to represent diverse cultures, philosophies and interests across the world to steer us forward in our tasks of developing globally shared principles for a new eco-social world that leaves no one behind. These steering principles are *Buen Vivir*, love and care of people and the planet, responsibilities and rights; respect, dignity, harmony and justice; diversity, belonging, reciprocity and equity; and *Ubuntu*, togetherness and community (see also chapter 4).

The People's Summit is one activity to link research with concrete action for change. UNRISD has launched a second initiative in collaboration with the Green Economy Coalition, the Global Research and Action Network for a New Eco-Social Contract. This network brings together organizations and individuals from the research, practice, advocacy and policy decision-making communities working for social, climate and environmental justice in a progressive knowledge and action alliance. The network is a space for dialogue, debate, co-construction and action around the meaning of a new eco-social contract, good practices for its design and mechanisms for its application.

Source: The People's Global Summit n.d.; UNRISD n.d.

**Buen Vivir*: an Indigenous social movement from South America that describes a way of life and a form of development that sees social, cultural, environmental and economic issues working together and in balance, not separately and hierarchically as at present.

***Ubuntu*: an African philosophy based on people's interdependency and interconnectedness with their environment; I am because we are.

During neoliberal globalization, while economic interdependencies have increased at the global level in asymmetric ways, solidarity structures and communitarian values that strengthen deep community relations and a life in harmony with nature, such as those presented in chapter 4, have been dismantled and undermined. Instead of “social” security, multi-pillar social risk management was promoted through market mechanisms complemented by some basic state guarantees,²¹⁵ often resulting in a disruption of informal support systems without replacing these with reliable alternatives. Solidarity-based social insurance schemes, those that pool risks and finance defined benefits by bringing together high- and low-income earners as well as enterprises and the state into one scheme, were considered inefficient and unsustainable, with many countries replacing them with private, individualized insurance schemes. Easy access to credit for vulnerable groups, including micro-finance, was touted as part of risk-management at the household level, though in practice, it resulted in increasing vulnerabilities and inequalities due

to the incapacity of low-income households to serve market debt in times of crisis (chapter 2). Increasing fragmentation happened also within social services, with higher income groups opting out of public services and increasingly relying on private commercialized services (see chapters 2 and 3). Finally, increasing reliance on social assistance schemes such as conditional cash transfers resulted in a separation of poor and vulnerable groups from the rest of society, instead of addressing the root causes of inequalities, poverty and exclusion.

A first lesson from these experiences of dismantling solidarity-based social contracts and substituting them with new contracts reflecting the market-based ideology is that we need to bring solidarity principles back into public policy, including social and fiscal policy (see section 3 above). Strengthening solidarity principles within universal social systems and tax policy is an important step toward overcoming vertical and horizontal inequalities and promises to strengthen social cohesion and social peace. A second task is to reinvigorate solidarity principles



In order to move toward global social, economic and ecological justice, we need to rethink the fundamental values that guide our economies and societies.

in international cooperation. According to the proposal for a rights-based economy, governments should cooperate internationally to realize rights and reduce inequalities across borders.²¹⁶ The human rights framework promotes values such as dignity, equity, solidarity, accountability and justice which provide powerful guidance for promoting economic justice. International solidarity can be expressed in multiple forms, institutionalized and informal, and will involve all actors, from state to business to civil society. It concerns reaching the goal of committing at least 0.7 percent of donor countries' GDP to ODA as well as a massive transfer of technology from rich to poor countries to accelerate the sustainability transition and promote global health. It is also increasingly expressed in regional cooperation and horizontal global relationships, for example, between communities or cities of different regions or continents. Considering different contexts and capacities as well as historical injustices such as colonialism or environmental destruction will be important in this process, in line with the principles we have laid out for building a new eco-social contract (chapter 4). A third task is to strengthen alternative economic or development approaches which are guided by solidarity and values such as equity, justice, harmony with nature, recognition and self-determination, from SSE to Buen Vivir.

Rethinking the normative foundations of our societies is an ambitious project and an essential step in building a new eco-social contract (see box 5.8). It is likely to be a contentious process which itself needs to be built on clear procedural values such as trust, mutual respect, transparency and open-mindedness toward the positions of others.

A reformed multilateral system and strengthened international solidarity require enlightened politicians who transcend narrow and short-term national interests and recognize the benefits of working together in pursuit of common interests to the benefit of people and planet. However, it will only be stable and impactful if it is built from the bottom up and is legitimized by the people, as we have suggested for the process of constructing a new eco-social contract. For this to happen, we need to ensure broad-based and meaningful participation by civil society actors, engage with justice movements and empower weaker stakeholder groups as well as the countries of the global South.

For global governance to facilitate the systemic changes that are needed, we need new rules and norms to rein in hyperglobalization, as outlined in this chapter, and strengthen a rights-based multilateral order that provides support for policy space and implementation of alternative economic models and transformative social policies for triggering an eco-social turn.

5. Overcoming Inequalities: Policy Recommendations

In this report we have associated rising inequalities, multiple crises and the breakdown of the social contract with policy choices in the age of neoliberal hyperglobalization that have had detrimental impacts on sustainable development and social justice. These policy choices have reinforced systemic contradictions that were already visible during the post-war era of coordinated or managed capitalism—the undervaluation and exploitation of non-market spheres such as unpaid work and the natural environment and the asymmetries and exploitative structures between so-called developed and developing countries in a hierarchical global economic system. While sections 2–4 in this chapter have laid out a new development approach for transformative change and sustainable, inclusive development, this section presents an overview table summarizing key policy recommendations for reducing inequalities (table 5.1).²¹⁷ Equality is a cross-cutting issue and all policies should be evaluated in view of their impacts on equality, taking an intersectional, dynamic and power-oriented approach (chapter 3).

Table 5.1 Policy recommendations for reducing inequalities

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Universal social policies ● Fiscal policies ○ Labour market and employment policies ○ Business and market regulation ○ Socially sustainable environmental policies ○ Urban policies ○ Gender equality policies ○ Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies ○ Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action ○ Democratic governance and access to rights ○ Global governance reforms and global redistribution 	
● Universal social policies	Universal social policies are a key instrument for well-being, development and social cohesion, and lie at the core of the social contract. They guarantee free and universal access to services necessary for the health and well-being of all, including health, education and social protection programmes. They promote social mobility and reduce economic insecurity associated with lifecycle contingencies and market risks.
→ health	Access to health for all must be ensured, and care must be adapted to contexts and population groups and sustained across the life course; reforms must address disparities in access to and quality of care that affect underserved or stigmatized groups, such as women, older persons, racial minorities and LGBTIQ+ persons. To maximize the benefits of reforms in health and address the social determinants of health, reforms in other sectors such as nutrition, transport, water and sanitation, housing, labour markets and education must be made.
→ education	Access to quality education at all levels must be ensured for all. However, provision of free education is not sufficient to address inequalities unless a systems approach is taken to ensure schools are safe and accessible, and address other factors that may affect access, such as discrimination, gender inequality, spatial segregation, disparities in access to technology and economic disadvantages.
→ social protection	Social protection programmes (child allowances, pensions, social assistance, unemployment benefits, maternity benefits, etc.) must be universally accessible and adapted to the current moment, taking into account the changing world of work and shifting family structures.
● Fiscal policies	Fiscal policies are a key instrument for stabilization, redistribution and social investment. Revenue policies such as taxation as well as expenditure policies such as social protection need to be designed in ways that reduce vertical and horizontal inequalities. They can also provide incentives for green transitions, structural change and alternative economic approaches such as SSE.
→ progressive tax reform	Implementing progressive tax policies at corporate and individual levels, moving away from indirect taxes and introducing wealth and inheritance taxes are essential for ensuring the fiscal space to fund equality-enhancing public expenditure and reduce extreme wealth and income disparities. Green tax instruments raise funds while simultaneously providing incentives for more sustainable consumption and production patterns. International solidarity taxes as well as minimum global tax rates for MNCs can further enlarge fiscal space of developing countries and contribute to equality.
→ addressing tax avoidance	Implementing policies to reduce tax avoidance and evasion are essential to increase fiscal space and reduce wealth concentration, and also help to address the imbalance in flows of financial resources to high-income countries, where most tax havens and freeports are located. This can be achieved through the implementation of a global financial transaction tax, transparency reforms to access data, and information on the top tier of the wealth and income distribution, both at company and individual levels. These reforms will require international collaboration as well as the strengthening of national tax systems.
→ countercyclical approach	Countercyclical policies such as automatic stabilizers (tax-transfer systems that strengthen demand in times of economic downturns and avoid overheating in times of booms) and access to liquidity in times of financial or balance-of-payments crises (domestic and international) is important to stabilize markets and avoid large-scale bankruptcies and social costs.



Table 5.1 Policy recommendations for reducing inequalities (continued)

- Universal social policies
- Fiscal policies
- Labour market and employment policies
- Business and market regulation
- Socially sustainable environmental policies
- Urban policies
- Gender equality policies
- Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies
- Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action
- Democratic governance and access to rights
- Global governance reforms and global redistribution

● **Labour market and employment policies** Labour policies must be rights-based and productive, guaranteeing fundamental labour rights, social protection, decent wages, safe working conditions, rights to organize and life-long learning for all workers. Anti-discrimination protections to address discrimination in hiring practices, ensure equal pay, and stop workplace harassment must be put in place to ensure a safe, equitable and inclusive working environment. Provisions for caregivers such as paid parental leave and flexible hours must be provided. Legal protections are needed to protect informal and independent workers, coupled with access to social protection floors and economic inclusion policies to ensure these workers are not left behind.

● **Business and market regulation** Regulation of business and markets is crucial to prevent market concentration and monopolistic or oligopolistic structures, excessive profit accumulation to the detriment of wage shares, as well as inequalities at the firm level, for example between CEO and average workers' earnings, or between men and women. Strengthening trade unions and collective bargaining is not only important for workers' rights, but also for macroeconomic stability and more equalized capital-labour shares. Inequalities often spiral up along GVCs, requiring international binding standards and regulations, especially for MNCs and highly unregulated sectors such as the gig economy, internet firms, extractive industries, commodity traders and parts of the financial sector. New ways of sustainability reporting by companies can provide incentives for better valuing social and environmental investment and increase transparency and comparability. Alternative business models such as SSE that promote shared and democratized ownership structures should be supported and scaled up.

● **Socially sustainable environmental policies** Policies that address pollution, resource depletion, loss of biodiversity and climate change, while important for every person and country, will help to prevent already disadvantaged groups from being disproportionately affected by environmental degradation.

→ equitable decarbonization Differentiated responsibility must be taken into account in transitioning to clean energy, with global North countries addressing unsustainable resource consumption habits and making a radical transition to sustainable production. Less developed countries should be supported in developing and adopting climate adapted development practices, through technology and knowledge exchange, and financial support.

→ just transitions Policies to address job loss and other negative externalities of decarbonization must be implemented to ensure no one is left behind in the transition to clean energy.

→ eco-social policies Eco-social policies combine social and environmental goals, providing a good example for integrated policies. Examples are cash transfers supporting ecological activities or public employment programmes creating green infrastructure. Eco-social policies are a promising approach in emergency responses, for example regarding the recent Covid-19 pandemic (green fiscal stimulus), natural disasters or other humanitarian emergencies.



Table 5.1 Policy recommendations for reducing inequalities (continued)

- Universal social policies
- Fiscal policies
- Labour market and employment policies
- Business and market regulation
- Socially sustainable environmental policies
- Urban policies
- Gender equality policies
- Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies
- Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action
- Democratic governance and access to rights
- Global governance reforms and global redistribution

● Urban policies	To address spatial inequalities that play out in urban spaces, efforts are necessary to make cities inclusive, accessible, effective and green. Alternative economic models which center local actors, their needs and the environment such as SSE have a key role to play in this as well.
→ inclusive infrastructure and services	State investment in public infrastructure and public services, including housing, green spaces, cultural and educational institutions, public transport and roads, energy, etc., is necessary to ensure equal access to quality services, regardless of neighbourhood. This should be done in an inclusive, accessible and green way, with particular emphasis on areas that have historically experienced divestment or state neglect.
→ sustainable urban growth	Policies must be put in place to ensure that urban growth is environmentally sustainable and does not place residents in areas of heightened risk to natural disasters. Fostering innovation and turning to new technologies and nature-based solutions can capitalize on the potential environmental benefits of increased urbanization.
→ participatory governance	Local actors should be included in local policy-making processes, and feminist and youth-centred approaches to urban planning should be privileged. Further, local governments should be included in national and international decision-making processes.
● Gender equality policies	Gender equality-enhancing policies can provide women with access to decent work, social protection and social services and ensure gender-inclusive public institutions (including political representation). Applying a gender lens can help to assess all policies with regard to their differentiated impacts on genders, avoiding unintended effects or reinforcement of existing inequalities or stereotypes. Gender equality policies need to be based on an intersectional approach to uncover compounding disadvantages and discriminations based on different categories such as gender and race or ethnicity.
→ care policies	Care policies that bridge sectoral divides, have a strong gender and human rights perspective, and guarantee rights, agency and well-being of caregivers and receivers, are effective instruments to promote gender equality. They need to be accompanied by policies that support a change in social norms regarding the distribution of unpaid care work in the household and community.
→ quotas	Quota systems in educational institutions, economic governance and political office can ensure greater participation for women and a heightened role in decision-making processes. Addressing the gender pay gap and providing for greater gender balance within corporate structures is crucial. Increasing the number of women in political positions tends to lead to more policies to reduce gender inequality.
→ land rights	Expanding access to land rights for women can provide women with more economic independence and a greater role in political decision making as well as reduce incidents of violence against women, in particular if combined with broader reforms that aim to change social norms, foster women's voice and increase support for families.



Table 5.1 Policy recommendations for reducing inequalities (continued)

- Universal social policies
- Fiscal policies
- Labour market and employment policies
- Business and market regulation
- Socially sustainable environmental policies
- Urban policies
- Gender equality policies
- Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies
- Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action
- Democratic governance and access to rights
- Global governance reforms and global redistribution

● **Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies**

To ensure sustainable and just food systems in the face of globalization will require implementing protections for smallholder and Indigenous farmers, incentivizing sustainable farming practices, market regulations to ensure food remains affordable and accessible for all, heightened labour regulations for workers safety and fair treatment, stricter environmental regulations, implementation of fair trade policies and incentives, and protections for local communities facing externalities of the agricultural industry such as displacement, pollution and other environmental impacts. Protection against land grabs and privatization/commercialization of land, in particular of communal land, land reforms that lead to more equal land distribution or restitution of land rights (to communities or Indigenous peoples) and policies supporting small farmers' seed and food sovereignty will also have positive impacts on food systems, nutrition, eco-systems and livelihoods. There is also a need to generate awareness around sustainable food choices and shift consumption and dietary preferences to locally grown and less resource-intensive food.

● **Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action**

Policies that address horizontal inequalities associated with race, ethnicity, resident status, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, disability or age are necessary complements to universal rights and entitlements, as they have the capacity to overcome stratification within universalism. Universal approaches are a necessary condition to garner broad-based political support, sustainable financing and solidarity across the population, while specific policies such as affirmative action, quotas, legal reforms, awareness raising and training address discrimination and disadvantage related to group-status. Ethnic, racial and religious minority groups should enjoy protections of their cultural, religious and language rights and be represented in political and cultural life, promoting social cohesion and inclusion and the enrichment of societies.

● **Democratic governance and access to rights**

Policies that strengthen democratic governance and access to rights, and that empower all members of society, including migrants regardless of status, children and youth, or other groups which are not fully exercising citizenship rights, are essential for inclusive and equitable societies.

→ fair institutions

Institutions that promote equality and equity should be transparent, inclusive and accountable to the public; equipped with enough resources to fulfil their mandate, for example delivering high-quality services to the population, and guaranteeing decent work conditions and continuous learning for their staff; adequately designed and governed to avoid reproduction of inequalities in implementation processes, ensuring that interactions between bureaucrats and beneficiaries are fair and empowering; grounded in common principles and values such as human rights, democracy and sustainable development; shielded from undue political interference from political leadership, private interests or the corporate sector, while establishing good relationships and communication channels; and exemplary in their use of internal equality and empowerment policies regarding gender, minorities, age, work status, wage differentials and worker participation.



Table 5.1 Policy recommendations for reducing inequalities (continued)

- Universal social policies
- Fiscal policies
- Labour market and employment policies
- Business and market regulation
- Socially sustainable environmental policies
- Urban policies
- Gender equality policies
- Food systems sovereignty and nutrition policies
- Anti-discrimination policies and affirmative action
- Democratic governance and access to rights
- Global governance reforms and global redistribution

● **Global governance reforms and global redistribution**

Reforms in global governance are needed to address inequalities between countries, taking into account the specific situation of each country and distributing costs and benefits in a fair way. Reducing power asymmetries between countries requires a strengthened multilateral system that is empowered and equipped to act on behalf of the global commons, promote the values of the United Nations and support the national-level delivery of commitments such as the SDGs. Aid policies should be clearly aligned with strategies of recipient governments instead of promoting global policy blueprints or interests of donor countries. Overcoming siloes in the work of multilateral or bilateral actors, for example by applying nexus approaches such as the humanitarian-development-peace approach, is important to improve policy coherence and link short-term with long-term policies.

→ policies to address power asymmetries

Increasing the spaces for participation of civil society and strengthening their influence relative to private actors is essential to ensure global decisions are made for the benefit of the many, not the few. Similarly, the voice of global South governments must be increased relative to the North in global policy forums and their policy space at national level be increased. This can be achieved by avoiding policy conditionality, promoting debt relief, and changing global rules that protect leading global companies, often headquartered in the global North, facilitating market concentration and entry barriers.

→ strengthened rules

Reinvigorating a rules-based international order promises to curb inequalities, increase stability and open policy space for sustainable development. Reforms of the global trade, finance and investment regimes are needed to rein in financialized hyperglobalization, promote global public goods (for example access to vaccines, health and climate-friendly technology), improve access of developing countries to finance, technology and knowledge, and protect human rights and the environment. Transnational business activities need to comply with international human rights law and environmental standards, while migration governance requires binding commitments to protect migrants' rights and facilitate international mobility. International rules and regulations need to be monitored at global and national levels, with concrete accountability mechanisms and enforcement of rules.

5.1 Where there's not a will

In recent decades, inequality and crises have increased and compounded to create a situation that can seem insurmountable. However, as this chapter has laid out, there are a great number of possibilities for charting a new and more sustainable, just and equitable path ahead, from new development paradigms to reimaged governance systems to countless policy reforms that can reduce inequality. However, mobilizing the political will to implement these is another story. Those in power harness their influence to limit possibilities for progressive change. This section will explore ways to place checks on elite power and rein in political inequalities, paving the way for reduced inequality and greater social and environmental justice.

Many have argued for the importance of implementing reforms in electoral systems, in particular around campaign financing to limit the ability of elites to influence politicians. Further, electoral reforms that address inequalities in representation and voter disenfranchisement are needed to ensure all votes have equal weight.²¹⁸ However, this might not be enough to improve the representation of women and minority groups in elected office, and additional measures such as quotas could be instated.²¹⁹ Data show that quotas for women in office have a direct correlation with progressive change in the areas of women's rights, public health and poverty alleviation,²²⁰ while chapter 4 has argued that these reforms can be improved by simultaneously working toward changing social norms and public attitudes toward gender equality. Getting even deeper to the heart of elite economic dominance, quota systems that ensure a percentage of seats in parliamentary assemblies are set aside for representatives from disadvantaged or minority socioeconomic groups has vast potential to shift power asymmetries and move forward progressive change.²²¹

Another realm of important reforms involves ensuring access to factual information, in particular by reducing elite control of media to guarantee independent and quality information (see Spotlight by Anya Schiffrin). On the flipside, several of the cases explored in this section reveal that elites also have skewed perceptions of inequality and redistribution, while the public is exposed to competing sources of information and misinformation, often unable to correctly assess the personal implications of

The achievement of proposals [to democratize vaccine access] is held back by constraints that are mainly political, reflecting the significant lobbying power that large corporations have with states across the world. But such constraints are binding only if citizens do not apply sufficient counterpressure on their governments. This is necessary not only to ensure the vaccine equity that is essential to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, but also to achieve the international solidarity that is a minimum requirement for humanity to address other existential threats such as that posed by climate change.

– Jayati Ghosh

Professor, University of Massachusetts Amherst

policy proposals.²²² It is therefore important that governments and NGOs invest in communications strategies to address this.²²³

Income and wealth accumulation is the key driver of political inequality, and therefore implementing progressive fiscal policy will go a long way to

reducing it. This includes progressive tax policies (including wealth, excess profit and inheritance tax) and improved tax governance (reducing tax avoidance and evasion), which can result in more equal distributional outcomes and more fiscal space for governments to fund equality-enhancing public expenditure. These need to be combined with reforms of global tax governance and instruments, for example, elimination of tax havens and IFFs, implementation of a global financial transaction tax, transparency reforms to access data, and information on the top tier of the wealth and income distribution (table 5.1).

Business and market regulation is crucial to prevent market concentration and monopolistic or oligopolistic structures, excessive profit accumulation to the detriment of wage shares, labour violations and environmental degradation, as well as inequalities at the firm level, for example, between CEOs' and average workers' earnings, between racial and ethnic groups, or between men and women (table 5.1). To reduce inequalities along GVCs, international binding standards and regulations, especially for transnational corporations and highly unregulated sectors such as the gig economy and Internet firms, are required. Alternative business models such as the SSE that promote shared and democratized ownership structures should be supported and scaled up, and new approaches to assess sustainable business performance be promoted.²²⁴

Essential for bringing these changes about, and for reducing not only political inequalities but inequalities in other dimensions, is support for and protection of democratic CSOs.²²⁵ Alliance building is essential to effectively harness the power of the many to rein in the influence of the few who are working only for their own benefit. As chapter 4 explored, such alliances take a very different form today than they did in the past, adapting and changing in the face of evolving economic systems, shifting identities, new forms of politics, new conceptions of class, a transformed world of work and reimagined notions of family and community. For example, forms of collective resistance are emerging among digital workers, who are making use of social media to organize strikes and protests and establish unions or alliances as well as mobilizing legal mechanisms to lobby for their rights.²²⁶ New forms of collaboration are emerging among marginalized

groups as they apply various strategies to adapt to a rapidly changing environment while stabilizing their livelihoods. For example, small fishers in India have developed innovative strategies to increase their capital base for investments²²⁷ or informal workers in India and Thailand co-produce social services as a way to change their relations with state and market providers.²²⁸ Domestic workers in Paraguay and Uruguay have built networks of different types of actors to mobilize for better wages and working conditions.²²⁹ Alliances between trade unions and other workers' associations have increased minimum wages, improved occupational safety and health, and made advances in other forms of labour legislation through the use of social dialogue mechanisms and the constructive contribution of experts in countries such as Colombia and South Africa.²³⁰ As explored in chapter 2, the age of mass protest has created new social movements and brought about considerable progress in many areas, often leading to meaningful policy change but also prompting large-scale cultural reckonings with previously less discussed social ills such as racism, sexism and extreme wealth concentration. Finally, creating institutional links between civil society, organized interest groups and the political system, for example with political parties or local governments, has been conducive to policy change in the past and is likely to be an effective strategy in the future.²³¹



Alliance building is essential to effectively harness the power of the many to rein in the influence of the few.

6. Shifting Power for a New Eco-social Contract

This report has laid out a new development model for a new eco-social contract, informed by seven principles, which consists of three key pillars—alternative economic approaches that centre environmental and social justice and rebalance state-market-society-nature relations, transformative social policies based on a fair fiscal contract, and reformed and strengthened multilateralism and solidarities—and is enabled by 11 policy platforms for reducing inequalities (see figure 5.2).

The key question is then how to arrive at the political support and financial means to put these suggestions into practice. Recent research has shown that reduction of inequality and exclusion is supported when policies lead to visible results, when policy design and process build long-term solidarity and when policy implementation is credible and not easily reversible.²³² UNRISD research has shown that a combination of progressive leadership inspired by the common good and public interest, and grassroots pressure from below by progressive social movements and CSOs supported by multilateral organizations and frameworks, can go a long way toward more sustainable and inclusive development approaches.²³³ Learning from successful past experiences in fighting inequality, including which policies and political strategies have worked, provides lessons for future struggles;²³⁴ while key pillars of equality-enhancing strategies are public services, taxation and workers' rights (as measured in the Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index),²³⁵ transformative change will not happen without strong pressure from below and redistribution of power. In the words of Ben Phillips (2020:85), “reversing rising inequality is not just about changing the rules but about changing who gets to make the rules.” According to Phillips, overcoming deference and defying authority when necessary, building power together through collective organizing and broad-based coalitions, and creating a new story to shift attitudes and norms are essential elements in this endeavour. In a world where economic wealth and power are more and more concentrated, democracies are under threat and global challenges are mounting, determined, smart and coordinated action is needed more than ever before.

Ordinary people should be front and centre in developing green climate policies. People have a range of resources and creative potential to influence the process: as voters, as wealth owners, as consumers, as citizens and as holders of knowledge.

– Kumi Naidoo

*Advisor, Community Arts Network (CAN)
and Green Economy Coalition*

People around the world are demanding new social contracts to heal a divided world.²³⁶ Preceding chapters in this report aimed to improve understanding about the interconnectedness between specific policy choices, multiple crises and intersecting inequalities and the vicious circles created by them. They have shed light on the crises and challenges of current times and identified the long-term trends that shape our opportunity and decision space, from demographic and technological change to shifting global power structures (chapters 1 and 2). They have unpacked how income and wealth inequalities intersect with group characteristics such as gender or race, creating a hierarchical system sustained by dominant groups and elite power (chapter 3). This system works to the detriment of disadvantaged and vulnerable persons and the natural environment and is distorting states and markets. It has resulted in unsustainable production and consumption patterns and triggered a crisis of social and environmental reproduction which undermines future resilience, sustainability and social cohesion.

Figure 5.2 A new development model for social, economic and environmental justice


7 Principles for building a new eco-social contract



3 Pillars of a new development model that promotes justice, equality, sustainability and resilience



11 Policy platforms for reducing inequality



Future strategies and reform proposals need to be grounded in rigorous analysis, pluralistic knowledge and evidence, learning from past experiences and crafting solutions that are appropriate and feasible for specific contexts and which can endure over time. This report aims to contribute to this process, while not pretending to have all the answers. Rather, it aims to create openings for alternative interpretations of current problems and new approaches to overcome them.

Despite a challenging context, solutions exist, many of which have proven their effectiveness in real-world contexts, as demonstrated in this report. Power asymmetries and inequalities are daunting, but there are also countless examples of ways those at the bottom have successfully pushed back and shifted power away from the top. However, policies and strategies that have worked in one country might not be applicable or transferable to different contexts, or they may need to be adapted to national conditions. Importantly, instead of applying blueprints, we have to find and test alternative solutions by tapping into the creativity, imagination and skills of experts, entrepreneurs, political leaders, citizens and holders of traditional knowledge and wisdom. These new policies and institutional reforms need to reflect the values and goals agreed upon in new eco-social contracts, supported by an expanding community of ideas and actors that transcends silos and is collectively committed to a vision for the future grounded in the universal principles of justice, equality and sustainability.



Instead of applying blueprints, we have to find and test alternative solutions by tapping into the creativity, imagination and skills of experts, entrepreneurs, political leaders, citizens and holders of traditional knowledge and wisdom.

Endnotes

- ¹ Gabor 2021.
- ² UNCTAD 2021.
- ³ UNRISD 2016; Utting 2015; Yi 2017.
- ⁴ Standing 2019; Unmüßig et al. 2012.
- ⁵ Ulriksen and Plagerson 2014.
- ⁶ UNRISD 2016.
- ⁷ Pires 2022.
- ⁸ UNRISD 2016.
- ⁹ UN 2022a.
- ¹⁰ Elson 2010; Fukuda-Parr et al. 2013; Heintz et al. 2021.
- ¹¹ Stewart 2020.
- ¹² Barca 2020.
- ¹³ UNCTAD 2017, 2019.
- ¹⁴ Gerschenkron 1962; Hujo and Yi 2016.
- ¹⁵ UNCTAD 2019.
- ¹⁶ Jackson 2009.
- ¹⁷ Cox 2020; Gough 2017; Hickel and Kallis 2019.
- ¹⁸ Banerjee and Sood 2012; Bumpus 2011; Cook et al. 2012; UNRISD 2016; Winer et al. 2012.
- ¹⁹ De Torres 2021.
- ²⁰ Latour and Schultz 2018.
- ²¹ Unmüßig et al. 2012.
- ²² Mazzucato 2013.
- ²³ McAfee 2012.
- ²⁴ UNRISD 2016.
- ²⁵ Pettifor 2019.
- ²⁶ The Green Economy Coalition (GEC), an alliance of trade unions, businesses, NGOs, UN agencies and citizen's groups, has set out to make green economy approaches more transformative and rooted in local experiences. They call for new measuring and governing for nature and well-being, a reformed financial system serving the needs of society, a low-carbon revolution in all economic sectors, tackling inequality and valuing nature (GEC n.d.).
- ²⁷ Gough 2021; Pettifor 2019.
- ²⁸ Cox 2020.
- ²⁹ Raworth 2017.
- ³⁰ Gabor 2021.
- ³¹ Gallagher and Kozul-Wright 2019; Kozul-Wright and Gallagher 2019.
- ³² Xiaobei et al. 2022.
- ³³ Haberl et al. 2020.
- ³⁴ Asara et al. 2015; Hickel 2020; Kallis 2011; Kallis et al. 2018; van Griethuysen 2009, 2012. For a critique, see Pollin (2018).
- ³⁵ Mastini et al. 2021:3. See also Kallis et al. (2018).
- ³⁶ Schneider et al. 2010.
- ³⁷ Hickel et al. 2021; Wiedmann et al. 2020.
- ³⁸ Heffernan et al. 2021.
- ³⁹ Palladino and Gunn-Wright 2021.
- ⁴⁰ Muchhala 2021.
- ⁴¹ Stiglitz et al. 2009.

42 Dalziel and Cameron 2021; Feigl 2017.
 43 Monkelbaan 2021; Laurent 2021.
 44 CESR and Christian Aid 2020; Ampofo-Anti and Saba 2022.
 45 Stevis et al. 2021; UNRISD 2016, 2021a.
 46 JTRC 2019.
 47 Krause et al. 2022; Clarke and Lipsig-Mummé 2020.
 48 Galgóczi 2014; Hospers 2004; JTRC 2019.
 49 Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft 2020.
 50 Arbeitsagentur 2021; Regionalstatistik Ruhr 2021
 51 Cock 2018; van Niekerk 2020.
 52 Cloete 2018.
 53 Akuno 2020.
 54 Akuno 2020:98–99.
 55 Heffernan et al. 2021.
 56 Caldentey 2008:28.
 57 UNCTAD 2021.
 58 Mkandawire 2001, 2012; Bresser-Pereira 2019.
 59 UNCTAD 2021.
 60 UNCTAD 2019.
 61 Mazzucato 2013.
 62 Mazzucato 2021.
 63 Chang and Zach 2018; Evans 1995; Haggard 2018;
 64 Mkandawire 2001.
 65 Nem Singh and Salah Ovadia 2018.
 66 Chang and Zach 2018.
 67 UNRISD and others have conducted extensive
 research on this topic, see for example Mkandawire
 (2001), Kwon (2005), Riesco (2007), Yi and
 Mkandawire (2014) and Tapscott et al. (2018).
 68 Chang 2003; Ocampo 2020.
 69 Akyüz 2012.
 70 Chang and Zach 2018; Chang et al. 2016; Mazzucato
 2021; Mazzucato and Li 2020; Rodrik 2016; UNRISD
 2010.
 71 Antonopoulos et al. 2010.
 72 ECLAC 2020; UNDP 2020; UNRISD 2016.
 73 This was not the case in 2008, when demand shocks
 prevailed and inflation was low. See Roubini (2022).
 74 Roubini 2022.
 75 Georgieva 2022.
 76 UNCTAD 2015; EURODAD 2019.
 77 Gough 2021.
 78 O’Callaghan and Murdock 2021; UN Women and
 UNDP 2022.
 79 ECA 2016; Ocampo 2020; UNIDO 2021.
 80 Ocampo 2020.
 81 Chang and Zach 2018; Rodrik 2014.
 82 See UNCTAD (2021) for a discussion of recent trends
 related to the proposed Carbon Border Adjustment
 Mechanism (CBAM) and other measures with
 potentially negative impacts on developing countries.

83 Chang and Zach 2018.
 84 Chang and Zach 2018; UNIDO 2021.
 85 Evans 1995.
 86 Rodrik 2014.
 87 Altenburg and Assmann 2017.
 88 Altenburg and Assmann 2017.
 89 TNI and TUED 2021.
 90 Polanyi 1944.
 91 Adaman et al. 2003.
 92 Utting forthcoming.
 93 Giagnocavo forthcoming.
 94 Yi et al. forthcoming.
 95 Borzaga et al. 2017, 2020; Defourny et al. 2019.
 96 This number does not include presidential decrees or
 laws related to particular forms of SSEOs, such as
 social enterprises or cooperatives. Broadly focused
 SSE laws have been adopted in Honduras, Colombia,
 Spain, Greece, Ecuador, Mexico, Portugal, Bolivia,
 France, Romania, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Cameroon,
 Uruguay, Tunisia and Senegal. It should also be noted
 that the laws in question, while generally referring
 to similar principles, objectives and actors, may use
 different terminology such as “social,” “solidarity,”
 “popular,” “plural,” “associative” and “community”
 economy.
 97 Diop and Diop Samb 2021; Fonteneau 2015;
 Fonteneau and Pollet 2019.
 98 See, respectively, Laratta and Nakagawa (2019), Yoon
 and Lee (2020), Ciepielewska-Kowalik et al. (2015),
 Neamtan (2019) and Rossel (2015).
 99 On the issue of “party” versus “state” policy, see
 Coraggio (2015).
 100 Coterio 2019; Poirier et al. 2018; Utting 2017.
 101 This was the case under the Lula and Rousseff
 administrations that governed from 2003 to 2016,
 after which the National Secretariat of Solidarity
 Economy was dissolved (Coterio 2019; Morais and
 Bacic 2020).
 102 Mendell and Alain 2015.
 103 Such organizations include the Chantier de l’économie
 sociale and the Quebec Council for Cooperation and
 Mutuality in Quebec (Mendell et al. 2020) and the
 Korean Social Economy Network in the Republic of
 Korea (KoSEA 2019).
 104 Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 2020; Morais
 and Bacic 2020.
 105 Borzaga et al. 2020; Chaves-Avila and Gallego-Bono
 2020; Jenkins et al. 2021; Mendell et al. 2020.
 106 See KoSEA 2019.
 107 UNRISD 2016.
 108 Borzaga et al. 2020; Coterio 2019; Fonteneau and
 Pollet 2019; ILO 2022; Jenkins et al. 2021; Utting
 2017.

- Coraggio 2021; Serrano et al. 2019; Utting 2016.
- This may include, for example, financial and fiscal support, public procurement and laws and regulations governing economic organizations which make it far easier to establish a private company than a cooperative.
- Representing SSE actors and interests, intermediary SSE bodies mediate between SSE actors and government. They advocate SSE values, educate policy makers on SSE, help SSEOs navigate the policy environment and negotiate on their behalf (Jenkins et al. 2021). Such intermediary bodies are often associations or federations representing particular sectors such as cooperatives and informal economy workers, for example, the Japanese Consumers' Cooperative Union and Homenet Philippines, respectively. They may also constitute broad coalitions or networks of SSE and civil society actors such as the Chantier de l'économie sociale in Quebec, the Cámara Nacional de Economía Social Solidaria in Costa Rica and the Foro Brasileño de Economía Solidaria (FBES).
- Saba and Koehler 2022.
- UNTFSSSE 2014.
- UN DESA 2020.
- Costella et al. 2021.
- Hujo 2014; Hujo and Carter 2019; Hujo and Cook 2012.
- Koehler and Namala 2020.
- Abramo et al. 2019; ILO 2018a.
- UN Women 2021.
- Francis and Valodia 2021.
- Esquivel and Kaufmann 2017.
- UNRISD 2016.
- Mkandawire 2004; UNRISD 2010, 2016.
- Hujo 2021a; Hujo et al. 2017.
- Pires 2022; Rohregger et al. 2021; UNRISD 2016.
- ILO 2021a; UN 2020.
- Gentilini et al. 2021.
- UNRISD 2016.
- Ladd and Bortolotti 2020; UN DESA 2020.
- Lindebjerg et al. 2015.
- Gough 2021.
- Korpi and Palme 1998.
- Verbist et al. 2012.
- Verbist et al. 2012.
- Plagerson 2021; UN DESA 2020.
- Gough 2021.
- Pichler et al. 2019.
- Rivenbark and Ichou 2020.
- Tibandebage et al. 2013.
- Hujo and Carter 2019.
- UN DESA 2020.
- UNRISD 2020b.
- Hujo and Carter 2019. See also UNESCO (2021) which calls for a new social contract for education that guarantees the right to quality education for all as a means to repair historical injustices and shape sustainable futures.
- Alfers (2022) presents an example of informal women workers' agency in co-producing social services as a political strategy, laying the groundwork for a new social contract inclusive of informal workers.
- Azuara et al. 2019.
- UNRISD 2016.
- ILO 2008.
- UNRISD 2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c.
- Esquivel and Kaufmann 2017; UNRISD 2016.
- Hujo and Carter 2019.
- Meagher 2013; Samson 2015.
- Mitlin 2008. See also Alfers (2022) on health services and Samson (2015) on waste management.
- ILO 2018b.
- ILO 2018b.
- ILO 2021^a; UN 2021a.
- Borzaga et al. 2017; UNTFSSSE 2014.
- UN Women 2021.
- Staab 2021.
- Batthyány 2020; ECLAC 2021.
- Hujo and McClanahan 2008; UNRISD 2010, 2016.
- Cobham 2022; Hujo 2020; UN 2022b; UNRISD 2016.
- Besley 2020; Cloutier 2021.
- Tax Justice Network 2021; Hujo and Bangura 2020.
- UNCTAD 2019.
- Global Alliance for Tax Justice et al. 2021.
- Zucman 2015.
- European Commission 2021b; OECD 2021.
- UNCTAD 2019.
- Cobham 2021.
- Hujo 2020; UNRISD 2021b.
- UNCTAD 2019.
- Hujo and Bangura 2020; Mkandawire 2020.
- OECD 2020.
- UNRISD 2021b.
- Hujo 2012, 2020; UNRISD 2016.
- Cobham 2021.
- UN 2022.
- OECD 2020.
- Lehmann et al. 2021.
- Lustig 2018.
- UNRISD 2016.
- UNDP 2022.
- Gallagher and Kozul-Wright 2019; Koehler 2015.
- Gallagher and Kozul-Wright 2019.
- UN 2021b.

186 Women's Major Group 2022; Reyes 2021.
187 CESR and Christian Aid 2020; Gallagher and Kozul-
Wright 2019; UNCTAD 2018.
188 Gallagher and Kozul-Wright 2019:25.
189 UNCTAD 2018.
190 Kesselring et al. 2019.
191 Behrendt et al. 2019.
192 European Parliament 2018.
193 European Parliament 2018; Seitz 2022.
194 See, for example, Gallagher and Kozul-Wright (2019).
195 Hujo 2019; Wise 2018; Bastia et al. 2022.
196 Hujo 2019.
197 UN 2018a; UN 2018b.
198 Mkandawire 2001, 2015.
199 Mkandawire 2001.
200 In the case of the World Health Organization (WHO),
for example, only 20 percent of its funding derives
from member states contributions (WHO n.d.). Many
UN agencies are entirely funded through voluntary
contributions or project funds, for example research
and training institute such as the UN Institute for
Training and Research (UNITAR), UNRISD, or the World
Food Programme (WFP).
201 Morena 2022.
202 De Schutter 2021; De Schutter and Sepulveda 2012.
203 ILO 2021b.
204 UN 2021b.
205 Jolly 2009.
206 Koehler 2015.
207 Bissio (2014), cited in Koehler (2015:747).
208 Koehler 2015.
209 Hennebry et al. 2019.
210 Piper and Rother 2020.
211 GPF et al. 2021.
212 Zumach 2015; Women's Major Group 2022.
213 Koehler 2015.
214 Constantinou 2022.
215 Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000.
216 CESR and Christian Aid 2020.
217 See also UNRISD (2019).
218 Cagé 2020; Dahl 2006.
219 Bush 2011.
220 Clayton 2021; Hughes et al. 2017; Paxton et al. 2020;
Wängnerud 2009.
221 Cagé 2020.
222 Parmigiani 2022.
223 Atria et al. 2021; Krozer 2020.
224 Utting and O'Neill 2020.
225 Stewart 2011.
226 Meagher 2022.
227 Rao and Manimohan 2020.
228 Alfes 2022.
229 Rojas Scheffer 2022.

230 Torres-Tovar 2019; Francis and Valodia 2021.
231 UNRISD 2010, 2016.
232 Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies
2021.
233 UNRISD 2016, 2010.
234 DFI and Oxfam 2020; Phillips 2020.
235 DFI and Oxfam 2020.
236 Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies
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